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ABSTRACT
The thesis aims to develop an account of the ecological 
self and its relationship to nature which takes account 
both of a feminist perspective and of the critique advanced 
by recent environmental philosophy, and to understand the 
role of gender and gendered nature/culture dualism in the 
development of a human identity alienated from nature in 
western culture. I argue that the fact that the dominant 
human identity has been masculinised has been a major
aspect of the problem. A major resulting theme is concern 
with problems in ecofeminism and especially the question of 
how far an alternative identity can be based on women and 
the affirmation of the feminine.
Chapter One sets ecological feminism in a political 
context, examining its relationships to both feminist and 
green theory. Chapter Two reviews the major literature in 
the area and its critique of western culture , as well as 
examining problems arising from it concerning the history 
of patriarchal culture, the status of the »-body as nature, 
and tension between accounts stressing dualism and those 
stressing difference. Chapter Three problematises both 
liberal feminist (androcentric) and radical feminist 
(gynocentric) positions, and tries to clarify the range of 
options to the androcentric model of human identity, and 
what is defensible in the affirmation of the feminine.
Chapters Four, Five and Six develop a feminist and 
historical perspective on environmental philosophy, arguing 
that dualism —  a notion clarified in Chapter Four with the 
help of gender theory —  has shaped not only our concepts 
of human identity as alien to nature (Chapter Four), but 
also our concept of nature as mechanism (Chapter Five) . 
These chapters examine the historical legacy of 
rationalism, while Chapter Six develops a feminist 
perspective on instrumentalism and on the self. This is 
built on in Chapter Seven, which also critiques from the
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perspective of feminist ethics current trends in 
environmental ethics and deep ecology, arguing that these 
positions have been insufficiently sensitive to the 
c o n tribution of rationalism to the problem and its 
continued influence in their philosophical frameworks. 
Chapter Eight returns to consideration of the major theme 
of earlier chapters in clarifying the affirmation of the 
feminine and options for the reconstruction of gender, and 
presents an account which combines elements of both power 
and difference analyses.
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Chapter One j_ Ecological Femini sm j_ Linking the Movement s
At the same time , by understanding that we are all part 
of the same organic flow of life, we are reminded, with 
a stirring that excites our deepest selves, of who we 
really are. We are part of this earth, and thus the 
world becomes a place of infinite mystery, of delight to 
the senses and theintellect.
Judith Plant Remembering Who We 
Are: The Meaning of Ecofeminism.
If there is one idea that can be said to link together 
all that is said and reported here, this idea is also a 
feeling. It is a grief over the fate of the earth, that 
contains within it a joyful hope that we might reclaim 
this earth. Does this one idea answer all our questions? 
It is not meant to . It is meant to make us ask more 
questions .
Susan Griffin ^
INTRODUCTION j_ GENDER, ECOLOGYr IDENTITY
W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  faces a p r o f o u n d cri s i s  in its 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  to nature, a crisis w h i c h d e m a nd s  m u c h  
rethinking, but especially that we rethink the way in 
which our human identity has been framed in the west as 
outside and independent of the natural world . This thesis 
is about the way forward to a new human identity which 
r e c o g n i s e s  c o n t i n u i t y  and i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  and 
reconceptualises not only the human but also nature itself. 
It is also about the past , about what went wrong with the 
old identity, for the forging of a new identity is not 
independent of how we understand the problems in the old, 
of what it has done to distort our view of ourselves, our 
view of nature , and of the appropriate relations between 
our species and the rest of the earth .
I address especially the role of gender in the problem, and 
the way in w h i c h  p a t r i a r c h a l  culture in its w e s t e r n  
expression, has employed a genderised n a t u r e / c u 1ture 
distinction to construct a human identity which is alien to 
nature. The formation of this human identity in relation
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has taken place in a way w h i c hto nature, I argue, 
parallels in certain crucial respects the formation of 
masculine identity in relation to the feminine, so that 
this human identity can itself be regarded as gendered, as 
masculine. Attempts to reconstruct this identity along new 
lines will be inadequate unless they take account of the
dimension of gender.
This raises the question which forms the second major theme 
I a d d r e s s  —  to what extent and in what sense the
alternative is an identity which is feminine . I discuss
the a t t e m p t s  of m o d e r n  gender theorists, e s p e c i a l l y  
e c o l o g i c a l  f e m i n i s t s ,  to c o n s t r u c t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
identity based on reintegrating what has been neglected,
r e p u d i a t e d  and s u p p r e s s e d  in the f o r m a t i o n  of this 
masculinised human identity and in the masculine domination 
of culture, an identity which is based too upon the 
affirmation of those aspects of both nature and culture 
which have been devalued and excluded as feminine. I try 
to clarify the meaning of this reintegration and
affirmation of the feminine . It has been of particular 
concern to ecological feminism , but it is in tension with 
other aspects of feminism and raises many problems and 
quest ions.
ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM j_ PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS
The story of a land where w o m e n  live at p e a c e  w i t h  
themselves and with the natural world is a recurrent theme 
of feminist utopias. This is a land where there is no 
hierarchy, among humans or between humans and animals, 
where people care for themselves and for nature, where the 
earth and the forest retain their mystery, power, and 
wholeness, where the power of technology and of military 
and economic force does not rule the earth, or at least 
that part of it controlled by women. For usually this 
state is seen as a beleaguered one, surviving against the 
hostile intent of men, who control a world of power and 
i n e q u al ity, of m i l i t a r y  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  m ight and
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screaming poverty, where power is the game and power means 
domination of both nature and people. Feminist vision 
often draws the contrasts starkly —  it is life versus 
death, Gai a  versus Mars, m y s t e r i o u s  for e s t  versus 
technological desert, women versus men.
It is hard to deny the power of that vision, or its 
ability to harness the hope and the sorrow the present 
world holds for those who can bear to confront its current 
course. We do live in a world often distressingly like the 
f e m i n i s t  d y s t o p i a s ,  where t e c h n o l o g i c a l  m a s t e r y  
e x t i n g u i s h e s  both n a t u r e  and less t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  
"rational” cultures , where we face the imminent prospect 
of loss of the worlds forests along with the bulk of its 
species diversity and human cultural diversity, where 
already many cultures have had the whole basis of ancient 
survival patterns destroyed by a species of development 
and "progress" which produces inequality as inexorably as 
it produces pollution and waste, and where the dominance of 
"rational" man threatens ultimately to produce the most 
irrational of results , the extinction of our species along 
with many others. Ecological feminism tells us that it is 
no accident that this world is dominated by men.
If we are women, we have as a group an interest in escaping 
our ancient domination. We women also have an interest, 
which we share with all other living creatures and even 
with men, in a sound and healthy planet, in sound, healthy 
and balanced ecosystems and in a sustainable and satisfying 
way of living on the earth. But according to ecological 
feminism there is more to it than that, and more to the 
connection of the movements than this accidental one , of 
women who happen to be green. Gender is at least a major 
part of the problem, and there is a way of relating to the 
other that is especially associated with women which 
contains the seeds of a different human relationship to the 
earth and perhaps too of human survival on it and with it.
But as it is often stated the ecofeminist vision, so 
sane and so attractive , seems to raise many problems
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and questions. Is ecofeminism giving us a version of the 
story that the goodness of women will save us ? Is it only 
women (and perhaps only certain properly womanly women) who 
can know the mysterious forest, or is that knowledge and 
that love in principle accessible to us all? Do we have to 
renounce the achievements of culture and technology to come 
to inhabit the mysterious forest? Can we affirm women’s 
special qualities without endorsing their traditional role 
and confinement to a "woman’s sphere" ? Can a reign of 
women possibly be the answer to the earth’s destruction and 
to all the other related problems ? Is ecofeminism giving 
us another version of the story that all problems will
cease when the powerless take power ? Is ecofeminism 
inevitably based in gynocentric essentialism ?
I come from a background in both environmental philosophy 
and activism and feminist philosophy and activism, yet my 
initial reaction to the position asserting such a link, 
like that of many people, was one of mistrust. It seemed 
to combine a romantic conception of both women and nature, 
the idea that women have special powers and capacities of 
nurturance , empathy and "closeness to nature", which 
are unshareable by men and which justify their special 
treatment, which of course nearly always turns out to be
inferior treatment. It seemed to be the antithesis of
feminism, giving positive value to the "barefoot and 
pregnant" image of women and validating their exclusion 
from the world of culture and relegation to that of nature, 
a position which is perhaps best represented in modern 
times by the male writer D . H . Lawrence . Or it did seem to 
provide a green version of the "good woman" argument of the 
suffragettes, in which good and moral women, who are 
nurturant, empathic and life-oriented, confront and reclaim 
the w o r l d  from bad men, who are i m m e r s e d  in power, 
hierarchy and a culture of death. Later reading showed me 
the diversity of the position and that, while an element 
of this is present in some accounts , by no means all
accounts conform to this romantic picture, nor is it a 
necessary part of a position which takes seriously the 
claim of non-accidental connection between the movements.
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One essential feature of all ecofeminist positions is 
that they give positive value to a connection of women 
with nature which was previously, in the west, given 
negative cultural value and which was the main ground of 
their devaluation and oppression. They are involved in a 
great cultural revaluation of the status of women, the 
feminine and the natural, a r e v a l u a t i o n  which must 
recognise the way in which their historical connection in 
western culture has influenced the construction of feminine 
identity, and as I shall try to show, of both masculine and 
human identity . Beyond that there is a great deal of 
diversity ; ecofeminists differ on how and even whether 
women are connected to nature , on whether such connection 
is in principle shareable by men , on how to treat the 
exclusion of women from culture, and on how the revaluing 
of the connection with nature connects with the revaluing 
of traditional feminine characteristics generally, to 
mention a few areas. They differ too on the implications of 
ecofeminism for the connected movements, feminism and the 
environment movement, and their intellectual counterparts, 
the critiques of a n d r o c e n t r i s m  and a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m  
respectively. There is great variation in ecofeminist 
literature on all these areas.
Like any other diverse position , ecological feminism is 
amenable to careful and less careful statements , and some 
versions of e c o f e m i n i s m  do provide a version of the 
argument that it is the goodness of women which will save 
us. This is an argument, with its Christian overtones 
of fall and feminine redemption, which appeared in 
Victorian times as the view that women’s moral goodness, 
their purity, patience , self-sacrifice , spirituality and 
maternal instinct , either meant that they would redeem 
fallen political life (if given the vote), or, on the 
alternative version, meant that they were too good for 
fallen political life and so shouldn’t have the vote. The 
first version ignores the way in which these Stirling 
qualities are formed by powerlessness, and will fail to 
survive translation to a context of power ; the second
recognises this but insists that in order to maintain these 
quali t i e s  for the benefit of men women must remain 
powerless.
The popular contemporary green version attributes to women 
a range of different but related virtues, those of empathy, 
nurturance, cooperativeness and connectedness to others and 
to nature, and usually finds the basis for these also in 
women’s reproductive capacity. It replaces the "angel in 
the house" version of women by the "angel in the ecosystem" 
version. The myth of the angel is , like the the Victorian 
version, of dubious value for women; unlike the more usual 
misogynist accounts western culture provides of women it 
recognises strengths in women’s way of being, but it does 
so in an unsatisfactory and unrealistic way, and again 
fails to recognise the dynamic of power.
Simplistic versions of this story usually attribute these 
qualities to women simply and universally, but it is only 
plausible to do so if one practices a denial of the reality 
of women’s lives, and not least a denial of the divisions 
between women themselves, both within the women’s movement 
and in the wider society. Not all women are empathic, 
nurturant and cooperative, and many of these virtues have 
been real but restricted to a small circle of close others. 
Women do not necessarily treat other women as sisters 
or the earth as a mother ; women are capable of 
conflict, of d o m i n a t i o n  and even, in the right 
circumstances, of violence. Western women may not have 
been in the forefront of the attack on nature, driving the 
bulldozers and operating the chainsaws, but many of them 
have been support troops or have been participants, often 
unwitting but still enthusiastic, in a modern consumer 
culture of which they are the main symbols, and which 
assaults nature in a myriad direct and indirect ways daily. 
And of course women have also played a ma jor role , largely 
unacknowledged in a male-led and male dominated environment 
movement, in resisting and organizing against the assault 
on nature. The invisible, alternative background economy 
which has for so long framed, their identity is not so
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strongly based on disregard for the earth as the 
official male-centred and male-controlled official economy 
of the developed world . As we shall see, the western 
mapping of a h i e r a r c h i c a l  gender relation onto the 
nature/culture distinction is a major culprit in the 
destruction of the biosphere , but this does not translate 
into a simple "men bad, women good" formula , and if we 
think that the fact of being female guarantees that we are 
automatically provided with an ecological consciousness and 
can do no wrong to nature or to one another, we are going 
to be badly disappointed , and we are going to miss out on 
discerning and developing the real strengths that women 
and feminine identity have to offer. It is difficult to 
steer a course between unrealistically idealising women and 
re c o g n i s i n g  their real and potential strengths —  
especially difficult because of the millenia of denigration 
and inf er ior isat ion of both women and the qualities they 
have or have been taken to have —  but we must try to steer 
that course .
ECOFEMINISM AND FEMINISM
The "angel in the ecosystem" is a simplistic version of the 
affirmation of feminine qualities, both individual and 
cultural, which has been such a marked feature of this 
century’s second wave of feminism, especially that which 
has stressed difference. The link is not nearly as simple 
as the "angel" version of women’s character takes it to be 
—  in fact the "angel" argument involves a classic 
sex/gender confusion, since to say that there are 
connections for instance, between androcentrism and 
an t hr opoc en t r ism is no t to say anything at all about women 
in general being "close to nature". Nevertheless, there is 
an important point in the linkage of women to many of 
these qualities which our culture needs now to affirm, 
and a vitally important critique in the addition of the 
critical dimension of gender to the story of human, and 
especially western, relations to nature. Clarifying and
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refining what it is that is liberatory and defensible 
about this affirmation of the feminine , and clarifying 
just how these qualities are connected to women, has been 
the major task of the search for a feminist identity and 
for feminist theory and scholarship in the last fifteen 
years, and this task continues to challenge our political 
and philosophical understandings and frontiers.
The need to clarify and refine the statement and meaning of 
this affirmation for the case of ecofeminism is one of the 
major themes explored here, and ecof eminist analysis of 
these p r o blems may help in turn to advance our 
understanding of some of these questions, which have been 
difficult and often divisive for feminist theory. And as 
Karen Warren has pointed out , ecological feminism may help 
to resolve some of these divisions in feminist theory. As 
well as the d i f f e r e n c e  b e t ween power and difference 
analyses, some of the main varieties of feminism have 
inherited from their father theories, frameworks assuming 
the inferiority of the sphere of nature, or imposing a 
sharp nature/culture division, and these must be challenged 
and transcended in ecofeminism’s development of a new phase 
of feminist theory. Much ecofeminism to date has drawn 
mainly on radical feminism for its inspiration , and tended 
to inherit much of its outlook and sometimes its problems, 
for example assumptions tending to gynocentric essentialism 
and the attempt by some forms of radical feminism to take 
over and reduce other critiques rather than to develop 
connections with them . This results at the extreme in
the view that w o m a n ’s oppression is the one basic and 
fundamental kind of oppression in terms of which all others 
are to be explained, and that pat r i a r c h y  is the one 
fundamental explanation for all evils, including that of 
the destruction of nature, that is , in reductionist and 
totalising approaches. But there is nothing inevitable 
about these reductionist approaches, which in ray view 
place an excessive explanatory burden on the category of 
gender, and suffer from the usual problems of reductionist 
and totalising positions.
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Ecofeminism as it stands in terras of contemporary feminist 
theory seems to rest on the horns of a dilemma framed by 
the d i v i s i o n  in feminist theory between power and 
difference analyses. If it stresses women’s power as an 
antidote to their their powerlessness in their traditional 
role, and the creation of a new identity in terms of 
culture, it may be feminist but it is not ecological, for 
its claim to be so rested on women’s identity as part of 
the excluded sphere of nature. But if it stresses women's
dif f erence and identity based on kinship with nature in
such a way as to accept exc 1usion from power and the
sphe r e of culture, it may b e ecological but it is not
f eminis t . For ecof eminism to work it must f ind a way to
resolve this dilemma, to be both liberatory for women and 
for the sphere conceived of as nature with which women have 
been i d e n t i f i e d  , and hence to point the way to a 
resolution of the division between those forms of feminism 
which analyse women’s situation in terms of power and those 
which analyse it in terms of difference. I have tried to 
make use of insights and analysis from both areas .
In western thought systems, women have been seen as nature, 
and women, the feminine and the natural have been, with few 
exceptions, valued negatively . Ecofeminism addresses a 
major problem this gives rise to for contemporary western 
women in throwing off their ancient oppression as "nature” . 
They can try to join men as equals in the realm of culture, 
spirit, and domination of the natural order, breaking the 
ancient connection and accepting the inferiorising and 
distance from nature which is part of this model. Or they 
can accept their old identity as "close to nature", 
e m bracing this now with pride. The first of these 
solutions ignores the devaluation of nature , and is 
unacceptable in terms of the new critique of the western 
model of human relations to nature. The second ignores the 
oppressiveness to women of an identity thus constructed by 
exclusion from what has been valued in human culture. 
While the parameters of the problem are set in traditional 
terms, each solution is unacceptable to one movement or 
the other .
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This problem, which is central for ecofeminism, is a major 
theme considered in this thesis. One of the main claims 
this thesis will pursue is that this dilemma can only be 
resolved satisfactorily by challenging the oppositional 
construction of the nature/culture distinction. We must
insist that women are as fully human and as fully part of 
human culture as men, but that the model of the human and 
of what is v a l uable in human culture c o n s t ru c te d in 
opposition to nature and- the feminine must go. The problem 
is stated here in terms of a dilemma for w o m e n ’s 
contemporary identity , but it is not just a problem for 
women, for both women and men need to find a way of being 
in the world which does not depend on the exploitation, 
exclusion and devaluation of the sphere of the feminine 
and of nature, both within and without the human self. And 
it seems that only ecofeminism is addressing this problem 
fully, environmental theorists mostly being content to 
give a positive value to nature and add this on to existing 
structures (as in the case of wilderness and the ethics of 
wilderness) without addressing the changes that need to be 
made as a result to oppositionally-construeted concepts 
of human culture, identity and self .
The careful and theoretically sophisticated working out of 
these new positions also presents a political dilemma 
familiar from past radical movements. If too much 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  mach i ne r y is r eq uired , the resulting 
analysis will be accessible only to very few, and those few 
not much concerned with real change. And inaccessiblity 
carries real -political dangers of elitism and 
ineffectiveness. But if no such careful analysis is made 
and the position remains so unconvincing as to be readily 
—  too readily —  rejected , it will also eventually be 
politically ineffective. Either way the chance to make a 
important set of connections is lost, and we d o n ’t do 
justice to the position and lose the insights it has to 
offer. I do not know the solution to this problem which 
has beset so many past movements and their intellectual 
critiques, and which is becoming a serious problem for the
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women’s movement. It is a problem tied to the problematic, 
which is taken up in some detail in what follows, of 
dualism and the dominance of the rational. I think that 
part of the answer lies in countering the dominant and 
hierarchical role which tends to be accorded theoretical 
activity, rather than ceasing or resisting theoretical 
development, and in working at and integrating theoretical 
analysis in a variety of levels and as one part of a 
variety of ways of working for political and cultural 
goals. So the theory should be developed but not given 
exclusive or highest priority, and it should be not 
opposed to but integrated with other activities and wider 
goals.
Despite this, c l a r i f i c a t i o n  and d e v e l o p m e n t  of an 
ecofeminist position in a way that is both strategically 
useful (for the social m o vements involved) and 
theoretically rigorous is one of the central intel1ec tual 
endeavours of our time. Ecofeminism is essentially a 
response to a set of key problems thrown up by the movement 
of the two great social currents of the later part of this 
century —  feminism and the environment movement, and 
addresses a number of shared problems. There is the shared 
problem of how (and whether) to reconcile these movements 
and their associated critiques (of anthropocentrism and 
androcentrism), which have many areas of conflict as well 
as some common ground. There is also the problem of how 
to reintegrate the great western division of nature and 
culture, and of how to give a positive value to what has 
been traditionally devalued and excluded as nature without 
simply r e v e r s i n g  values and rejecting the sphere of 
culture. These are central problems for the theories, 
strategies and alliances of both movements.
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LINKING THE MOVEMENTS j_ CRITIQUE NETWORKING
The draw i n g  of links between the w o m e n ’s and green 
movements is a difficult but essential task of networking 
at both the theoretical, cultural and political levels . It 
is currently fashionable to view different social movements 
such as feminism, the environment movement, anarchism, 
socia l i s m  etc. , and their a s s o c i a t e d  critiques as 
presenting "incommensurable discourses". This has the 
virtue of avoiding the reductions and takeover bids so 
familiar from the Marxist past, but it also dodges the 
crucial question of how these movements and critiques 
connect.
Back in the days when M a r xism was king of radical 
discourses, other discourses, such as those of the women’s 
movement and the environment movement, were reduced to 
subject status, to be subsumed, incorporated into the 
kingdom of the sovereign. Their insights and problems were 
r e c o g n i s e d  just to the extent that they could be so 
absorbed. When a rebellion finally arose, the newly-freed 
subject discourses agreed to avoid competing for power 
between themselves , to respect one another’s territory and 
differences, by taking the noble status of "incommensurable 
discourses", each to remain in its own fiefdom. This 
meant that they were different and incomparable, so there 
could be no question of one taking over and subsuming the 
others. But it also meant that they never really 
encountered one another, that questions could not be asked 
about how they were related, that they could not 
cooperate or combine at the level of theory, and that they 
were therefore isolated and so much the weaker.
One can hope that it is possible to respect the differences 
which different struggles and forms of oppression give rise 
to, to recognise their irreducibi1ity, without paying 
this kind of price. As with individuals, so with movements, 
connection is risky but nevertheless essential for many
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reasons. First, some of us find ourselves oppressed in 
different but connected ways, and hope for a world in 
which sexism, the destruction of nature, and racism, for 
example, do not exist. It would be nice to know that 
their underlying philosophies or theories are compatible, 
which is often not the case at present. To seek 
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  is not to require uniformity, or the 
absorption of each critique and movement into a single 
global theory or movement. Different forms of domination 
must lead to different views of the world, different 
priorities and struggles. But it may still be essential to 
know whether environmentalism, for instance, is being built 
on assumptions and practices which feminism makes a point 
of rejecting. Some conflicts may be impossible to avoid, 
others may point to weaknesses, incompleteness or problem 
areas within one or both positions.
There is an enormous amount to be gained from exploring
connections , at all levels , and this is an inherently 
strengthening process for movements. For ’example, seeing 
how women are treated as "nature” and as body helps explain 
so many features of their historical oppression, from their 
confinement to a reproductive role to their categorisation 
as emotional and the treatment of their contribution as a 
mere background to what is valuable in human life (culture 
and rationality) . It also explains many features of both 
the current and historical treatment of nature, as an 
object upon which to demonstrate control and prove 
masculinity, as a mere instrument to human ends, and as 
something to be maximally differentiated from and 
distanced from as inferior. Such links illustrate the way 
in which s t rugg1 es and their associated critiques can be 
distinct and non-reducible , but still essentially and not 
merely accidentally connected. We do not have to choose 
between the reduction of critiques to one another or their 
isolation as "incommensurable", between cannibalism and 
atomism . Awareness of such links influences choice of 
strategy in a variety of ways.
Exploration and awareness of links also enables movements
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to change, challenge and enrich each other, and helps to
counter the danger of their absorption into the status quo.
For example women who are aware of these links between the
domination of women and domination of nature come to see
the struggle as much wider than simply elevating women to
some sort of equality in the ranks of male workers or in
the male sphere of public life. Ecological feminism
provides one important test of whether feminism retains any
capacity to challenge broader aspects of the society and to
be critical of male institutions and culture. Similarly,
✓ecofeminism challenges the tendency or potential of the 
environment movement to be sexist , to show ignorance not 
only of feminist critique but that of other groups, and to 
be insensitive to issues of power and inequality in 
problem analysis and strategy. E c o f e m i n i s m  has 
particularly stressed that the treatment of nature as 
inferior has supported and "naturalised” not only the 
hierarchy of male to female but the inferiorisation of many 
other groups of humans seen as more closely identified with 
nature, for example the supposed inferiority of black races 
(conceived as more animal) , the supposed inferiority of 
"uncivilised " or "primitive" cultures, and the supposed 
superiority of master to slave, boss to employee , mental 
to manual worker. For western society, which has 
particularly employed a strongly genderised concept of 
nature as way of imposing a hierarchical order on the 
world, feminisation and naturalisation have been crucial 
and conne c t e d  planks in supporting pervasive human 
relations of inequality both within western society and 
between western society and non-western societies. At the 
level of the forest, the domination and destruction of 
nature goes hand in hand with the d o m i n a t i o n  and 
destruction of the human cultures economically dependent on 
it and linked to it by powerful and ancient bonds.
In isolation then resistance to domination can often be 
accommodated by a broadening of the dominating class to 
include those resisting, or significant and vocal sections 
of them, and yesterday’s radicals become to-day’s speech- 
writers, press secretaries or advisers. Connection with
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other struggles provides one means to resist this co­
option —  change must not only elevate the original 
resisting group but also challenge the status and 
character of the oppressing group in its relation 
to other oppressed groups. Strategies which take account 
of or promote this wider, connected set of objectives are 
then p r e f e r r e d .  An e x a m p l e  w h i c h  i l l u s t r a t e s  the 
connectedness of these issues and strategies is the fight 
for tropical rainforest and the fight for social justice 
(eg.land reform) and the rights of indigenous peoples in 
the third world .
Ecofeminism provides a good example of a movement-linking 
activity we might call, drawing on w o m e n ’s traditional 
activities in linking social groups, ’’movement networking” ; 
at the. theoretical level it is "critique networking". Like 
w o m e n ’s social networking, this area has been backgrounded, 
of low visibility and status, but is essential to the 
c o n t i n u e d  f u n c t i o n i n g  of soc i a l  g r o ups. W o m e n  make 
effective networkers in radical movements because they 
usually suffer from multiple forms of oppression, and 
relate unrelated theories through their lived experience; 
they .are black women, they are ethnic women, they are 
women who suffer through the product and process of the 
destruction of nature, they are women who are subordinated 
in their working relations as women, either in the movement 
or outside it,  ^ and in their personal relationships as 
women, and they are subordinated espec i a l l y  in terms of 
those of their qualities and characteristics perceived as 
natural, their sexuality, their reproductivity. Networking 
is not a l w a y s  a p l e a s a n t  , s u p p o r t i v e  and " h e l p f u l "  
activity , undertaken by the angel in the ecosystem ; it 
may involve criticism , revision and r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  of 
comfortable certainties and positions, and confrontation of 
oppressive relations. It may be seen as divisive , 
threatening and timewasting by people who remain in an 
instrumental paradigm which defines movement goals as 
narrowly, and therefore conservatively, as possible. 
Feminist criticism of the environment movement has often 
been seen in this way. Definitely not a task for angels.
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Networking is one answer to a system of power relations
conceived of as itself a net. On this analysis there is no
not
simple "us" and "them", and power does^emanate from a 
single simple source, (as theories of power such as earlier 
forms of anarchism supposed) but, as Foucault notes, "is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. 
And not only do individuals circulate between its threads ; 
they are always in the pos i t i o n  of s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  
undergoing and exercising this power . They are not only 
its inert or consenting target ; they are almost always 
also the elements of its a r t i c u l a t i o n . "   ^ Power is 
often articulated through the formation of identity, 
including sexual and gender identity, (and I shall argue, 
human identity), and is not a separate, added-on element to 
that identity. Challenging that network of power relations 
involves challenging at a very deep level the formation of 
our identities, as women or men, and as human beings in a 
culture which separates off and subordinates nature. We 
need not take all elements in the net of oppression as of 
equal significance, nor see power as so diffused as to be 
"everywhere and therefore nowhere" . There are key points 
or foci in the web, and gender has emerged as playing just 
such a key role in linking, modelling and structuring other 
elements. . It is therefore capable of providing insights 
into and connections to many other forms of oppression. 
Masculine and feminine are t r a d i t i o n a l l y  related as 
humanity to animality, as mind to body, as reason to
feeling, as subject to object, as end to means, as
centre to periphery, as focus to background, as dominant 
to subordinate, as higher to lower orders of being. Very 
often, to be powerless is to be feminised . This has much 
to tell us of the structure of oppression.
HUMAN IDENTITY AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM
The key role of a sharply differentiated and genderised 
concept of nature, in which women (and other inferiorised
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groups) are seen as aligned with the inferior order of 
nature and men as aligned with the superior order of 
culture, intellect and rationality, is something some 
ecofeminist writers have particularly stressed in their 
histor i c a l  a n a lysis . These eco f e m i n i s t s  have been 
developing a somewhat different line of thought concerning 
the connection of gender and nature to that involved in the 
affirmation of the feminine, and its connections with this 
affirmation require further investigation. This account 
stresses the historical and explanatory importance of a 
dualistic way of thinking which opposes mind to body, 
culture to nature, humans to nature, male to female, 
emotion to reason, as separate and superior as
contrasted to inferior orders of being. A major part of my 
argument here is that it is not only the list of contrasted 
areas above which have been treated dualistically in 
western systems of thought and social organisation, but 
also the contrast of human and nature itself, and that this 
has important consequences both for its account of human 
identity and its account of nature.
This framework focussing on this system of linked dualisms 
has c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x p l a n a t o r y  power and a strongly 
integrative function for cultural critique, since there 
are already independent critiques of a number of these (and 
quite a few more) in social theory and especially in 
feminist thought. It reveals also a common enemy in this 
network of dualisms, linked centrally by the account of 
reason or mind and of its various bearers, which provides a 
framework in which the various parts support and strengthen 
each other. The various critiques and movements which 
correspond to these dualisms are connected, in an essential 
and not accidental way, as the undersides of the contrasts 
of reason and its various elaborations. The critique of 
reason, an important aspect of contemporary philosophy and 
especially feminist philosophy has, as I try to show 
below, a great deal to contribute to our understanding of 
these dualisms and to our understanding of the connections 
between c r i ti q u e s and the forms of d om i na t io n  and 
resistance movements they correspond to.
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But the gendered character of this concept of reason, of 
the nature / culture dualism, and of the whole web of 
other dualisms interconnected with it, is not a feature of 
human thought or culture per se , and does not relate the 
universal man to the universal woman ; it is specifically 
a feature of western thought. — It is important that an 
ecofeminist analysis recognises this, and some have failed 
to do so clearly. Women in certain New Guinea cultures 
for example are seen as aligned with the domestic or 
cultivated sphere, men with the forest and with wild land  ^
We cannot therefore see the alignment of women to nature as 
the entire basis and source of women’s oppression, as some 
accounts have done, since women often stand in relatively 
powerless positions even in cultures which have not made 
the connection of women to nature or which have a different 
set of genderised dichotomies. Nevertheless it can still 
be seen as providing the basis of much of the cultural 
elaboration of that oppression in the west, the particular 
form that it takes in the western context, and that is 
still of considerable explanatory value. And this feature 
can be used to explain in turn much that is especially 
western in our ways of relating to the other and to nature. 
That is how I have tried to use it here.
Another related problem which must be considered concerns 
the way in which the concepts of humanity and of nature 
are used in developing the critique of the human domination 
of nature. Some critics have complained that the use of 
the blanket category "human” obscures highly relevant 
cultural differences and differences in responsibility for 
and b e n efits from the domina t i o n  of nature between 
different human groups. The Penan who defend the forest at 
the risk of their lives are not to be held responsible for 
its d e s t r u c t i o n  in the way those who pursue its 
destruction for power and enrichment are. The blanket 
concept of "humanity" can be used to obscure the fact that 
the forces directing the destruction of nature and the 
wealth p r o d u c e d  from it are owned and contro ll ed  
overwhelmingly by men. I think that this criticism is valid
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for some ways of developing the critique, but not for 
others. Certainly it applies to those ways of developing 
the critique which hold that it is simply humanity as a 
species which is the problem and which use the blanket 
concept "human" to hide v i t a l l y  important social, 
political and gender-based analyses of the problem, which 
assume some sort of underlying species selfishness, perhaps 
as part of human nature, and which tend to focus on a 
general reduction in human numbers as the solution.
But this approach should not be confused with the critique 
of the way human identity has been treated in particular 
influential cultures such as western culture. According 
to the way of understanding the critique developed here, it 
is the development in certain cultures, especially and 
originally western culture, of a particular concept and 
practice of human identity and relationship to nature which 
is the problem, not the state of being human as such. 
The difference might be compared to the difference
between ways of understanding patriarchal domination which 
see males (sex) as the problem and ways which see the 
prob l e m  in terms of p a r t i c u l a r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  and 
practices of masculine identity in particular social and 
cultural contexts (gender). There has been much confusion 
on this point, which has led to charges that critiques 
which question human domination are "anti-human", treat 
being human as a disease, and so on The critique of
human domination is and must be a continuation of the 
familiar and healthy practice of cultural critique, not
some sort of äcultural and ahistorical expression of
9collective human-species guilt and revulsion
S i m i l a r l y  , although the critique must involve some 
recognition of the human species as a whole as more limited 
in its claims on the earth and in its relation to other 
species than it has commonly been taken to be , this does 
not translate simply into claims about the need for blanket 
reductions in human numbers or into the view that different 
human groupings have equal responsibility for and benefit 
equally from the destruction of nature. This process is
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human-centred in the competitive, chauvinistic sense that 
it does in the short term {although not in evolutionary 
terms ) benefit humans comparatively as a species in terms 
of the percentage of the earth’s surface which is humanised 
at the expense of other species . But it is not human- 
centred in any noble sense, since not all humans share in 
or benefit from this process or from the problematic 
concept of human identity, indeed some -- including women 
as well as those identified as less fully human -- are its 
victims, just as many humans are the victims rather than 
the b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of the assault on nature. Thus 
understood, the critique is in no way incompatible with 
older critiques which reject human hierarchy, indeed it 
complements and makes more complete our understanding of 
this hierarchy . But just as the situation for women 
cannot be remedied or justified by more equal parcelling 
out of the spoils between males in the way the pre-feminist 
critiques invoking equality and fraternity assumed, so 
d e s t r u c t i o n  of nature can be neither rectified nor 
justified by a more equal distribution of the results among 
human groups, as these older critiques suggested. Instead 
as ecofeminist political understandings reveal it , and as 
ecofeminism particularly has insisted, human domination of 
the natural sphere must be seen as continuous with human 
domination of other humans, although like all forms of 
domination adding specific and non-reducible elements of 
its own.
ECOFEMINISM AND GREEN THEORY
What might loosely be called "green theory” includes 
several critiques and positions whose relationship has 
recently been the subject of vigorous and often bitter 
debate, and which have some common ground but apparently a 
number of major divergences. The three main articulated
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positions involved in this debate, which are usually taken 
to present alternative and competitive accounts of the 
analysis of environmental problems * are social ecology, 
deep ecology , and ecofeminisra.
The debate seems to have revealed that there is at present
no underlying unified account, theory or ideology behind
the environment movement, and raises the question of
whether it is and must remain no more than a political
alliance of convenience between different interest groups
affected differently by the assault on nature. There are
several major areas of difference. Points of difference
have arisen between those accounts which treat the crucial
factor as the domination of nature (characteristically
deep ecology) versus those which analyse the problem in
terms of human h i e r a r c h y  ( c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  social
ecology) or as some other problem envisaged as social.
There is debate between those accounts which view
human domination including especially the domination of
women and the d o m i n a t i o n  of nature as connected
(characteristically ecofeminism) versus those (especially
deep ecology) which take the view that, as two leading
deep e c o l o g i s t s  r e c ently e x pressed it, "there is no
necessary connection between these two forms of
..10domination" . There is still disagreement as to
whether the critique of anthropocentrism, of the human 
domination of nature, is valid and non-reducible or not, 
its validity and non-reducibi1ity being contested by 
leading social ecologists and a few ecofeminists.
E c o f e m i n i s t  p o s i t i o n s  which reject this critique of 
anthropocentrism or deny it independent status include 
those which would reduce its explanation entirely to 
patriarchal domination, as well as those which work in the
f r amework of social ecology. The main thrust of
ecofeminism however has involved critique networking, and 
ha s been to r ecogn i s e the va lidity of both critiques and 
forms of domination and to treat their explanation as 
connected, and to use understandings and insights from 
feminist thought to enrich understandings of the connected
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area (and vice versa ) without attempting to reduce one to 
the other. Hence most ecofeminists are not committed to 
the thesis that the struggle against patriarchy is the same 
struggle as the struggle of the environment movement , or 
that fixing one problem would automatically fix the other, 
which is a causal fallacy for most linked phenomena. 
Confusion on these points plays an important role as 
motivation for the denial of links . Thus ecofeminist 
positions such as my own can and do recognise the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  and i r r e d u c i b i 1 ity of the critique of 
anthropocentrism and of human domination of nature and 
treat its importance , especially at this juncture in the 
history of our culture, as being no less than that of 
androcentrism or male domination.
Deep ecology has a high profile in some parts of the
environment movement and is often identified with this
critique of anthropocentrism , but this is a major error,
not only in terms of conceptual alternatives but also
historically, but it is one which deep ecologists, with
12some exceptions do not usually hasten to correct. In
fact the critique of anthropocentrism has been developed in 
a number of different ways by various different schools of 
environmental philosophy, and deep ecology is only one of 
these ways, not n e c e s s a r i l y  the most satisfactory, 
especially from the point of view of providing a unified 
account of environmental concerns. This is a key point, 
because much criticism does not distinguish criticism of 
the kind of position deep ecology represents, the critique 
of anthropocentrism, from the specific details of this 
c r i t i que whi c h are peculiar to the deep ecol ogy form of 
development of that critique. This has an important bearing 
on how the alternatives are seen and on the question of 
whether the type of enterprise deep ecology represents is 
reconstructib1e in different terms or whether it has to be 
entirely a b a n d o n e d  as some critics have claimed. 
Ecofeminism provides a different account of the basis and 
dynamics of anthropocentrism from that provided either by 
deep ecology or the main brands of e n v i r onmental 
philosophy.
There is also major d i sa g re em en t  between all three 
positions at the philosophical level especially over the 
treatment of the ecological self and its relation to nature 
and on various other connected points . This last issue 
is taken up in detail in later chapters of this thesis, 
where I argue that ecofeminism can provide an account of 
the ecological self which is unlike that provided by those 
d e v e l o p m en t s  in deep ecology which draw on eastern 
religious traditions, and which links a number of radical 
critiques, including that of feminism and of critics of the 
market and of instrumental reason. It is here in the 
account of the self I think that we find both the basis of 
disagreement and the seeds of potential agreement between 
these green positions, as well as a wider range of 
critiques. Feminist accounts critique egoism and view the 
self as embedded in a network of particular relationships, 
whereas deep ecology has been developed to provide an 
account in terms ' of a merged self or an expanded "Self" 
operating on the familiar fuel of egoism and transcending 
ties to the c o r r u p t i n g  partic ul ar  in favour of 
identification with a cosmic whole. Deep ecologists have 
wanted to appeal to this account of self as close to a 
feminist sensibility, but this has raised problems for a 
number of feminists.
Janet Biehl, writing in 1988 in the Canadian anarchist 
magazine Kick i t Over , expresses some of this feminist 
misgiving when she says that this deep ecological account 
of the self as merged with nature seems to ask women to 
return to the arena of their oppression, to require that 
women remain egoless, unformed, and as they have been for 
millennia, connected to the point of self-effacement. 
Women and men alike are asked "to efface themselves before 
nature, to ignore their identity as a species in a 
surrender to a boundary1ess, cosmic "oneness"". She argues 
that this connected identity has been a problem for women, 
who are now " i n t e n s e l y  striving for subjectivity, 
precisely for selfhood and for a full recognition of their 
subjectivity and selfhood in a new society".
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Feminists now do insist that women can no longer be 
relegated to the sphere of nature interpreted as exclusive 
of that of culture, and in these terms Janet Biehl is right 
in rejecting, in the name of feminism, the continued (even 
if now laudatory) treatment of women as undifferentiated 
nature by some proponents of deep ecology. Feminists
reject also the altruistic, s e l f - e f f a c i n g  role
traditionally assigned to them in the private sphere (and 
often now reflected in their public sphere roles) in which 
their significance is entirely relational and value is 
assessed in terms of an ideal of feminine goodness which is 
instrumental to male ends, and which fails to recognise 
their subjectivity and self-worth and forces them to 
pursue their ends and goals by "living through" others. 
This is a form of selfhood in which the self is merged with 
the other, and fails to achieve true individuation..
But at the same time feminism has been equally critical of 
the counterpart deformation , the masculine selfhood 
embodied as the dominant mode in the public sphere and its 
institutions , especially in the market and in liberal 
ideals of political life. Masculine selfhood, especially 
as understood by o b ject-re1 ations theory, is seen as 
d i s c o n n e c t e d  from the other, and as a c h i e v i n g  its 
individuation ("false individuation") by forming itself 
reactively, in opposition to the other and the feminine. 
It is, or tries to be, a non - relational self, whose 
connections to others are always external and accidental to 
its sense of its own identity, and which aims to maximise 
satisfaction of a set of desires which take only accidental 
account of those of others , just as described in the 
theory of the market and in theorems such as the Hidden 
Hand. This' sort of self has been c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as 
"disembodied and d i s e m b e d d e d " ^  ; its aim is power over
others as a means of achieving its self-contained desires, 
and its mode of relating to the other is as instrument to 
the realisation of these ends.
These two forms of selfhood, corresponding to ideals of
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m a s c u l i n i t y  and f e m i n i n i t y  as und e r s t o o d  in certain 
traditional social contexts , to public and private, to 
egoism and altruism , to the sphere of ends and that of 
means, stand as c o m p l e m e n t a r y  disto r t i o n s  of human 
individual and social possibility. At the same time modern 
"difference" feminism has discerned in traditional feminine 
selfhood and relationship to others, if translated to a 
new social context of equality and opportunity for women, 
the seeds of a different, more social and connected way of 
being, a self whose identity is formed in and fully 
acknowledges relationship to others , and potentially also 
to the natural world, and which reaches its ethical 
expression not in intellectual obeisance to abstract moral 
pri n c i p l e s  but in a n e t w o r k  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and 
responsibilities to particular others. This relational
account of self is common both to some radical and some 
socialist feminism and to some forms of socialist and 
anarchist theory -- for example in modern critiques of the 
market and in Kropotkin’s account of the social individual 
as embedded in a network of social relations and of true 
social, political and ethical life as an expression of this 
embeddedness.
But there is an important rider here . This is not a 
merged or indistinguishable self, defined holistically as 
lacking boundaries and distinctness, and its connections to 
others involve usually highly ’particularistic ties and 
responsibilities. It is better viewed as a self-in­
relationship, whose identity is formed not as isolated atom 
or in opposition to others, but by embedding in a network 
of relationships to particular others. It is not the sort 
of self described by Murray Bookchin as passive and de- 
individuated"^, but it is not the sort of self made the 
basis of theory by deep ecology either. There are serious 
conflicts and discrepancies between the deep ecologists’ 
account of the ecological self, especially as derived from 
some eastern religious sources, and the feminist account of 
the ecological self, just as there are between feminist 
accounts .of the basis of ecological morality and that of 
malestream environmental philosophy.
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Deep Ecology j_ Unmaking Connect ions
C r i t i c i s m  of dee p  e c o l o g y  from o t h e r  p o s i t i o n s  has 
clustered especially around this treatment of the self, and 
this is now a major problem area in relating the different 
c r i t i q u e s  w h i c h  hav e  come to make up g r e e n  theory, 
especially feminism and social ecology . Social ecology and 
ecofeminism are hardly in much agreement on these points 
however , and social ecology, as expressed in the work of 
its leading proponent Murray Book c h i n  , also lacks a 
coherent critique of egoism or individualism, and suffers 
from a number of other problems. It fails to adequately
c r i t i q u e  the d o m i n a t i o n  of n a t u r e  w h i c h  it v i e w s  as
reducible to human domination and hierarchy, and to the 
extent that the critique of anthropocentrism is essential 
to the ecology movement it cannot provide what is needed 
as the basis of a unified ethical or philosophical theory. 
B o o k c h i n ’s account* gives excessive emphasis to "second 
n a t u r e "  over first n a t u r e ,  as r e a l i s i n g  the h i g h e s t
development of first nature , and views humans as able to
foster and accelerate natural processes in a way that 
seems to perpetuate human arrogance . The concept of 
humans as nature realising consciousness recognises human 
continuity with nature (although in a somewhat hierarchical 
way which inherits the overvaluation of the intellectual 
sphere) but does not seem to p e r m i t  a d e q u a t e  
conceptualisation of conflicts between the human species 
and nature.
Nevertheless I think that Bookchin is right in part of his 
critique of deep ecology, that ess e n t i a l l y  deep ecology 
has chosen the company of American nature mysticism and of 
certain religious eastern traditions such as Buddhism which 
are p o p u l a r  w i t h  the west, coast A m e r i c a n s  who have 
d e v e l o p e d  the theory, over that of v a r i o u s  r a d i c a l  
movements, including feminism, it might have kept better 
company with. Deep ecology has chosen to develop its 
account of ecological self in a way which is incompatible
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with these critiques and which stress a different set of 
connections. I think social ecology is right too about 
some of the political implications of this choice, that 
they lead away from connections with the women’s movement 
and other radical movements and traditions, and lead 
towards these being seen as only accidentally connected to 
environmental concerns. That is, deep ecology has chosen 
a theoretical base which leads to a weakening of connection 
with other radical movements that are then seen as only 
accidentally connected, which from a different perspective 
appear essentially connected. (See Chapter Seven below). 
Its stance is the opposite to that of ecofeminism, 
which is that of making connections -- mistaken by deep 
ecologists for the project of reduction.
If we look to the concerns of the environment movement 
since its beginnings, there seems to be little doubt that 
it has been concerned with such conflicts, and also to 
raise the status of nature from its traditional role as a 
background to human life. The critique of anthropocentrism 
goes to the heart of many of those concerns, especially 
those o r i e n t e d  to p r e s e r v i n g  natural e cosystems and 
diversity. But it is equally clear that it has been 
concerned too, and equally centrally, with environmental 
problems as aspects of human social organisation and as a 
form of human oppression. That has been the main focus of 
many struggles over a long period, especially those turning 
around energy use, health and development issues, and 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons. This sort of concern is
nicely expressed by Marge Piercy’s poem The Bottom Line 
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That white withered angel cancer 
steals into a house through cracks, 
lurks in the foundation, the walls, 
litters down its infinitesimal dandruff 
from school ceilings into childrens' lungs.
That invisible fungus hides in processed food, 
in the cereal , the salami, the cake.
We 1 corned into the body like a friend 
it proceeds to eat you from inside, 
parasitic wasp in a tomato worm.
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Out of what caprice quenched in a moment’s 
pleasure does the poison svep?^
We come to mistrust the body 
a slave to be starved into submission, 
an other that can like a rabid dog 
turn on and bite a separate me.
But the galloping horse of the thighs, 
the giraffe of the spine are innocent 
browsing their green. We die of decisions 
made at three fifteen in boardrooms
We die of the bottom line. We die 
of stockholders’ dividends and a big bonus 
for top executives and more perks. Cancer 
is the white radioactive shadow of profit 
falling across, withering the dumb flesh.
Key aspects of environmental critiques too are centred on
the way ,that control over and exploitation of nature 
contributes to, or is even more strongly linked to, control 
over and exploitation of human beings. As numerous research 
studies have shown, high t e c h nology a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
forestry in the third world which is e c o l o g i c a l l y  
insensitive also strengthens the control of elites and 
social inequality, increasing for example m e n ’s control 
over the economy at the expense of women , ‘and it does 
these things not just as a matter of accident. People 
suffer because the environment is damaged, and also from 
the process which damages it, because the process has 
disregard for needs other than those of an elite built 
into it. We die of the product (the destruction of nature) 
and also of the process (technological brutality alias 
te c h n o l o g i c a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  serving the end of the 
marketisation of nature). As the free water we drink from 
common streams, the free air we breathe in common become 
increasingly unfit to sustain life, the biospheric means 
for a healthy life will increasingly be privatised , and 
will increasingly become the privelege of those who can 
afford to pay for them . The losers will be (and in many 
places already are) those, human and non-human, without 
market power, and environmental issues and issues of 
justice will increasingly converge . It seems that unless 
we are to write these two sorts of environmental concerns
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anoff as simply divergent and disparate tendencies, 
adequate theoretical account will have to cater for both 
sets of concerns, those concerned with human social systems 
and those concerned with nature, and give an important 
place to their connection, even unification .
Given these points it seems that both deep ecology and 
social ecol o g y  are uns u i t a b l e  as they are c u rrently 
articulated for forming the basis of such a connecting 
framework. Social ecology stresses environmental problems 
as social problems, arising from the domination of human 
by human, but has no adequate account of the connection to 
the domination of nature, while deep ecology has chosen to 
deve l o p  in a way which provides an account of the 
d o m i n a t i o n  of nature but blocks its con n e c t i o n  
theoretically to human oppression , and leading theorists 
of deep ecology can write off any links. So deep ecology 
has developed in a way which has the virtue of resisting 
attempts to reduce the domination of nature to some form of 
human domination, but which attempts to direct the focus of 
the movement away from connections with human domination 
and to confine it to wilderness issues.
Both these positions provide an inadequate basis for a 
unifying theory. It seems that if we are to obtain such a 
t h e oretical base adequate to encompass and link the 
concerns of the envir o n m e n t  movement then it is to 
ecological feminism that we will have to turn for it. The 
account of the social and ecological self developed here, 
together with other aspects of the ecofeminist critique 
such as the account of dualism and the role of the concept 
reason in linking a range of different hierarchies , makes 
it highly promising for such a task. Connections to other 
radical movements and traditions also flow from such an 
account. The domination of women is of course central to 
the ecofeminist understanding of domination, but is also an 
illuminating model for many other kinds of domination, 
since the o p p r e s s e d  are often both feminised and 
naturalised. The ecofeminism of writers such as Rosemary 
Ruether has always stressed the links between the
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domination of women, of human groups and of nature . "An
ecological ethic", she writes , "must always be an ethic of
ecojustice that recognis es the interconnect ion of social
1 9domination and the domination of nature ". Ecofeminism
provides an excellent framework for the exploration of such 
interconnections . I attempt here to provide some of the 
philosophical basis for such an account.
Ecology and Human Identity
One of my main concerns has been to apply the insights of 
feminist theory, both socialist feminist and radical 
feminist, to the development of a different account of 
human identity and of environmental philosophy than is 
provided by any of the malestream brands, including both 
deep ecology and more conventional environmental ethics. 
Both these positions employ methods and as sumptions drawn 
from rationalism which have been used to inferiorise
both women and nature, and these are discu s s e d  and 
rejected. The problem is reconceptualised in terms of 
the concepts of self and other, of difference , continuity 
and power, and this results in a c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e ­
orientation of environmental philosophy. What becomes 
central is the cultural adoption of dualistic masculine 
models of human identity and of the self, and of nature 
construed in polarised terms as passive and mechanistic, 
that is as the underside of the dualisms of human/nature 
and self/other.
Modern environmental prophets such as David Suzuki have as 
their main , constantly stressed message that humans are 
animals and that we have the same dependence on a healthy 
b i o s p h e r e  as other forms of life. It is puzzling, 
obviously puzzling to them also, that an apparent truism 
should have so much force, find so much resistance and 
should so much need to be stressed. The reason is that 
western culture has for so long denied it, and has given us 
a picture of human identity as only accidentally connected 
to the earth, a picture which for all our formal knowledge
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of evolution remains deeply entrenched in our conceptions 
of ourselves and of nature and which is reinforced by many 
aspects of technology and the urban life style which has 
become in recent times the dominant one over much of the 
globe. The rationalist tradition has given us an account 
of human identity defined in o pp o si t io n  both to the 
feminine and to nature. In the c o n s t ru c ti o n of an 
alternative, the feminist account of self as essentially 
related to others is extended to give an account of the 
eco l o gi ca l  self which enables e x p l a na t io n  of the 
instrumental treatment of nature and of its exclusion in 
western culture from ethical significance. The problem is 
not that of simply revising upward the value of nature and 
adding this somehow on to an otherwise unchanged structure 
of human identity and the institutions of liberal economic, 
political and social life, but that of reworking human 
identity and associated concepts of human society , value 
and virtue as they have been conceived since at least the 
time of the Greeks, as exclusive of and discontinuous with 
the inferior orders of nature and the feminine.
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Chapter Two j_ The Chal 1 enge to Western Culture
Patriarchal religion split apart the dialectical unities 
of m o t h e r  religion into an a b s olute dualism,
e l e v a t i n g  a m a l e - i d e n t i f i e d  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  to 
transcendent apriority. Fundamentally this is rooted in 
an effort to deny o n e ’s own mortality, to identify 
essential (male) humanity with at transcendent divine 
sphere beyond the matrix of coming-to-be-and-passing- 
away. By the same token , woman came to be identified
with the sphere of finitude that one must deny in order 
to negate o n e ’s own origins and inclusion in this realm. 
The woman, the body and the world were the lower half of 
a dualism that must be declared posterior to , created 
by, subject to , and ultimately alien to the nature of 
(male) consciou s n e s s ,  in whose image man made his
g o d.... The patriarchal self-deception about the origins
of consciousness ends logically in the destruction of 
the earth.
Rosemary Radford Ruether New Woman New Earth,pi95.
The view that w o m e n ’s oppression and inferiority was 
linked to their connection to and immersion in the sphere 
of nature predates ecofeminism. It was central to the 
analysis of Simone de Beauvoir , and is implicit in earlier 
feminist analyses such as that of Mary Wollstonecraft . In 
these early treatments however the connection with nature 
is seen as negative , as precisely what women have to 
throw off if they are to become fully human.
What is different and new in ecofeminism is the treatment 
of the connection with nature as a positive rather than 
negative feature of women’s identity, and of nature itself 
in positive terms . Ecofeminism is a diverse position, and 
different ecofeminist positions vary considerably in their 
accounts of how the connection with nature has arisen, 
what it now means for women and how it should now be dealt 
with. For some ecofeminists it is a matter of embracing 
with pride their old maternally- derived identity as part 
of nature —  an identity they view as only doubtfully 
accessible to men —  and empowering this as a new model of 
the human by having female experience determine culture.
37
For others the old identity of women as natural beings 
requires considerable transformation , and the ecofeminist 
project invo1ves the development of a new human identity as 
both natural and cultural beings which is accessible to men 
as well as women. Empowering this identity is not a matter 
of having women replace men as power holders , but a matter 
of developing and empowering certain qualities , areas of 
life and types of social organisation which have been 
excluded from male dominant culture. These are found 
especially but not exclusively in women , because of the 
kinds of lives they have led and the areas of human life 
they have had responsibility for. What both sorts of 
p o s i t i o n s  have in common is the r e jection of the 
contemporary and historical western model of human identity 
in terms of the alienation from and domination of nature, 
an understanding of this model as linked to patriarchy, and 
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of women as o p pressed by the same 
processes and structures of patriarchy which result in the 
domination and destruction of nature.
The last decade has seen the appearance of a body of
powerful and passionate literature whose main theme is the
link between the domination of women and the domination of
nature. The e c o f e m i n i s t  theme has been a minor but
p e r s i s t e n t  one in much recent feminist literature,
especially radical feminist literature (for example in the
1work of Adrienne Rich , Mary O ’Brien , and Mary Daly ) . 
The theme has been a major one in a number of pieces of 
work ranging through a variety of literary forms —  from 
academic books and papers in philosophy, theology, politics 
and the history of ideas, to activist speeches and essays , 
poetry and novels. Much of this more specialised work can 
be seen as extending the concerns of feminism generally, 
for example showing how the same structures of domination 
operate to oppress both women and nature . The area has 
been largely ignored by academic feminism , with a few 
exceptions, and the wellsprings of much of the literature 
have come from activism , from women voicing their 
concern and anger at the destructiveness they see around 
them at women’s marches , rallies and actions to save a
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piece of nature or to d e m o n s t r a t e  against nuclear 
technology or armaments . The literature of ecoferaisra 
offers a striking and highly relevant historically-based 
critique of the development of western culture up to the 
present time , as well as a vision of alternatives to it.
ECOFEMINISM AND WESTERN CULTURE
Three major themes have been prominent in ecofeminist 
writ i n g  ; two of them are h istorical in emphasis, 
explaining how western society inherited or evolved from 
the past its current patterns of domination of women and 
nature :
(1) the location of the problem for both women and nature 
in their place as part of a set of dualisms which have 
their origin in classical philosophy and which can be 
traced through a complex history to the present; or in some 
cases the location of the problem even further back in the 
displacement by patriarchy of matriarchy and the resulting 
displacement of earth-oriented goddess religion.
(2) the location of the problem for both women and nature 
in the rise of mechanistic science during the Enlightenment 
and pre-Enlightenment period .
(3) contemporary critique stressing explanations of the 
link based on either comtemporary dualism or on difference 
e.g. on sexually-differentiated personality formation or 
conscio u s n e s s ,  and on features of m a s c u l i n i t y  and 
structures of contemporary patriarchy.
Although a coherent ecofeminist historical perspective 
does emerge from the work of particular authors such as 
Rosemary Ruether, there are overall some substantive 
disagreements about the historical account, especially of 
the pre-classical period . The ecofeminist historical 
perspective sees the current formation of contemporary 
western human identity in relation to nature in terms of
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the evolution of a number of phases of culture. The pre-
classical phase in which female deities were worshipped is
seen variously . On some accounts it was one in which the
worship of the life-generating and nurturing powers of the
universe, conceptualised as female , was reflected in
female power and status in society, that is, in
matriarchy or else in a society in which women held equal 
3power to men . For others such as Rosemary Ruether it was 
a period in which the power of the earth goddess, that of 
nature and of female creativity , was invoked and used by 
male rulers in the service of a basically male power 
structure —  the period of the conquest of the mother.
The classical period , whose c o n t r i b u t i o n  to our
intellectual, social and philosophical traditions is much
easier to document , has been less c o n t entious for
ecofeminists .-.Its contribution to the shaping of a human
identity conceived of as outside of or in opposition to
the inferior sphere of nature and the feminine has been a
major focus of much insightful work. This identity can be
traced back to a dualism arising in classical civilisation
between male and female, reason and nature, which
associates reason with masculinity and elevates reason to
supreme status. Both ecofeminist and feminist analyses have
rejected such a dualism , and those who stress its
influence in their analysis of the problems of women and
nature include Rosemary Radford Ruether, Susan Griffin,
Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Ynestra King, Ariel Kay Salleh,
Karen J. W arren ^and also a number of c o n t e m p o r a r y
5feminist theorists .
The first account of the historical development of this 
dua1istically-coneeived human identity in the classical 
period , and still one of the clearest and most 
suggestive, was presented by Rosemary Radford Ruether in 
her 197 5 book New Woman New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and 
Human Liberati on . A theologian with a concern for 
racism and hierarchy as well as sexism and the destruction 
of nature, Ruether provides an account of the linkages 
between women and nature in terms of the development and
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persistence in western thought of a gendered , hierarchical 
dualism, developing especially from the Greek view and 
fusing with the Hebraic position to give the Christian 
tradition, and tracing this dualistic tradition briefly 
through n e o - P l a t o n i c  thought, the e n l i g h t e n m e n t  and 
romanticism to the present day. This dualism is seen by 
Ruether as a feature of patriarchal religion , but it is 
just as much (indeed primarily ) a feature of classical 
philosophy, transferred to patriarchal religion via the 
influence of classical thought on it..
Nature, Ruether points out, was not re jected in the Old
Testament tradition. Although it was seen as available for
human use, it was not seen as inferior, corrupt or evil,
but rather as "an autonomous sphere of G od’s dominance and
the revelation of divine power and glory ..." . The Old
Testament, she concludes, was patriarchal without linking
this to an alienated view of creation . The element of
alienation enters with the Greek tradition and classical
philosophy, and especially with the development of what she
calls "transcendent dualism", that view which regards
consciousness as transcendent to visible nature and the
bodily sphere as inferior. This spirit-nature split is
then read into class and sexist relations, women, slaves
and lower classes being seen as analogous to the inferior
realm of bodily "nature", while ruling class males identify7themselves with transcendent spirit. The' result was a 
"naturalisation" of hierarchy , especially the hierarchy of 
males over females :
These two elements, absent from pre-exilic Old Testament 
religion, are typical of classical philosophy. Here the 
authentic self is regarded as the soul or transcendent 
rationality, over against bodily existence. As we have 
seen, the rel a t i on  of spirit to body is one of 
repression, subjugation, and mastery. Ma te ri a l 
existence is ontologically inferior to mind and the root 
of moral evil. Moreover, the language of hierarchical 
dualism is i d e n t i f i e d  with social hierarchy. The 
hierarchy of spirit over body is expressed in the 
dominion of males over females, freedmen over slaves, 
Greeks over "barbarians”. Domination is "naturalized", 
so that the inferior ontological and moral 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of body in relation to mi nd  are 
identified with the inferior psychobiological "natures" 
of women and subjugated classes.
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Thus "cosmic alienation and spiritual dualism triumphed in
9classical Christian spirituality" and Ch r i s t i a n  n e o ­
platonism rejected as evil both women and the material 
world of the body and nature —  this phase she calls "the 
negation of the mother". Ruether goes on to give an account 
of the key historical stages in reaching our current 
position in terms of the development of the reason / nature 
dualism of classical times to the modern position of 
public/ private dualism , in which men are identified still 
with the "real world" of rationality, now expressed as 
the sphere of rational public economic and political life, 
while women are limited to being, custodians of the realm of 
"natural" feeling and relationships in the i n c reasingly 
less important domestic sphere of the home. W o m e n ’s 
identification with the inferior realm of nature undergoes 
a f u r t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  in the V i c t o r i a n  a c c o u n t  of 
femininity —  the phase of "the sublimation of the mother" 
—  in which their motherhood is lauded but their sexuality 
is denied , and they are treated as weak and enfeebled.
A f t e r  r e n a i s s a n c e  humanism* the m o d e r n  v e r s i o n  of
intranscendent rationality is expressed the male realms ofA
science and technology, as well as in public and economic 
life , and dualism is expressed in the enterprise of 
redeeming nature, through transformation by science, from 
the demonic sphere. The classical dualisms are retained as 
gendered but take a peculiarly modern form .
R u e t h e r ’s pathbreaking and t h o u g h t - p r o v o k i n g  book is 
splendidly complemented by two others which appeared a few 
years later, Susan G r i f f i n ’s- Women and Nature and
E l i z a b e t h  D o d s o n  G r a y ’s G r e e n  P a r a d i s e  Lost . T h e s e  
illuminate the detail of how the critique of dualism 
transfers to a contemporary context and explore the effects 
of dualism on the consciousness of women and within the 
human self. Susan Griffin suggests the way in which 
dualistic treatment of distinctions not only elevates one 
side (eg reason) and inferiorises the other (eg nature, the 
feminine, the emotions) but also defines and narrows the 
concept of reason itself and its contrasts. This is an 
area which has also received attention from feminist
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philosophers recently (eg Genevieve Lloyd The Man of Reason) 
. Susan G r i f f i n  writes in the preface of "going 
underneath logic, writing associative1y . . . thus my prose 
in the book is like poetry and like poetry always begins 
with feeling. One of the loudest complaints which this 
book makes about patriarchal thought ... is that it claims 
to be objective, and separated from emotion, and so it is 
appropriate that the style of this book does not make that 
separation." (p .xv). The writing conveys powerfully and 
dramatically the common domination and devaluation of 
women and n ature in classical pat r i a r c h y  and the 
rationalist tradition , placing phi1osophical judgements 
about the nature of matter side by side with opinions about 
the nature of women. Patriarchy speaks its absurd and 
oppressive edicts in the rational voice of authority and 
detachment (indicated by the passive voice "It is decided 
t h a t ..")
It is decided that matter is transitory and illusory 
like the shadows on a wall cast by firelight; that we 
dwell in a cave, in the cave of our flesh, which is also 
matter, also illusory; it is decided that what is real 
is outside the cave, in a light brighter than we can 
imagine, that matter traps us in darkness. That the 
idea of matter existed before matter and is more 
perfect, ideal ... . It is decided that matter is passive 
and inert, and that all motion originates from outside 
matter. . . That matter is only a potential for form or a 
potential for movement. It is decided that the nature 
of woman is passive, that she is a vessel waiting to be 
filled. 11
The first part of the book deals with the same themes as
Ruether —  the rejection of the body, of nature and of
women which reached its peak in Neo-Platonic thought and
the period of the witch-craze — and the elevation to
s u premacy of a transcendent m a s c u l i n e - i d e n t i f i e d
consciousness and rationality.
And what is sublunary is decaying and corruptible. The 
earth "is so depraved and broken in all kinds of vice 
and abominations that it seemeth to be a place that hath 
received all the filthiness and purgings of all other 
worlds and ages", it is said.
And the air below the moon is thick and dirty, while the 
air above "shineth night and day of resplendour
perpetual", it is said.
And it is decided that the angels live above the moon 
and aid God in the movement of the celestial spheres.
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"The good angels", it is said, "hold cheap all the 
k n o w l e d g e  of material and temporal matt e r s  which 
inflates the demon with pride."
And the demon resides in the earth , it is decided, in 
Hell, under our feet..
It is observed that women are closer to the earth.
That women lead to m a n ’s corruption. Women are "the 
Devil ’s Gateway", it is said.
To those without acquaintance with classical philosophy
much of what is written here would appear incredible : the
fact that it is an accurate if imaginative portrayal of
periods of patriarchal thought needs to be conveyed by some
sort of referencing system. Later sections are concerned
with mechanism and the character of science and scientific
knowledge. The development of the mechanistic view of
nature as inert and passive, as devoid of any reality or
significance except that expressed in disembodied systems
of numbers, is another exp r e s s i o n  of the priority
patriarchal consciousness attributes to a distorted model
of rationality, as the only thing which is real,
worthwhile , or capable of providing knowledge. The
devaluation and suppression of the natural sphere and its
construal as passive is parallelled by the suppression of
femaleness , female culture and the female voice as women
come to fear nature within and without, to practice
muteness and to fit themselves into an instrumental mould.
As the book progresses the female voice (the "we" ) , at
first subdued and demoralised, gathers strength and
confidence, and begins to explore alternatives to dualistic
and mechanistic ways of perceiving the world . This voice
rejects the clas s ic a l  account of human identity as
discontinuous from or outside nature , the dualistic view
of the true human home as being in a separate, superior
world of culture defined in terms of reason or its
creations, and the associated ontological- cleavage between
the perceiving, conscious and rational knower or subject
and the passive object of knowledge :
We know ourselves to be made from this earth. We know 
this earth is made from our bodies. For we see 
ourselves . And we are nature. We are nature seeing 
nature. We are nature with a concept of nature^^Nature 
weeping. Nature speaking of nature to nature."
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A different approach to the historical account is taken by- 
Carolyn Merchant in The Death of Nature j_ Women , Ecology 
and the S c i e n t i f i c  R e v o l u t i o n  This details the 
replacement of the organic model of nature, in which 
nature was seen as a living being -- usually a benevolent, 
nurturing mother -- by a mechanistic model in the period 
since the sixteenth century. It discusses also some views 
of nature as female and as nurturing mother in classical 
thought.
On Merchant’s account, the identification of women with 
nature was by no means always negative, licensing the 
exercise of power over an inferior sphere, but could also 
be protective and respect-invoking for both. She sees the 
pre-sixteenth century view as one in which "the root 
metaphor binding the self, society, and the cosmos was that
of an o r g a n i s m  ..... o r g a nismic theory e m p h a s i s e d
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  a m ong the parts of the human body, 
subordination of the individual to communal purposes in 
family, commerce and state, and vital life permeating the 
cosmos to the lowliest stone" .
The enlightenment substituted for this organic model one 
of nature as empty mechanism , but also continued to treat 
it as a female to be interrogated by science in a metaphor 
in which knowledge is construed as power , and the power of 
the male knower (subject) over the female known (object).
PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There seems to be some conflict between this account of the 
pre-enlightenment view of nature as organic and that of the 
first group of theorists stressing classical dualism and 
rationalism as the source of the problem , for the problem, 
according to Merchant’s account, essentially sets in after 
the replacement of this pre-enlightenment organic model. 
According to Merchant :
The rise of mechanism laid the foundation for a new
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synthesis of the cosmos, society, and the human being, 
construed as ordered systems of mechanical parts subject 
to governance by law and to predictability through 
deductive reasoning. A new concept of the self as a 
rational master of the passions housed in a machine-like 
body began to replace the concept of the self as an 
integral part of a close-knit harmony of organic parts 
united to the cosmos and society. Mechanism rendered 
nature effectively dead, inert and m a n i p u 1 ab 1e from 
without. As a system of thought, it rapidly gained in 
plausibility during the second half of the seventeenth 
century...
It is difficult to reconcile M e r c h a n t ’s account of the 
pre-seventeenth century concept of the self as "an integral 
part of a close-knit harmony of organic parts united to the 
cosmos and society" and of "vital life penetrating the 
cosmos to the lowliest stone" with the classical and neo- 
Platonic Christian world views of transcendent dualism 
discussed by the first group of ecofeminist writers , which 
saw the authentic self as soul or transcendent spirit 
divorced from the lower realms of nature and the body. The 
concept of the self as rational master of the passions is a 
major theme of classical rationalism , especially Platonic 
rationalism, and these dualist views appear to be the ones 
which triumphed in the dominant traditions of Christian 
thought in the p r e - e n l i g h t e n m e n t  period. The "pre- 
seventeenth century organic view" Merchant outlines seems 
rosy indeed, and the contrast between pre-seventeenth 
century organicism and later mechanism too simple. The 
first group of theorists seem to be correct in stressing 
the key role of classical dualism, and its effects on 
Christianity ; Cartesian mechanism did not arise in a 
vacuum, but has its roots in this earlier dualism and 
rationalism . Seventeenth century mechanism takes over and 
intensifies the contrast between the human (mental) sphere 
and the inferior mindless non-human sphere, reinterpreting 
the world of nature as a neutral machine-like sphere open 
for the human mind’s manipulation, instead of as an evil 
sphere of the devil, but it does not originate that 
dualism.
Despite the assembling of a great deal of detailed and 
sometimes suggestive historical material on various views 
of nature as female, and useful chapters on Bacon and
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others, The Death o f Nature does not really fulfil its
promise of illuminating the conceptual connections between 
women and nature, or between anti-mechanism and feminism, 
being mainly content to find examples (of which there are 
very many) of metaphor or transfer of imagery from the
sphere of women to that of nature and vice versa. One
reason for this i s that because of the failure to get to
grips with the roots of the connection in pre-seventeenth 
century t r a n s c e n d e n t  dualism, the real basis of the 
conceptual and historical connection has been lost, leaving 
only a set of metaphors apparently based on little more 
than convention. The thesis of the loss of a dominant 
organic world view before the seventeenth century would 
also, if correct, actually create difficulties for the 
ecofeminist thesis of a connection between women and 
nature, since it cannot explain the r e jection of 
physicality or the treatment of women as inferior or as 
evil during the pre-enlightenment period. We are left with 
a vision of a pre-enlightenment organic pastorale which 
seems to correspond poorly to facts such as the witch- 
trials during the alleged organic period.
Nevertheless Merchant’s book is impressively documented, 
although often from minor sources as far as the organic 
view is concerned. Could it be that a much olde.r, pre- 
classical organic tradition has persisted as a minor one 
all along , often alongside the dominant tradition , its 
fortunes varying at different points ? More work is needed 
to resolve these issues , and a more adequate historical 
account would no doubt need to be more complex than either 
Ruether’s or Merchant’s accounts , recognising different 
strands of tradition (and thus perhaps resolving the 
conflict between their accounts). Although ecofeminism is 
not primarily an historical thesis, the issue is an 
important one because it makes a difference to where the 
heart of the problem , both for women and for environmental 
philosophy, is seen to lie. If Merchant is right the key 
to the problem lies in mechanism and atomism, and the 
alternative lies in a more connected and enspirited view of 
nature. What the alternative is for women in developing or
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rejecting their ancient association with nature is unclear. 
If the dualist analysis is correct (and that is the view I 
favour), mechanism and atomism are only part of the 
problem, and can essentially be explained as forms of 
dualism (see Chapter Five below). The overall problem is 
much bigger, and its ultimate and thorough resolution would 
also involve the reworking of gender, of dualised human 
i d e ntity and of large areas of culture in which 
interlocking dualist structures are embedded.
But the dualist analysis itself is not without its 
problems. None of the accounts making use of the concept of 
dualism or transcendent dualism (with the exception of 
Jaggar and Warren ) clarify sufficiently this key notion, 
which raises a great many unanswered questions. Different 
authors seem to mean different things by it , some assuming 
that any distinction counts as a dualism , and some taking 
it to be a certain specially polarised distinction. (I try 
to clarify this notion in Chapter Four).
The account also raises a number of further unanswered 
questions about the nature of the link between women and 
nature and is in places ambiguous. For example, at a 
number of points Ruether suggests that the connection is a 
metaphor, or the transfer of a model from one sphere to 
another, "the reading of the spirit-nature split into class
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and sexist re1ations"(p .188 my italics); "The 1anguage of 
h i e r a c h i c a l  dualism is identified with social 
h i e r a r c h y "  (p. 189 my italics) . . ."the structures of 
patriarchal consciousness that destroy the harmony of 
nature are expressed symbo1 ic a 11y and socially in the 
repression of women" (p.196 my italics.) The last thesis 
seems a little stronger than the others. But the thesis 
that the one sphere has provided linguistic images or other 
symbolism for the other is a relatively weak one for 
ecofeminism, and provides only for a rather loose 
connection based apparently on convention. Why does the 
metaphor transfer, it is tempting to ask?
Another possibility is to understand the link as a causal
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or historical connection, in which transcendental dualism 
arose first and actually led to the inferiorisat ion of the 
female and the non-human sphere through the identification 
of the female sphere with nature and the body. But this 
causal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would strike trouble as an 
explanation of women’s domination if patriarchy existed in 
times prior to transcendental dualism, and in cultures less 
affected by it. It seems that such an account in terms of 
dualism would be relevant to explaining only one form of 
the domination of women, the particular form it takes in 
western culture strongly permeated by "transcendental 
dualism" and other gendered dualisms, rather than being 
able to present a general explanation of it . This more 
limited explanation would be no mean achievement, and 
indeed if we aim to explain the destruction of nature it 
does seem essential to focus on the influential western 
model, but it is essential that the cultural relativism of 
such an explanation be clearly recognised.
If the thesis is interpreted as a causal thesis, it also 
strikes chicken and egg problems, the familiar problems of 
the assumption that conceptual structures are the causal 
agents of social change. Transcendental dualism itself 
presumably did not appear in a social vacuum; did it 
produce inferiorization of the spheres of women and nature? 
Or were the foundations already present in the inferior 
treatment of women, nature and inferior social groups such 
as slaves? Are women i n f e r i o r i z e d  because of
identification with nature, or is nature inferiorized 
because of identification with the female sphere? Or are we 
faced with a set of interlocking structures and levels of 
domination which mutually evolve and reinforce one another, 
in turn both aiding and drawing strength from the 
conceptual structure of transcendental dualism? The latter 
seems more likely. But these questions seem to need more 
clarification and consideration than they have so far 
received .
Again, Ruether takes the rise of transcendent dualism as 
e x p l a n a t o r i l y  basic. But in some radical feminist
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frameworks, the emergence of transcendental dualism itself 
—  the elevation of "a raale-identified consciousness to 
transcendent apriority" -- would in turn be explained in 
terms of sexual domination. The "excessive priority of the
rational", Ruether herself suggests at one point, can be
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seen as compensation for males for their inability to
create life -- instead life is created by a male deity and
males recreate and manipulate the earth through a male-
identified science and technology. The emphasis on the
mental is fundamentally rooted in "an effort to deny one’s
own mortality, to identify essential (male) humanity with a
transcendent divine sphere beyond the matrix of coming-to-
17be and passing away"
Such radical feminist explanatory frameworks take sexual 
domination as explanatorily basic, and seek to explain the 
a p p e a r a n c e  of transcendent dualism in terms of it. 
Cultural diversity remains a problem for such explanations, 
since the reproductively-based features of masculinity and 
femininity—  the ability to create life or the lack of it-- 
which they seek to use as antecedent and as an explanatory 
basis were (until recently at least) universal, but the 
supposed consequent, the "transcendent apriority of the 
rational" is not a universal feature, but appears in a much 
more marked form in some cultures as opposed to others. 
These problems do not mean that such a position is not 
illuminating , but do point to the need for a more complex 
explanatory framework than one where the only dimension is 
that of gender.
Ecofeminism and the Mythic Past
There is major disagreement within feminist accounts 
concerning the period of the preclassical past for which 
there is only sketchy information , information which is 
compatible with a variety of hypotheses . Ecofeminism has 
had a major role in speculation about and interpretation of 
this period because of the crucial role the woman / nature 
connection is believed to have played in preclassical
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goddess religions and in the mythic systems of the west. 
This period can be seen as a mythic past not only because 
it is concerned with the meaning of religion and myth, 
which forms much of the basis of its interpr e t a t i v e  
enterprise, but also because such interpretation is itself 
the creation of myth, the construction of a history to 
complement and extend a vision of the present and the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  for the future . This is exp l i c i t l y  
recognised by Andree Collard , who writes "The history of 
women’s oppression must continually be juxtaposed with what 
came before. Only then can we have a vision of what we were 
and therefore what we can be" . In fact most of the 
arguments for a prepatriarchal matriarchy have taken the 
instrumental form followed by Collard, that such a set of 
beliefs would be helpful to women and assist their 
empowerment . The mythic past is treated as an area of 
freedom where choice and vision is continuous with and 
related to choice and vision of the future. Thus different 
feminist and ecofeminist approaches to the contemporary 
issue of women’s identity have been engaged in constructing 
their own versions of the preclassical period of goddess 
worship, as well as in deconstructing the authorised 
androcentric versions.
The chief area of contention is the ques t i on of whe t he r
goddess worship represented a period when nature was
revered and women were powerful, a period some characterise
as matriarchy and others as a period of sex-equality or
p a r t n e r s h i p  . To many advocates of the matriarchal
hypothesis this is simply obvious and does not need further
consideration or argument. Thus Andree Collard writes
"Earth/Goddess worship is always a sign of matriarchal
2 0organisation" . As Riane Eisler puts it "It further
seems logical that women would not be seen as subservient
in societies that conceptualised the powers governing the
universe in female form —  and that "effeminate" qualities
such as caring, compassion and non-violence would be highly
21valued in these societies" . But as Rosemary Ruether
among others points out , this conclusion does not follow. 
She envisages the social context of goddess worship as one
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in which already ruling males exercise power (as sons) 
through the mother goddess and take over these creative 
powers , conceptualised as female, in the service of a
male-dominated elite 22 Human identity was conceived in
terms of dependenc e on female nature , rather than a s
m a s t e r  of it, but in R u e t h e r ’s vie w "this stage o f
religious symbols also represents the first stage of a male
cooptation of the female into a system of power exercised
o oby males" —  the conquest of the mother .
It is hard to accept the identification of goddess-worship 
with female power which is so uncritically made by many
contemporary advocates, especially given that worship may 
be based not upon reverence for female creative power but 
upon envy of it or upon the attempt to compensate for it, 
assimilate it , or obtain such power for males. That
the w o r s h i p  of fem a l e  d e i t i e s  and the
conception of nature as a female deity is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for women’s social empowerment is borne out 
not only by R u e t h e r ’s analysis of Egypt i a n  and other 
ancient uses of the mother goddess, but by the continued 
conceptualisation of nature and the earth as a divine
female in periods (eg the mediaeval and late classical
O  Ap e r i o d s )  w h e n  w o m e n  had poor s o c i a l  status. Some
contemporary non-western religions, such as some of the
cargo cults of New Guinea, also present examples where the
major deities are female but women do not hold much social
power or status, and where religion may use female deities
to compensate males for their role in reproduction or to
obtain access to or control over power conceived as female
25
%
Nevertheless while female deities do not imply female power 
in society as so often assumed , they may be compatible 
with it and may in some cases be suggestive of a still
earlier social phase of women’s empowerment which "the
conquest of the mother" succeeded . Differences on this 
point are not crucially problematic for ecofeminism, since 
neither the critique of the succeeding periods nor the 
conception of contemporary altern a t i v e s  depends in any
52
crucial way on the assumption of a matriarchal or sex-equal
"golden age". Neither is the treatment of the mythic past
as an area of freedom for the construction of helpful myths
n e c e s s a r i l y  p r o b l e m a t i c  ; w h e r e  t h ere is s c a n t y  or
conflicting evidence and a number of competing theories are
compatible with that evidence, there is an area of freedom
and choice, and choice of theory will usually be a
matter of preference based on politics, values , or some
view of the significance of the past for the present . It
is b e t t e r  to r e c o g n i s e  the b a s e s  for t h e o r y  c h o i c e
explicitly as Collard and others have done than to hide
them, (as is done in so much m a l e s t r e a m  theory which
refuses to consider accounts which are not androcentric),
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and better still to indicate the range of options as well 
as the reasons for choice. Dogma and irrationalism sets in 
not with choice based on values but when such choices are 
treated as not open to revision in the light of further 
e v i d e n c e  or c h a n g i n g  v a l u e s  . So far a n d r o c e n t r i c  
interpretations of the mythic past are at least as liable 
to the charge of dogmatism and lack of historical fidelity 
as gynocentric ones.
The question of the historical fidelity of current feminist 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  and r e v i v a l  of g o d d e s s - w o r s h i p  as an 
ecological and gynocentric religion is a vexed one, but 
the real problems and dangers do not seem to lie in the 
much canvassed issue of its historical fidelity , but in 
its current content, political directions, and in the
adequacy of the gynocentric outlook it is associated with . 
Because so much of the story is a blank, appeals to a past 
p e r i o d  of m a t r i a r c h y  or g o d d e s s  w o r s h i p  are u s u a l l y  
attempts to transpose onto the past questions which really 
a r i s e  in and r e q u i r e  r e s o l u t i o n  in a c o n t e m p o r a r y  
context. It is also to misrepresent the nature of these 
questions, and thereby options for both the present 'ctnd the 
future.
We n e e d  to ask why those who see the nee d  for a 
contemporary woman-centred, ecological religion need to 
find it inscribed in the past . The construction of a new
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ecological and post-patriarchal culture (which may 
involve a spiritual component) is crucial, but its 
viability and defensibi1ity do not depend upon discovering 
its replica in the past. Such a discovery would wear an 
ambiguous face as far as a demonstration of viability is 
concerned, since its demise and replacement could be seen 
as demonstrating its lack of viability, and unless we were 
able to discover more about its actual features would do 
very little either to settle issues about the likely 
political consequences of its contemporary adoption . Often 
the real, largely unacknowledged reason for the desire to 
believe that ancient goddess-worship provides what is 
currently needed is the belief that true human nature is 
and has always been gynocentric, and that the period of 
patriarchal culture is an aberration from that true nature 
to which a revival of gynocentric culture will return us . 
This aims to legitimate a current gynocentrism by giving it 
the mantle of naturalness, just as androcentrisra has for so 
long been legitimated, and presupposes an atemporal, 
culturally universal female nature.
This does not mean that there is not a great deal of point 
in questioning androcentric assumptions about the past and 
the way in which sexist cultural evolution theory projects 
male values from the present onto the past . Collard is 
right in her claim that perspectives on the past have a 
deep effect on how present potentialities are seen . A 
feminist account will seek to reject the assumption that 
women played a passive and a u x i l i a r y  role in the 
development of human culture, just as feminists reject that 
account for the present, and to affirm continuity with 
past women and their lives and achievements . But this is 
not the same as finding a fully developed solution to 
contemporary problems and a contemporary identity in a 
remote and idealised period of history , and politically 
it is much more open than the assumption that the past 
conformed to one among the several contemporary options to 
androcentrism, the gynocentric one.
The attempt to construct a religious context for
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affirmation of kinship with nature and of women must be
assessed on its own merits rather than legitimated in terras
of the m y t h i c  past. T h e r e  a r e  m a n y  m e r i t s  in the
affirmation of community , of embodiment , emotionality and
continuity with animals and nature found in current goddess
religion , and in the celebration of women as powerful and
creative. But as a number of critics have pointed out ,
there are also many problems and dangers. The dangers and
problems in current attempts to "revive” goddess-worship
lie mainly in potentialities for reproducing patriarchal
and h i e r a r c h i c a l  patterns in s u b t l e  forms, for e x a m p l e
through the construction of a reverse demonology , and a
reverse account of virtue. Hilde Hein argues that
"adherents of the Goddess religion do not deny the role
ascribed to women by patriarchy , but they reverse the
patriarchal estimation of its value ". W o m e n ’s essential
nature is still conceived in terms of motherhood, the body
and cl o s e n e s s  to nature. S u c h  an a p p r o a c h  p r e s e r v e s
p a t r i a r c h a l  dual i s m  and its w a y s  of c o n c e i v i n g  h u m a n
experience, rather than challenging or escaping those ways.
It continues a tradition which , as Luce Irigaray notes,
"continually presents and represents us with the glorious
s a t i s f a c t i o n  of m o t h e r h o o d ,  bu t  r a r e l y  w i t h  t h a t  of
womanhood" . The role of female divinity in reinforcing
h i e r a r c h y  is anot her p r o b l e m  some h a v e  p o i n t e d  to ; as
Irigaray notes "There is no great advantage in resisting
the man-woman hierarchy, Woman-State, a certain woman-God ,,
or w o m a n - m a c h i n e  only to fall b a c k  u n d e r  the powe r of
na t u r e - w o man , an i ma 1-woman , or e v e n  ma t r i a r c h - wo man or
„30women-women
)
For R o s e m a r y  Rue t h e r  the p r o b l e m  f a c e d  by a g y n o c e n t r i c  
religion which affirms what has been denied, suppressed and 
devalued ' in western culture is the same as- that faced by 
r o m a n t i c i s m  in its a f f i r m a t i o n  of an a l t e r n a t i v e  to the 
dominant aspects of western culture , that "it casts 
p e o p l e  i n t o  f a l s e  o p t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the d o m i n a n t  a n d  
suppressed consciousness", between the biblical and the 
pagan, the rational and the instinctual , the "masculine" 
and the "feminine"" . There is no good reason why such an
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attempt to construct a c o nt e m p o r a r y  ecological and 
feminist religion has to follow these well-worn paths which 
lead to the creation of an inverted image of the 
androcentric worldview, (except that because they are 
well-worn they are easy to follow). But as we shall see 
susceptibility to this kind of problem and danger provides 
an important w a t er s h e d b et ween different anti- 
androcentric positions and strategies . It is a problem 
inherent in the gynocentric strategy of substitution of a 
feminine model for the masculine one as providing the true 
content of human identity, where feminine and masculine 
have been conceived and determined, as in usual 
patriarchal culture, in terms of a polarity or dualism. 
This problem appears repeatedly in contemporary ecofeminist 
critiques and visioning of alternatives through a whole 
range of areas.
THE CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE : SEX OR GENDER ?
V
Much of the ecofeminist critique continues to emphasise the 
importance of dualism in a c o nt e m p o r a r y  rather than 
historical context . For example the role of dualism and 
of patriarchal religion is one of the themes taken up in 
Elizabeth Dodson Gray’s book Green Paradise Lost: Remything 
Genesis. She argues that the perception of difference in 
nature and between species has been shaped by hierarchical 
dualism and treated as one of superiority-inferiority. She 
presents , with many clear and well thought out examples, 
the beginnings of an alternative environmental philosophy, 
adopting a strongly anti-instrumental view, rejecting the 
’’human s t e w a r d s h i p ” approach to nature as too
paternalistic and implicitly hierarchical, and stressing 
connectedness and continuity between living things. Dodson 
Gray is one of the few ecofeminist writers who has begun to 
address the details of a feminist environmental philosophy 
and ethics concerned with relations with the non-human 
world, most being concerned only with its broad outlines. 
There has been little interaction between environmental 
philosophy and feminist thought in this area . Dodson Gray
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argues against anthropocentrism, seeing humans as having 
justified the view of humans as superior by the question­
begging route of making what they (that is, humans) do
3 2best the true measure of superiority
Elizabeth Dodson Gray applies the critique of dualism
especially to the treatment of nature in the form of the
human body, i l l u s t r a t i n g  the still h o n oured and
influential place of such dualism in contemporary thought
by a critique of the work of Ernest Becker . Becker’s The
/3 3Denial of Death , which won a Pulitzer Prize, has become a 
favourite target for feminists , because it displays an 
almost Platonic aversion to and horror of the body, with 
added existential flavouring. It draws together and sums 
up many patriarchal themes, showing by example how negative 
attitudes to the body are associated with aversion to 
women, nature and with anthropocentric arrogance towards 
animals. The mental and symbolic, Becker assures us, give 
man the place of "a small god in nature", but his sorrow is 
the body, source of painful contradiction and of problem, 
"a material fleshy casing that is alien to him in many 
ways", which bleeds, decays and dies and forces the "small 
god" to participate in the awful mortality of the natural 
world. The identification of the authentic human self with 
the mental and undecaying and of the body as a "problem" 
external to the self is a further Platonic feature of 
Becker’s account . Becker’s connection of the problem area 
of the body and the physical with the equally problematic 
female is clearly made, as Dodson Gray points out.
The hierarchic paradigm, she suggests, has produced a 
severing of connections with the body and nature, the body 
being nature in the human form. The rejection of nature 
and physicality carries with it the rejection of woman. 
Although highly critical of patriarchy’s inferiorisation of 
the body, D o d s o n  Gray accepts its view of woman as 
determined by na t u r e and the body to a far greater extent 
than men ; because of the reproductive cycle, she claims, 
it is much harder for women tc escape a sense of connection 
to the natural world. Woman’s bodily experience, she
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provides3 4suggests  "an inescapable limit upon her 
physical existence. It would be difficult for such a woman 
to dream up a sense of herself as unlimited or as all- 
conquering mind or as a Promethean self". There is no 
comparable experience for most men, she suggests. In the 
c1osing chapters she outlines an alternative of openness to 
and connectedness with the natural world and the body ; the 
body (and its limitations) can be valued positively and not 
negatively as it is in a framework of hierarchical dualism.
Difference and the Body :Sex Or Gender?
The argument raises the question of how far ecoferainism is 
a thesis about sex, about differently sexed bodies and the 
consequences of them for the formation of attitudes to the 
natural world, and how far it is a thesis about gender, 
about the social significance given to bodies and bodily 
difference. The argument as presented by Dodson Gray and 
by some kinds of radical feminism seems to try to ground 
an alternative and universal female consciousness in sex, 
in different reproductive features of the female body , and 
this raises some problems. The male body does seem to offer 
comparable experiences of limitation not only through 
sickness and disease but because humans are quite limited 
beings, in the sense that they are unable to do many things 
that other species of animals can do , and many things that 
machines can do, as well as many things they might imagine 
themselves doing or want • to do. And it is only from a 
particular social perspective (that of male dominance and 
of the male as a norm) that the female body is seen as more 
limiting than the male, is seen in terms of inability, is 
so construed and so constructed. Both male and female 
bodies are limited, although in different ways. It is what 
men and women make of this experience of limitation that 
is different, and here feminists such as Simone de 
Beauvoir have shown how, in western society at least, women 
are expected to accept bodily limitation (and other kinds 
of limitation as well) , while men are expected to chafe 
against it and challenge it. But this difference does not 
just arise from the body , and to treat it as if it does is
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to is to write out the social context of male dominance.
There are similar problems in the idea that there is a 
single, universal female bodily experience, inaccessible to 
men, which provides, unmediated by culture, a link to 
nature. Menstruation, Dodson Gray’s example, may be viewed 
and experienced very differently depending on its social 
context ; it is not a pure, cultureless, ” female" (sex) 
bodily experience of connection to nature . For example in 
a culture which treats nature as alien to human identity 
and women as alien to the norm of humanity, menstruation 
may be viewed highly negatively and confirm the view of 
nature as an obstacle to and hindrance to the truly human 
life; it becomes a badge of shame for women who must share 
the state of fallen nature, or is seen as the takeover of 
the body by the force of necessity alien to true humanity, 
as described by Simone de Beauvoir. But those of us who 
have seen such views challenged and changed (perhaps not as 
much as we would like, but to some extent) in our own 
lifetimes will be aware that such meanings are not built-in 
but are acquired in a given social context. But the same 
is true of the treatment of menstruation as providing a 
link to nature and a sense of proper limitation regarding 
nature .
Similar points can be made about nurturance ; although 
women’s reproductivity may be shared with female animals, 
so is men’s shared with male animals , and so are many 
other features of our human lives. Although it is true 
that this shared area of r e p r o d u c t i v i t y  is a more 
important part of most women’s lives and identities than it 
is of men’s, that is .also not something which should be 
seen as due just to nature , at least not according to
feminists ; it can be changed , and is changing , It is
doubtful that we can find a clear sense in which such 
female experience can be seen as providing, independently 
of social context and meaning , a universal female 
characteristic of limitation or closeness to nature based 
in female bodies.
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This is not to argue that bodily difference is irrelevant 
and has no role in determining consciousness, that culture 
or mind is the only relevant factor in the framing of 
gender. If the body and bodily experience is not pure 
nature, neither is it pure culture. Gender is a matter of 
the social significance of the sexed body, and hence has to 
be seen as involving both nature and culture, and usually 
not in separable ways. A p o l a r i s i n g  and dualising 
nature/culture distinction distorts this area as many 
others, e n c o u r a g i n g  a d u a l i s t i c  treatment of the 
sex/gender distinction as either a matter of pure nature 
(sex, the body) or of gender treated as pure culture, or 
else counselling its abandonment if it does not conform to 
this pattern .
The treatment of female bodily exp e r i e n c e  in terms 
identifying it with pure nature , now valued positively, 
reproduces the dualist reversal strategy discussed above. 
Thus it is questionable how far such a treatment of body 
and of woman’s connection to it is successful in escaping , 
rather than merely reversing, the dualism Dodson Gray 
criticises . The acceptance of the closer connectedness 
of women with the body and nature seems to flirt with the 
romantic position of accepting the dualistic division but 
assigning a positive valuation to the hitherto negatively- 
valued side, the side of p h y s icality, the body, bodily 
limitation and of women. Such reverse value strategies 
fail to take account of the way in which 
superiority/ inferiority , dominance and polarisation, 
complementarity and exclusiveness, have developed together 
as part of a system of power in which exclusion from valued 
activities and confinement to less valued ones becomes 
written into gender.
The resulting apparent acceptance of female confinement to 
immanence is unacceptable from a feminist point of view. It 
seems at times to come dangerously close to implicitly 
accepting the polarities which are part of the dualism, and 
to trying to fix up the result by a reversal of the 
valuation which would have men joining women in immanence
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and identifying the authentic self as the body. As an 
important group of ecofeminists now argue , a questioning 
of the negative valuation assigned to the physical sphere 
is certainly needed, but a real solution will involve much 
more, questioning not only the negative valuation of the 
sphere of physicality but also the polarised way in the 
mind/body human/nature, male/female and n a ture/c u 1ture 
dichotomies (among others) have been defined, and other 
parts of the dualistic framework as well. Thus Karen 
Warren writes of radical feminism’s location of women on 
the nature side of the nature/culture dualism :
" . .it mystifies women ’s experience to locate women 
closer to nature than men, just as it underplays 
important aspects of the oppression of women to deny the 
connection of women with nature , for the truth is that 
women, like men, are both connected to nature and 
separate from it, natural and cultural beings. Insofar 
as radical feminism comes down in favor of one side or 
the other of nature/culture dualism — by locating women 
on the nature or on the culture side —  it mistakenly 
perpetuates the sort of oppositional thinking for which 
patriarchal conceptual frameworks are criticised. "
Dodson Gray’s draws attention however to the way in which 
acceptance of the body does involve accepting limitation, 
and the way in which conceiving identity in terms of "a 
Promethean self" beyond the body involves a particular kind 
of rejection of limitation and a view of the true self as 
outside nature. She is right in taking this view of 
limitation to be associated with masculinity and the 
rationalist tradition,(and perhaps to an even greater 
extent with the Marxist tradition) and in suggesting that 
it needs to be abandoned or modified in forming an 
ecological identity, that we need to see ourselves as much 
more limited with respect to nature than the western 
tradition has permitted. "The Promethean self" of the west 
sees itself as transcendent , having virtually unlimited 
powers and rights with respect to nature . The more modest 
attitudes of other cultures have often seen this as hubris 
and the acceptance of limitation (sometimes treated as 
feminine) is a major message of non-western texts such as 
the Tao-Te-Ching. As Chief Joseph put it in his discussion 
of white men’s ways in 1873 : " We were content to let
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things remain as the Great Spirit made them. They were not,
O Qand would change the rivers if they did not suit them"
Does this mean that such an ecological self involves here a 
feminine model, accepting the kind of traditional feminine 
immersion in nature which has been so oppressive to women 
on the analj'-sis of feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir ? 
It depends of course on which limitation and how much; 
even Taoists do not accept everything . But that it has 
been so oppressive is partly due to the fact that it has 
been just women who have been thus required to accept 
limitation, "immanence" , and that this is part of the 
context of their social oppression in a society where full 
humanity is defined in terms of not accepting it, and 
part of a pattern of domination in which feminine immanence 
contrasts with masculine transcendence . If acceptance of 
limitation is now to be taken as an ecological virtue it 
must clearly be so for everybody , not just women , and is 
thus different from traditional subordinated feminine 
passivity and immanence .
But on the kind of analysis involved in the critique of 
dualism, what is needed here is not so much general 
acceptance of a traditional feminine model of passivity and 
immanence based in inequality , as a rethinking of these 
concepts themselves and the way in which the dominant 
western model for human^ nature relations has developed as 
part of a gendered pattern of domination in which both 
nature and women are seen as acted upon by a dominant 
and transcendent masculine subjectivity, that is, the 
dualistic construction of the transcendence/immanence, 
m a s c u l i n e / f e m i n i n e ,  and h u m a n / n a t u r e  contrasts as a 
relationship of dominance and subordination.
THE CRITIQUE OF MASCULINITY
An alternative approach to ecofeminism follows out a rather 
different strategy to those discussed above based in the 
historical account and the critique of dualism. This 
alternative appeals to difference theory and the critique
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of masculinity to explain ecological destruction. But 
difference and masculinity are treated by the different 
feminist positions in very different ways, and this leads 
to different perspectives on vecofeminism. This area has 
been ably discussed by Karen Warren, who has traced the 
way in which the four leading feminist positions of 
liberal, Marxist , socialist and radical feminism treat 
environmental issues and issues of w o m e n ’s relation to 
nature.
Neither liberal nor Marxist feminists, if they remain
faithful to their father theories, can treat seriously the
issue of an alternative ecological self based in a critique
of western relations to gender and nature, since both
positions are committed to the existing paradigm of human
identity in which nature is what is to be left behind in
the formation of the truly human aspects of social and
individual identity ^  . But for both radical feminism and
for those broader forms of socialist or anarchist feminism
which have been less influenced by the Marxist treatment of
nature, the issue of framing a new ecological identity
which integrates a critique of gender does arise, but is
treated in very different ways. Radical feminism has
indeed addressed the issue as one requiring radical change,
and mainly seen the new identity as needing to be based on
rejection of masculinity and the adoption of a feminine
model. Radical feminist treatments of the destruction of
nature have tended not only to reduce the problem to one
of gender difference, blaming masculinity and allowing
other factors only a minor role or none at all, but have
tended to deal with gender d if fe re n ce  as a cultural
universal. Thus Andree Collard writes :
Just as the Goddess had the same characteristics the 
world over, so the God is similar everywhere . Man, 
too, named himself through his gods and took his images 
with him wherever he went . Woman had perceived herself 
as being like un t q nature ; man n a med himself as 
distinct from nature4 .
But any attempt to thus explain the problem of 
environmental destructiveness in terms of differences which 
are treated as culturally universal, whether of the
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features of the female body or of the male body , seems to 
be doomed to failure . Such an explanation is much too 
diffuse, implicating all male humans, and indeed in some 
cases all male animals . Environmental destructiveness is 
not a feature of all cultures , and does not appear to 
correlate in any simple way with male/female dominance 
patterns within cultures. Contemporary forms appear to beh
especially to western culture and technology and its 
treatment of nature in terms of a gender i s e d  
nature/culture dualism. Radical feminism’s insensitivity 
to cultural context slips easily into ethnocentrism, taking 
a western viewpoint for granted as the universal context of 
human life. This does not mean that gender is not 
implicated, but that it is necessary to examine not just 
maleness but the different forms of masculinity as they are 
worked out in different cultural contexts. It does not 
mean either that radical feminist work in the area has not 
contributed many very valuable insights, or that some 
claims may not be valid in specific cultural contexts, 
but rather that these have often been given the wrong 
significance.
Collard supports her view by implicating original male 
association with a culturally universal activity —  hunting 
—  as the source of a violent and predatory, attitude 
towards nature and animals , later extended to women. 
Feminist thinkers have rightly challenged the emphasis on 
hunting in the thinking of male dominated accounts of human 
cultural evolution ; but this blanket condemnation of 
hunting seems a harsh judgement on the many human cultures 
which have lived responsibly and sensitively with their 
non-human surroundings, including controlled hunting of 
animals in their activities as any group which exploits the 
food chain fully must do. Hunting is , as Collard claims, 
a violent act, but the social context of the act can give 
it a different significance from the social cultivation of 
violence. Thus Indian hunters variously evolved a special 
sacred relationship with the hunted animal, invoked its 
consent by ritual means , explaining the depth of their 
need, and carried out religious ceremonies to place the
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act in a context of continuity between life forms and of
respect for the slain. Hunting is not divided strictly
according to gender, and in many societies (Australian
Aboriginal society is an example) women regularly hunted
and killed small animals , whose claim to consideration is
4 2presumably not invalidated by their small size
The normal hunting context of contemporary western society 
is very different. It is that of an instrumental 
masculinity, treating the world as its oyster, killing for 
pleasure and without true need or sometimes even purpose, 
an approach thoroughly condemned, by many traditional 
hunters such as Black Elk :
"I can remember when the bison were so many that they 
could not be counted, but more and more Wasichus came to 
kill them until there were only heaps of bones scattered 
where they used to be. The Wasichus did not kill them 
to eat ; they killed them for the metal that makes them 
crazy ; and they took only the hides to sell. Sometimes 
they did not even take the hides , only the tongues ; 
and I have heard that fire-boats came down the Missouri 
River loaded with dried bison tongues. You can see that 
the men who did this were crazy. Sometimes they did not 
even take the tongues ; they just killed and killed them 
because they liked to do that. When we hunted bison, 
we killed only what we needed."
Masculinity is certainly implicated, but in a specific
cultural context and in combination with other factors.
Explanation in terms of a universal masculinity suppresses
or takes such social context for granted , or as in the
case above, invalidly extrapolates a particular social
context. Western culture is also implicated, but the
destructiveness of western culture has a great deal to do
with the way in which it has conceived the nature/culture
distinction in terms of a male /female relationship of
domination and subordination.
There is a case for treating masculinity in a less 
monolithic fashion. Although there may be some things we 
can say. about masculinity as a cultural universal, mostly 
we will need to focus on particular social and cultural 
forms of gender, both between societies and within 
societies —  on forms of m a s c u l i n i t y  rather than 
m a s c u l i n i t y  . This provides a better ex p l a n a t o r y
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frame w o r k  since it enables gender to function non- 
reductively in explana tions ; it enables explanation to 
take account of gender in combination with other factors, 
which seems likely to provide a better approach to 
explaining the destruction of nature given that the 
alignment of gender with the culture/nature contrast (which 
is a major factor in most of the explanations advanced so 
far) is culturally specific. Thus much of the problematic 
content of contemporary masculinity in the west as far as 
nature is concerned derives from its alignment with the 
market and other institutions of the public sphere . These, 
as I shall argue, continue and enhance the conception of 
human/male identity in terms of discontinuity from nature 
handed down by the classical and rationalist tradition*
The appeal to universal and invariant formations of gender 
adopted by some forms of radical feminism to account for 
ecological destruction must be rejected, along with the 
attempt to reverse the value of feminine characteristics 
and to discover a universal female experience which ensures 
that women are closer to nature. Nevertheless there is 
something that seems profoundly right about the idea that 
we need , as a culture, to review and upgrade the value of 
the feminine forms and areas of life, and that this is 
highly relevant to our culture’s ecological crisis. This 
is the perception that the omission , subordination and 
devaluation of what has been set apart as feminine/natural 
has profoundly distorted male dominant culture, and 
especially those areas of it which have had to do with 
nature, the formation of the self, and human identity. 
Jean Baker Miller provides some insight into what this 
distortion has meant :
In the course of projecting into women's domain some of 
its most troublesome and problematic exigencies , male- 
led societyr may have also s i m u ltaneously- , and 
unwittinglyr, delegated to women not humanity’s "lowest 
needs" but its "highest necessities" -- that is, the 
intense , emotionallyr connected creativity necessary for 
human life and growth.
This process of distortion and omission, which has applied both 
to women and to nature, has meant that the dominant spheres of
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western culture are incapable of acknowledging, valuing and
sustaining certain important kinds of relationships , and these
include, I shall argue, not only the kinds of relationships to
others r e le g a t e d  to w o m e n ’s mode of e x is te nc e but certain
important kinds of relationships with nature (nature both within
and without) . And nature itself is not among humanity’s ’’lowest
needs", as western culture has for so long thought , but among
its "highest necessities". We need to begin a process of
acknowledging and recognising (in the full sense) the feminine
and natural processes have been the disregarded and deniedA
"background" to our lives , and to recognise our essential human 
relationship to the earth, at both the individual and social 
1 eve 1 s ^
Ecofeminism has understood the need for recognition of nature 
and the feminine, has seen that these projects of reintegration 
and reclamation must go together. But we have seen some of the 
reasons to distrust the simple "reversal” model of reintegration 
and revaluing which has been put forward by some ecofeminist and 
romantic thinkers. The anti-dualist critique of this reversal 
strategy has been powerful, but has not yet supplied an 
alternative model. That problem, of what model we might adopt to 
reclaim and honour these subordinated and denied
feminine/natural aspects of our culture and ourselves, is one of 
the main ones which I address in the following chapters.
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Chapt er Thr e e j_ F emini sm and Human Identity
Male-dominant culture, as all feminists have observed, 
defines masculinity and femininity as contrasting forms. 
In contemporary society, men are defined as active, 
women as passive ; men are intellectual, women are 
intuitive ; men are inexpressive, women emotional ; men 
are strong , women weak ; men are dominant , women
submissive ,etc; ad nauseam ......To the extent that
women and men conform to gendered definitions of their 
humanity, they are bound to be a l i e n a t e d  from 
themselves. The concepts of femininity and masculinity 
force both men and women to overdevelop certain of their 
capacities at the expense of others. For instance men 
become excessively competitive and detached from others; 
women become excessively nurtu rant and altruistic. 
Whether one believes with liberal feminism that men more 
than women have been allowed to develop their more human 
capacities or whether one believes with radical feminism 
that women are more fully human than men, the fact 
remains that both sexes have been prevented from the 
full and free d e v e l o p m e n t  of their p r o d u c t i v e  
capacities. Both sexes are fragmented distortions of 
human possibility. Both sexes are alienated from their 
humanity.
Alison Jaggar Feminist Politics and Human N a t u r e ,
Harvester Brighton 1983, p316.
T h e r e  is n o w  a g r o w i n g  a w a r e n e s s  tha t  the w e s t e r n  
philosophical tradition which has identified, on the one 
hand, raaleness with the sphere of rationality, and on the 
other hand, femaleness with the s p h e r e  of n a t u r e ,  has 
p r o v i d e d  o n e  of the m a i n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  b a s e s  for the 
domination of women in western culture.
There are plenty of good reasons for feminists to distrust 
both the concept of rationality and the notion of links 
with nature and the conc ept of n a t u r e .  B o t h  of these 
concepts and their contrasts have been major tools used 
to inferiorize and exclude women (as well as other groups). 
The main function of the concept of rationality, which has 
a confusing array of senses in which it is often hard to 
d i s c e r n  a n y  p r e c i s e  c o n t e n t ,  s e e m s  to be a s e l f -  
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y  one for the g r o u p  t h o u g h t  to p o s s e s s  the 
prized q u a l i t y  and the e x c l u s i o n  and d e n i g r a t i o n  of the 
c o n t r a s t i n g  group which does not. Thu s  the s p h e r e  of 
r a t i o n a l i t y  v a r i o u s l y  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  and e x c l u d e s  the
7 3
sphere.of the emotions, the body, the passions, nature, the 
non-human world, faith, matter and physicality, experience 
and madness. The masculine  ^ rational sphere of public 
life, production, social and cultural life and rational 
justice is contrasted with the feminine sphere of the 
private, domestic and r e p r o d u c t i v e  life, the latter 
representing the natural and individual as against the 
social and cultural. Again, the rational masculine sphere 
is a sphere where human freedom and control are exercised 
over affairs and over nature, especially via science and in 
active struggle against nature and over circumstances. In 
contrast, the feminine natural and domestic sphere 
represents the area of immersion in life, the natural part 
of a human being, the sphere of passivity, acceptance of 
u n c h a n g e a b l e  human nature and natural necessity, of 
reproduction and necessary and unfree labour.
In these cases there is not merely a contrast but an 
unfavourable one; the sphere associated with femininity 
and nature is accorded lower value than that associated 
with m a s c u l i n i t y  and freedom. In all the senses of 
rationality, the "rational" side of the contrasts is more 
highly regarded and is part of the ideal human character, 
so that women, to the extent that they are faithful to the 
divergent ideals of womanhood, emerge as inferior, 
i m p o v e r i s h e d  or imperfect human beings, lacking or 
possessing in a reduced form the admired characteristics of 
courage, control, rationality and freedom which make humans 
what they are, and which, a c cording to this view, 
distinctively mark them off from nature and the animal. 
Feminine "closeness to nature" in this sense is hardly a 
compliment. The ideals of the masculine sphere and those 
of humanity are identical or are convergent. Those of 
femininity and humanity are divergent. To put the point 
another way, the ideals of the rational sphere give us a 
character model of the human which is masculine.
THE WOMAN-NATURE CONNECTION OUTDATED AND OPPRESSIVE?
The concept of nature too has been and remains a major tool 
in the armoury of conservatives intent on keeping women in 
their place and supporting a rigid division of sexual 
spheres, or worse. It is allegedly nature, not contingent 
and changeable social arrangements, which determines that 
the lot of women will be that of reproduction and domestic 
arrangements and which justifies inequality. Women have 
been seen as connected with nature in both its two major 
different contrast senses, that of nature in contrast to 
culture or society, the realm of necessity in contrast to 
that of freedom, of controllable human cultural and social 
arrangements, and that of nature in contrast to the human 
world, or what is distinctively human in the world. The 
first sense, in which what is natural is what is not • open 
to e x p l a n a t i o n  or change, inspires the following 
conservative comment:
"Nature i s n ’t fair, and never will be - it is not 
concerned with justice. Nature has made Man with more 
Assertion, so that he will not willingly let Woman take 
first place. If she tries to he will always feel his 
manhood affronted, and he will not like her so much. It 
i sn’t fair, but it is a fact. ...
Without women men will always fight and drink and live 
like crows - they are really little savages. I t ’s women 
who are the homemakers, the civilisers, the gentle, the 
beautiful ones - and all they require of men is Security 
and Love. But they get more enjoyment out of the Arts, 
more fun out of being creative, more love out of little 
children, more depth out of life. To ask to be equal as 
well - is it really fair?”
(No, it’s not a contemporary of Rousseau’s. That appeared 
in a book published in 1985 ) .
As Genevieve Lloyd has noted in her book The Man of Reason, 
however, the attitude to both women and nature resulting 
from the identification has not always been a simple one, 
and as Carolyn Merchant notes, it has not always been
Qpurely negative0 . The connection has sometimes been used 
to provide a limited affirmation of both women and nature 
for example, in the romantic tradition. But the dominant 
tradition has been one in which the conne c tion with nature 
accords women a lower status (even if one that is sometimes
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accorded some virtue as a "complement”), and has been used 
to confine them to limited and impoverished lives.
Given this background, it is not surprising that many 
f e m i n i s t s  regard with some s u s p i c i o n  a recent view, 
expressed by a growing number of writers in the ecofeminist 
camp, that there may be something to be said in favour of 
feminine connectedness with nature, and that there are 
important connections between the oppression of women and 
the domination and destruction of the natural world which 
feminism cannot afford to ignore. The very idea of a 
f e m i n i n e  con n e c t i o n  with nature seems to many to be 
regressive and insulting, summoning up images of women as 
passive, reproductive animals, contented cows immersed in 
the body and in unreflecting experiencing of life.
It is both tempting and common therefore for feminists to 
view the traditional connection between women and nature as 
no more than an instrument of oppression, a relic of the 
bad old days which should simply wither away once its roots 
in an oppressive tradition are exposed. After all, this is 
1990. It seems obvious enough that women must now claim 
full and equal participation in the sphere of humanity and 
rationality from which they have been excluded, and to 
which their traditional sphere of nature has been opposed. 
Freed of traditional prejudice and of the traditionally 
enforced tie to the natural, women can at last take their 
place simply as equal human beings. The connection with 
nature is best forgotten. Women (especially modern women) 
have no more rea.l connection with nature than men.
But there are several reasons why this widespread, 
"commonsense" approach to the issue is unsatisfactory. 
There are several reasons why the question of a woman- 
nature connection can’t just be set aside, why the question 
should be examined carefully by feminists. The first of 
these, which is developed in the first part of the chapter, 
is that it is essential to give critical examination to the 
issue because of its repercussions both for the model of 
humanity and for the treatment of nature.
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The second reason, which is developed in the later part of 
the chapter, is that it is essential for feminism to 
address the issue because the ecofeminist argument reveals 
an important ambig u i t y  in feminist theory itself. 
Examination of the ecofeminist argument can throw valuable 
light on questions at the heart of feminism itself, and has 
significant implications for distinguishing different 
strains of feminism and different associated strategies.
The commonsense approach might better be called the "naive" 
approach on analogy with naive realism in epistemology, 
since like naive realism it takes to be unproblematic what 
is not unproblematic. According to the naive view, the 
connect ion of women with nature should simply be set aside 
as a relic of the past, the problem for both women and men 
being that of becoming simply, unproblematically and fully 
human. But the question of what is human is itself now 
highly problematic, and one of the areas in which it is 
most problematic is in the relation of humans to nature, to 
the non-human world.
Another problem is that wha t is in question is not just a 
model of feminine connectedness with and passivity towards 
nature, but also a contrasting and complementary one of 
masculine disconnectedness from and domination of nature. 
But the assumptions in the masculine model are not seen as' 
such because the masculine model is taken for granted as 
simply a human model and the feminine as a deviation from 
that. Hence to simply repudiate the old tradition of 
feminine connection with nature and to put nothing in its 
place, usually amounts to imp li c it ly  endorsing an 
alternative masculine model of the human and of human 
relations to nature and to implicitly endorsing also female 
absorption into this model. It is not, as it might at 
first appear, a neutral position, because unless the 
que s tion of relation to na ture is explicitly put up for 
consideration and renegotiation, it is already settled -- 
and settled in an unsatisfactory way -- by the dominant 
western model of humanity into which women will be fitted.
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This is a model of domination and transcendence of nature, 
in which freedom and virtue are construed in terms of 
control over, and distance from, the natural sphere. The 
cri t i q u e  of the d o m i n a t i o n  of nature deve l o p e d  by 
environmental philosophers in the last 10 years has shown I 
think that there are excellent reasons to be critical of 
this model^. Unless there is some critical re-evaluation 
of this masculine model in the area of relations to nature, 
the old female/nature connection will be replaced by a 
dominant model of distance from, transcendence and control 
of nature which is masculine. Some critical examination of 
the question then has to have a place, and an important 
one, on the feminist agenda if a masculine model of the 
human and of human relations to nature is not to triumph by 
de f auIt.
Feminism and the Inf eriority of the Sphere of Nature
There is another reason then why the issue cannot be set 
aside in the way the naive view assumes. As a number of 
ecofeminists have observed, feminism needs to put its own 
house in order on this issue. If women do not have to 
fight the battles of other groups in a display of 
traditional altruism and self-abnegation, to carry the 
w o rld’s ills in recognition of motherly duty, as some 
arguments from peace and environmental activists suggest, 
it is also true that they can’t base their own freedom on 
endorsing the continued lowly status of the sphere from 
which they have lately risen. Moves upwards in human 
groups are often accompanied by the vociferous insistence 
that those new recruits to the privileged class are utterly 
disassociated from the despised group from which they have 
emerged —  hence the phenomenon of lower middle-class 
respectability and the officer risen from the ranks. 
Arguments for women cannot convincingly be based on a 
similar put-down of the non-human world.
But much of the traditional argument has been so based. 
For Mary Wo 11 s t onec r a f t for example, what is valuable in 
the human character ideal to which women must aspire and be
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admitted is defined in contrast to the inferior sphere of 
brute creation. Thus she begins her V i n d i c a t i o n  b y 
asking:"In what does m a n ’s pre-eminence over the brute 
creation, consist? The answer is as clear as that a half 
is less than a whole, in Reason." And she goes on:
For what purpose were the passions implanted? That man 
by s t r u g g l i n g  with them might attain a degree of 
knowledge denied to the brutes.
Consequently the perfection of our nature and capability 
of happiness must be estimated by the degree of reason, 
virtue and humanity that distinguish the individual and 
that from the exercise of reason, knowledge and virtue 
naturally flows . . . "^
In her argument that women do have the capacity to join men 
in "superiority to the brute creation", the inferiority of 
the natural order is simply taken for granted. It is 
certainly no longer acceptable for feminists to argue for 
equality in this way.
THE MASCULINITY OF THE DOMINANT MODEL
Several critiques converge to necessitate reconsideration 
of the model of feminine connectedness with nature and 
m asculine distance from and d o m i n a t i o n  of it and to 
problematize the concept of the human. They are :
(a) the critique of masculinity and the valuing of 
traits associated with it traditionally;
(b) the critique of rationality; relevant here is not 
only the m a s c u l i n e  and instrumental character of 
rationality , but also its overvaluation and use as a tool 
for the exclusion and oppression of the contrasting classes 
of the non-human (since rationality is often taken as the 
distinguishing mark of the human) and of women ( because of 
its association with maleness). The overvaluation of 
rationality is deeply entrenched in Western culture and 
intellectual traditions, not always taking the extreme 
form of some of the classical philosophers (for example 
the Platonic view that the unexamined life was worthless,
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or the neo-Platonic one that rationality was the ultimate 
value to which all others were i n s t r u m e n t a l )^ , but 
appearing in many more subtle modern forms, e . g , the 
limitation of consideration to rational moral agents.
(c) the critique of the human domination of nature, 
human chauvinism, speciesisra, or anthropocentrism : of the
treatment of nature in purely instrumental terms and the 
low valuation placed on it in relati on to the human and 
cultural spheres. Included in this is a critique of the 
model of the ideal human character and of human virtue, 
which points out that the Western human ideal is one which 
maximises difference and distance from the animal and the 
natural; the traits thought distinctively human, and valued 
as a result are not only those associated with masculinity 
but those unshared with animals. Usually these are taken to 
be mental characteristics. An associated move is the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the human with the higher, mental 
capabilities and of the animal or natural with lower bodily 
ones, and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the authentic human 
individual with the mental sphere.
The critiques converge for several reasons. A major one is 
that the characteristics traditionally associated with 
m a s c u l i n i t y  are also those used to define what is 
distinctively human, e.g, rationality (and selected mental 
characteristics and skills), transcendence and activity, 
i.e. domination and control of nature as opposed to passive 
immersion in it (consider the characterisation of "savages" 
as lower orders of humanity on this account), productive 
labour, s o c i a b i l i t y  and culture. These last
characteristics are assumed to be confined to humans but 
also associated with the masculine sphere of public life as 
opposed to the private, domestic, and reproductive sphere 
assigned to women.Masculine virtues are also taken to be 
human virtues, what distinguishes humans from the sphere 
of nature, e s p e c i a l l y  the qualities of rationality, 
transcendence and freedom. Some traditional feminist 
arguments also provide striking example of this 
identification of the human and the masculine. Thus Mary 
Wo 11stonecraft in the Vindicat ion appeals strongly to the
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notion of an ungendered human character as an ideal for 
both sexes ("the first object of laudable ambition is to 
obtain a character as a human b e i n g " ) ,  but this human 
character is implicitly masculine. The human character 
ideal she espouses diverges sharply from the feminine 
character ideal, which she rejects, "despising that weak 
elegancy of mind, exquiste sensibility, and sweet docility 
of manners". Instead she urges that women become "more 
masculine and respectable". The complementary feminine 
c h a r a c t e r  ideal is rejected —  both sexes should 
participate in a common human character ideal(p23) which 
despite some minor modifications (men are to become more 
modest and chaste and in that respect to take on feminine 
characteristics) coincides in its specifications with the 
masculine character. A single "unsexed" character ideal is 
substituted for the old two-sexed one , where the old 
feminine ideal was perceived as subsidiary and sexed.
The key concepts of rationality (or mentality) and nature 
then form a crucial link b etween the huitfan and the 
masculine, so that to p r o b l e m a t i s e  m a s c u l i n i t y  and 
rationality is at the same time to probleraatize the human, 
and with it, the relation of the human to the contrasted 
non-human sphere. The naive approach mistakenly takes the 
concept of the human to be unproblematic and fails to 
observe its masculine bias. This dual connection is then 
another reason why the issue of the traditional
connection of women and nature can’t simply be ignored, why 
the problems raised must be considered.
The concept of the human is itself very heavily normative.
The n otion of being fully or properly human carries
eno r m o u s  p o s itive weight , and usually with little
examination of the assumptions behind this, or the
inferiorisat ion of the class of non-humans this involves.
Things are deplored or praised in terms of conformity to a
concept of "full humanity". But the dignity of humanity,
like that of masculinity, is maintained by contrast with an
gexcluded inferior class .
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The concept of the human plays an important but somewhat 
shadowy role in the problem, and assumptions about the 
ideal nature of the human often stand silently in the 
background in discussion on masculinity and femininity, as 
well as in other areas. Thus for example behind the view 
that there is something insulting or degrading about 
linking women and nature stands an u n s tated set of 
assumptions about the inferior status of the non-human 
world. Behind the view that the the traditional connection 
between women and nature can be forgotten stands the 
assumption that women can now be fitted unproblematically 
into the current concept of the human, and , again, that 
this concept itself is unproblematic.
Once these assumptions are made explicit , the connection 
between the stance adopted on the issue of the woman/nature 
connection and the different possibilities for feminism 
becomes clearer. In terms of this framework the main 
traditional position —  the point of departure for feminism 
—  can be seen as one in which the ideal of human character 
is not," as it often pretends to be , gender-neutral, but 
instead coincides or converges with that of masculine 
character, while the ideals of w o m a n h o o d  diverge. 
Included, and indeed having pride of place in this 
character ideal are the ideals of rationality, self- 
expression, freedom and control via transformation and 
domination of the natural. Womanly character ideals of 
emotionality, passivity acceptance and nurturance stand in 
contrast. Thus, as Simone de Beauvoir has so powerfully 
stated, the tragedy of being a woman consisted not only in 
having one’s life and choices impoverished and limited, but 
also in the fact that to be a good woman was to be a 
second-rate human being . So that to the extent that 
these "neutral” human character ideals were subscribed to 
and absorbed and the traditional feminine role also 
accepted, women must forever be forced to see themselves as 
inferiors and to be so seen. Because women were excluded 
from the activities and characteristics which were highly 
valorised and seen as distinctively human, they were forced 
to be satisfied with being mere spectators of what the
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distinctively human business of life was all about, the 
real business of the struggle with nature.
De Beauvoir’s solution to this tragic dilemma is also 
stated with great force and clarity —  change was to come 
about by women fitting themselves and being allowed to fit 
themselves into the dominant model of the human, and women 
were thus to become fully human. The model itself, and 
and the model of freedom via the domination of nature it 
is especially based on , are never themselves brought into 
question, and indeed women’s eagerness to participate in 
it confirms and supports the superiority of the model. 
S i m i l a r l y  for others, e,g. Harriet Taylor and Mary 
Wollstonecraf t . As this earlier feminism saw it, the 
tragedy of women was that they were treated as less than 
fully human, or that , prevented from becoming fully human 
they were kept at the level of the brutes.
This has been called the first, masculinising, wave of 
feminism . The problem for women was to claim full 
humanity, i.e to conform to the main human character ideal 
defined by traits characteristic also of the masculine, and 
to fit into, adapt themselves to, the corresponding social 
institutions of the public sphere. These might require 
some minor modification but basically it was women who were 
to change and adapt (sometimes with help) , and women (or 
what society had made of them) who were the problem. The 
p o s i t i o n  can be summed up as that of d e m a n d i n g  
participation by women in a masculine concept or ideal of 
humanity, and the associated activist strategy as that of 
demanding equal admittance for women to a masculine-defined 
sphere and masculine institutions-.
Central to these was the domination of nature. Women, in 
this strategy , are to join men in participation in areas 
which especially exhibit human freedom, such as science and 
technology, from which they have been especially strongly 
excluded. These areas are especially strongly masculine 
not only because their style heavily involves the highly 
valorised masculine traits of objectivity, abstractness,
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rationality and suppression of emotionality, but also 
because of their function which exhibits most strongly the 
masculine virtues of transcendence of, control of and 
struggle with nature. In the equal admittance strategy, 
women enter science, but science itself and its 
orientation to the domination of nature remain unchanged.
This masculinizing strategy is the one which is being 
implicitly adopted when the problem of the woman-nature 
connection is simply sidestepped or set aside. It is 
assumed that the solution is for women to fit into a 
masculine, model of human relations to nature which does not 
require change or challenge.
In the last decade this first, masculinizing strategy of
feminism has come under strong criticism from several
feminist quarters and a number of its problems identified.
One problem is that the masculine model of the human and
corresponding social institutions has been arrived at
p r e c i s e l y  by e x clusion and d e v a l u a t i o n  of women and
feminine characteristics. Because it has been defined by
exclusion , it is loaded against women in a variety of
subtle and less subtle ways and women will not benefit from
admittance to it as much as they think. As Genevieve Lloyd
notes, "Women cannot easily be accommodated into a cultural
ideal that has defined itself in o p p o s i t i o n  to the
1 2feminine" . Absorption into the masculine model is not 
likely to be successful .
Other major criticisms come from those who see the need to 
reject or modify the masculine character ideal as well as 
(or in some cases instead of ) the feminine character ideal 
rejected or modified in the masculinising strategy. There 
are several different angles from which this criticism is 
directed. One is from difference theorists, who reject the 
masculine character ideal as a model, at least for women 
and in some cases for both men and women. Another is from 
ecofeminists, who reject the masculine model especially in 
the area of human relations to nature, and argue more 
directly that this masculinizing strategy amounts to having
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women join men in belonging to a priveleged class in turn
defined by excluding the inferior class of the non-human;
that is , it is a strategy of having women equally admitted
to a now wider dominating class, without questioning the
structure of, or the necessity for, domination ' . The
e c o f e m i n i s t  criticism here is that the conceptual
apparatus relating superior to inferior orders remains
intact and unquestioned, and what is achieved is a
broadening of the dominating class, without changing or
challenging the basis of domination itself. And the
attempt to simply enlarge the priveleged class by extending
to and including women not only ignores a crucial moral
dimension of the problem, it ignores the way in which
different kinds of domination act as models for and as
support and reinforcement for one another , and the way in
which the same conceptual structure of domination reappears
in very different inferiorised groups,e ,g . women, inferior
humans, slaves, manual laborers, "savages” , people of
14colour —  all "closer to the animals"
What seems to be involved here is often not so much an 
affirmation of feminine connectedness with and closeness to 
nature as distrust and rejection of the masculine
character model (especially as formed and expressed in the 
distinctively male public sphere and in its economic 
str u c t u r e s  and its structures of rationality) of 
disconnectedness from and domination of the natural order. 
The masculine character ideal is similarly rejected by the 
broader ecofeminists and by some theorists of non-violence 
who link the masculine character ideal (and in some cases 
biological maleness) to aggression against fellow humans, 
especially women, as well as against nature. They reject 
the absorption of women into this mould, which is perceived 
as yielding a culture not of life but of d e a t h ^  . This 
critique is based on the perception that it is not only 
that women have been damaged and oppressed by assimilation 
to the sphere of nature, but also that men have been 
damaged and distorted by their distance , discontinuity and 
opposition to the same sphere.
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A RIVAL FEMININE MODEL OF HUMAN IDENTITY ?
One thing that has emerged from the discussion so far is 
that a critical and thoroughgoing contemporary feminism is 
and must be engaged in a lot more than merely challenging 
and revising ideals of feminine character, that it is and 
must be engaged in revising and challenging as well the 
ideals of both masculine and of human character. The
masculinizing strategy is unsatisfactory and superficial 
precisely because it does not do this. In the light of 
this under s tanding it seems wor thwhile to try to compare 
and evaluate some alternative strategies for revising the 
human character ideal and to try to spell out more clearly 
what alternative model the ecofeminist argument is really 
a p p e a l i n g  to, and e s p ec ia l ly  how it differs from 
conservative positions it is often confused with. It seems 
clear that the basic common ground of the ecofeminist and 
non-violence argument is rejecting the masculine model of 
the human as a character ideal, at least for women, but 
beyond that there is confusion, a m b i g u i t y  and 
indeterminacy, and a number of different alternatives are 
possible or suggested.
Perhaps the most obvious way to interpret the ecofeminist 
argument is as one which replaces the masculine model of 
the human character by a new feminine model. That is, if 
the masculinizing s t ra t egy rejected the feminine charac ter 
ideal and affirmed a masculine one for both sexes, this 
feminizing strategy rejects the masculine character ideal 
and affirms a feminine one for both sexes. The 
masculinizing wave of feminism is succeeded by a new 
feminizing wave. Several slogans sum up this feminizing 
strategy, e . g . "the future is female", "Adam was a rough 
draft, Eve is a fair copy” . There are several different 
forms the the assertion of a feminine character ideal can 
take, and it is important to be clear about the 
differences.
First, a feminine character ideal can be affirmed not as a
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rival to the masculine character ideal but as a complement. 
The masculine model is not really challenged at all in this 
s t r a t e g y  and may in fact be affirmed and supported) 
although there may be some degree of upward revaluation of 
the relative worth of feminine traits ( as the quotation on 
p73 illustrates). For example, the romantic tradition 
often does this, affirming the value of the feminine but 
in a way that does not really challenge the masculine 
ideal, but rather c o m p l e m e n t s  it or adds a separate 
feminine model.
An associated strategy is that of affirming a traditional 
model of feminine character obtained by reversing the 
values, so that traits previously regarded as lowly and 
despised become instead virtues and are given a high value: 
e.g. closeness to nature, previously used to put women 
down, is recast as a virtue.
There is a fairly strong tendency for a position which thus
simply reverses the value of traditional feminine traits to
collapse into a complementary position, and conversely for
a complementary affirmation of feminine character to affirm
traditional traits. One reason for this is that really
traditional feminine traits include appropriate attitudes
of s u b s e r v i e n c e  or s e l f - a b n e g a t i o n  which require a
masculine complement. Thus where feminine virtues are
developed in a situation of exclusion and complementation
there is a problem about how they can stand on their own 
1 7 The associated social change strategy is that of 
separate spheres —  recognizing and revalorising traditional 
femininity as a complement to masculinity. This is a 
conservative pre-feminist or anti-feminist strategy, and 
is included here for completeness of alternatives, and so 
that it can be seen in relation to other positions.
A different strategy is that of affirming a feminine 
character ideal as a rival ideal, attempting to replace 
the masculine ideal, not merely to complement it. To be a 
genuine rival, it has to be affirmed as a rival model of 
the human , displacing or competing with the masculine
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model of the human. The human ideal then becomes a
feminine rather than , as traditionally, a masculine one ,
and human virtues are now feminine virtues and character
traits rather than masculine ones. Thus a feminine ideal
is seen as desirable for both sexes, although there may be
doubts as to how far biological males can ever approximate
to it. Thus, according to Sally Miller Gearhart,
It is time to dare to admit that some of the sex-role
m y t h o l o g y  is in fact true and to insist that the
qualities attributed to women (specifically empathy,
nurturance and co-operativeness) be affirmed as human
quälities capable of cultivation by men even if denied
1 8them by nature.
The "primacy of the female " ( i.e. of feminine character
traits, not necessarily biological femaleness) would be
1 9acknowledged ” as primary, the source of all life".
What has come to be called "difference theory" can involve 
the celebration and articulation of woman’s difference from 
the ideal and actuality of masculine character, and in
some forms, can represent another strand of this 
feminizing strategy. In contrast to the sort of position 
discussed above , which assumes that the identification of 
feminine traits is clear and that they can be known to 
include such traditional traits as nurturance and empathy, 
this alternative strand takes the form of the celebration 
of what is proclaimed as the genuinely feminine, which may 
be " a feminine principle not to be defined" . The
project of the discovery and emergence of the genuinely 
feminine, conceptualised not as something whose character 
has been formed by exclusion from the masculine sphere, but 
as an independent force, silenced and unable to reach 
expression under patriarchy, but ready and able to emerge 
once the barriers of p h a l l o c e n t r i c  society to its 
expression are removed. Women’s bodily experience is often
taken as the starting point in the attempt to give
2 1expression to the silenced and unknown feminine
If the strategy associated with the first, mascu1inizing 
model is that of equality (in masculine institutions), and
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the strategy of the second , complementary feminine form is 
that of separate (but supposedly equally valued spheres), 
the strategy of the third, feminizing form is that of 
separatism, in which feminine virtues can be developed and 
come to dominate, or the unknown and yet to be discovered 
true feminine can emerge. Each position faces problems.
Much of the trouble for the third position turns on the 
question of what the characteristics of the alternative 
feminine ideal are, and of how the desired traits can be 
identified as feminine. If the position of the first 
strand is adopted, some virtues (e.g. nurturance, empathy 
in Gearhart) are identified as feminine or feminine- 
associated and put forward as the new ideal for the human. 
But how is this identification of these traits as feminine 
arrived at ? Are the traits in question taken to be 
characteristic of all women in all circumstances (which is 
not very c o n v i n c i n g ) , or only under t r a ditional and 
complementary'circumstances, in which case how can we know 
that they will survive translation to a different non- 
traditional and non-complementary context ? Or is there 
some other alternative? Are they really traits of all 
actual women,(or only some?), arrived at by examining what 
actual women are like, or are they traits simply 
traditionally attributed to women ? So if traditional 
traits are affirmed, there is the problem Lloyd points to 
as to how traits developed in a complementary context (e.g. 
nurturance) can stand alone as a human ideal.
Gearhart skirts the problem, by referring to the relevant 
traits- as "feminine-associated” , an expression which is 
neatly four-way ambiguous between "attributed to women", 
"attributed traditionally to w o m e n ” , "occurring with 
women", and "occurring with women in the traditional 
context". The ambiguity enables her to assume that those 
traits a t t r i b u t e d  to women in fact occur with them 
unprobiematica11y in a non-traditional context, and thus to 
argue for transfer of power to women and reduction of male 
populations.
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Gearhart a], so conveniently overlooks numerous negative 
traits associated with women under patriarchy and in the 
traditional feminine. such as subservience, and does not 
explain what ensures that we will get the desirable 
characteristics but not the undesirable ones. Are the 
undesirable ones assumed to be produced by a patriarchal 
context, and the desirable ones somehow not? There are a 
host of problems in her proposed matriarchal scenario .
If we examine the second, difference theory strand we 
encounter a different set of equally serious problems, now 
turning on specifying what the characteristics of the 
alternative feminine ideal are. Independent criteria for 
selection and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of feminine traits are 
lacking.
Since these are not traditional virtues or character 
traits associated with the feminine, what are they? There 
has to be some way of determining which are to be affirmed 
in opposition to masculine traits. Often they are not 
identified or taken as identifiable (e.g. because of 
silencing), or are treated as to be discovered. The 
genuinely feminine is either unknowable or as yet unknown, 
to be brought into existence. In this case there seems no 
way of showing whether the desired characteristics e.g, 
alternatives to domination of nature, will or will not be 
present among the group of traits. Argu m e n t s  from 
psychoanalysis may suggest that they will be but are hardly 
conclusive as they stand; and as Claire Duchen suggests, 
relying solely on them appears to involve denying the
importance of other non-individual and social influences
2 2and bases of character.
The problem then is how to say what this concept of "the 
feminine" is , and what the ideal human character being 
affirmed is like. It seems that its character cannot be 
determined by examining the sorts of characteristics actual 
women now display, to the extent that these have been
determined by exclusion under patriarchy. Thus for example 
it is hardly c o n v i n c i n g  to suggest that passivity,
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insecurity, and the poorly developed sense of self and of 
independence many women are obliged to develop under 
patriarchal conditions are genuine but unrecognised human 
virtues. Again it seems impossible not to recognise that 
the oppression of women has produced undesirable as well as 
desirable character traits 23 .
So, since it cannot.be a c t u a l existing women whose 
character forms the basis for the ideal, this position sets 
off a search for some sort of feminine essence which eludes 
e x p r e s s i o n  in present societies, but appears as an 
unrealised potential, so much unrealised that it is, in 
some versions, almost essentially inexpressible. Since it 
seems that this character can never be instantiated by 
actual women in existing oppressive societies, the position 
has d i f f i c u l t y  in explai n i n g  exactly how the ideal 
character appealed to "belongs to " women, and which women 
it belongs to , i . e . what makes it feminine . And it seems 
inevitably either nebulous or circular, since we are asked 
to undertake a remaking of the human in the mould of a set 
of "feminine ” characteristics which cannot be specified 
unless and until that remaking is achieved, and whose 
relation to actually existing women is, at best, unclear. 
And the suggestion that we should thus blindly swear 
a l l e g i a n c e  to the nation of the female body, and to 
whatever characteristics they may develop or display, seems 
a mere piece of nationalism.
The body is sometimes thus introduced in an attempt to 
solve the problem of identifying the feminine, in what 
appears to be a form of reverse dualism. The position 
a p p a r e n t l y  accepts the m i n d / b o d y  division and its 
correspondence to masculinity and femininity, but replaces 
the masculine notion of identity as based in the mind or in 
consciousness with the supposedly feminine one of identity
as based i n -- and apparently reducible to —  the sexed
body. To the extent that bodily difference is taken as 
determining of the feminine, that the feminine is endorsed 
as the ideal of human character, and that what is involved 
is the assertion of a rival human ideal which men will
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necessarily never be able to participate in , the position 
seems to have built into it another hierarchy, another 
exclusion. There may be difference here , but too much 
remains the same.
In brief the position, whether interpreted according to 
strand 1 or strand 2, faces a dilemma as a base for the 
ecofeminist argument. If it follows strand 1 and specifies 
the traits, selecting only d e sirable ones such as 
nurturance, it faces the problem of explaining how these 
relate to existing women and how they are feminine. If it 
fails to do so , specifying them only in their relation to 
female bodies or to the e mergence of an u n s p e c i f i e d  
"genuine femininity” , it needs to provide a basis for 
believing, what is needed for the ecofeminist argument, 
that the desirable traits are included or will emerge. In 
neither case, it seems, can an adequate ecofeminist 
argument or alternative model be based in any simple way on 
women or women’s virtues.
But as we shall see, that d o e s n ’t mean that w o m e n ’s 
experience is irrelevant or that they cannot contribute in 
a very major way to the development of an alternative to 
the masculine model.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE MASCULINE MODEL
If the ecofeminist argument cannot be based on a simple and 
indiscriminate affirmation of women and their supposed 
qualities as an alternative to the masculine model, must 
it therefore be abandoned? I want to argue that it 
doesn’t have to be , although this simple form of it needs 
to be. Initially it seems obvious that the ecofeminist and 
peace argument is grounded on accepting a special feminine 
c o n n e c t e d n e s s  with the natural or with peaceful 
characteristics, and then affirming this as a rival ideal 
of the human (or as part of such an ideal) . But on closer
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examination this is not so clear.
The ecofeminist argument doesn’t have to take this simple 
form. The argument basically involves the rejection of the 
masculine model of the human and of the aggression towards 
and domination of nature seen as part of that model. But to 
reject the masculine model of the human is not necessarily 
to affirm a rival feminine ideal, nor to accept any other 
special connection between nature and the feminine . To 
free the concept of the human from the connection to the 
masculine which has lain behind its guise of neutrality 
doesn’t mean that it has to be replaced by a rival feminine 
ideal specified in reaction to the masculine ideal. It is 
open to us to view both men and women as damaged or 
distorted by the western mapping of the n a ture/c u 1ture 
distinction onto gender and by the structures of the 
domination of nature both within and without the human 
self, as well as by various aspects of current social 
systems, by patriarchy and the distribution of power along 
lines of sex and gender, by the division of life into 
public masculine and private feminine spheres and the
resulting connection of masculine identity especially to 
the structures of market society ^  . This doesn’t mean 
that we should feel equally sorry for both men and women 
and regard them as equally ’’v i c t i m s ” or as equally
positioned with respect to constructive change, as analyses 
which neglect the dimension of power and domination suggest 
we should, but it does mean that neither sex can
unproblematically and simply provide a model for a 
thoroughgoing alternative .
The choice between the masculine model of the human and its 
feminine rival is , fortunately then, a false choice. This 
can be seen clearly if we examine the logical options for 
the human ideal and its relation to a masculine or
feminine ideal. They can be set out as follows (using the 
symbol "R” to mean "reject" and the symbol "A" to mean 
accept):
(1) A masculine model, R feminine model
(2) A masculine model, A feminine model
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(3) A feminine model, R masculine model
(4) R masculine model, R feminine model
This set of alternatives is exclusive and exhaustive of the 
possibilities for an ideal if the categories are treated as 
wholes , but of course a further set of options can be 
generated if they are not or if the necessity for a human 
character ideal itself is questioned, viz. no character 
ideal at all. It is apparent from this set of alternatives 
that the a s s u m p t i o n  that an a l t e r n a t i v e  to (1 ) ( the 
traditional model) or (2) (the romantic complementary or 
separate spheres model) must be (3) (the feminine model) is 
wrong.
Thus it is open to an ecofeminist to agree in part with the 
commonsense view and assert that women are in fact no more 
significantly or essentially connected to nature than men 
(except as an alleged c o n n e c t i o n  has been used to 
inferiorise both and has involved exclusion of women from 
technology and culture ) but that what is needed is an 
account of the human ideal for both sexes which accepts 
the undesirability of the domination of nature associated 
with masculinity. This would be a strategy which rejected 
the masculine concept of the human , but because it denied 
any special significant connection between nature and women, 
and because it saw both men and women as damaged, was not 
committed to a rival feminine ideal. The fact that the 
concept of the human is up for remaking doesn’t mean that 
it has to be remade in the mould of either the masculine or 
the feminine.
Not only can an ecofeminist argument appeal more
satisfactorily to the fourth model than the third, that is
clearly what it often does. For example, Rosemary Ruether,
one of the pioneers of the position, is clearly appealing
to model 4, not model 3, when she writes:
Both men and women must be resocialised from their 
traditional distorted cultures of masculinity and 
femininity in order to find that humanized culture that 
i s .both self- affirming and o t h e r - a f f i r m i n g. It is 
precisely in this creation of a- humanity that is truly 
affirming of all life, both one's own and that of 
others, that the writers seek to find the deepest
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2 5connections between feminism and non-violence.
In some writers the adherence to model 4 over 3 is even
more explicit : for example
If the masculine character ideal supports militarism, 
what can support p e a c e ? Femininity'? AT o , for that 
character ideal also has been shaped by patriarchyr and 
includes along with virtues such as gentleness and 
nurturance a kind of dependency which breeds the passive 
-aggressive syndrome of curdled violence.
The rejection of the masculine character ideal does not
imply acceptance of corresponding feminine traits, and a
critique of both masculinity and femininity and their
complementary characters may be involved. Further , the
rejection of both traditional masculine and traditional
feminine character ideals is linked with the rejection of
the t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  dualisms of mind/body,
rationality/emotionality, public /private, and so o n , which
are also rejected as false choices, so that the
transcendence of the traditional gendered characters
becomes part of, is linked with the systematic
t r a n s c e n d e n c e  of this wider set of dualisms. These
dualisms are subject to independent criticism in the
ecofeminist literature. From this perspective , the model
which simply replaces the masculine by the traditional
feminine is a reactive model which fails to take adequate
account of the way in which gender is structured as a
dualism. It shares in the general inadequacy and criticism
of the reverse-value strategy for dealing with dualisms
which simply affirms the underside —  that to do so is
implicitly to accept and to preserve, rather than to
challenge , the dualistic structure.
The fourth model for demasculinizing the human character
may be developed in various different ways. One of the
most obvious and popular .ways to develop it is in terms of
andi'ogyny. Thus Kokopeli and Lakey continue:
We are encouraged by the vision of androgyny, which 
acknowledges that the best characteristics now allocated 
to the two genders indeed belong to both; gentleness, 
intelligence.nurturance, courage, awareness of feelings, 
co-operativeness...Many of these characteristics are now 
allocated to the feminine role. which has led some men to 
conclude that the essential liberating task is to become 
effeminate. We d o n ’t agree, since so m^ e desirable  
characteristics are now allocated to the masculine role
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(for example initiative, intelligence)c .
But androgyny is not the only construction to place on the
fourth model, and in turn has its problems. The concept of
androgynous human character suggests a recipe analogy, in
which the new human ideal is put together from existing
ingredients: take good points of each gender and place in
bowl, mix gently, throw bad points into dustbin.
But as I argue in Chapter Eight , such a model is also far 
too simple and shallow, ignoring relations of exclusion, 
complementation and so on between traits and suggesting 
that their allocation to their respective sex is arbitrary. 
It treats the problem as if it could be solved by an 
a m a l g a m  of certain e x i s t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  thrown 
together, just as the androgynous human is pictured as a 
physical composite of male and female organs. Similarly 
the androgynous terminology suggests that no significant 
character differences should remain between masculine and 
feminine characteristics, that there will be a single model 
for both sexes composed of the same set of character 
traits. And androgyny still leaves the problem of which 
masculine and which feminine will go to make up the basis 
for the selection of androgynous traits. If it is to be 
the traditional masculine and the traditional feminine, 
then the false choice arguments above apply, and if it is 
not, we need to be told how the genders involved are 
selected.
These assumptions are both unsatisfactory and unnecessary, 
and are not an inevitable part of the fourth model. The 
androgynous way of developing the fourth model should be 
d i stinguished from other ways ,e.g. where what is involved 
is not an amalgam of genders leading to identical gender 
roles, but a t r a n s c e n d e n c e  of the dualistic gender 
characteristics to produce a third set of characteristics 
that will often be different from either. The androgynous 
model overlooks the fact that the gender contrasts of 
existing character traits are often false contrasts. In 
fact the gender categories and most associated institutions 
can be seen as a systematic and related network of false
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c hoices.
There are then several further ways of developing the
fourth model (discussed in detail in Chapter Eight). One
of them is degendered, in that selection of characteristics
to be affirmed is not based on association with one sex or
the other or e x c l u s i v e l y  on traditional gender
characteristics, but aims to dissolve or move beyond them
(transcend them). Another one might be thought of as
regendered in that it does not aim to eliminate gender
and gender difference as such , but rather to reconstruct
it so as to free it from dualistic construction and in
particular to dissolve particular dualistically-paired
traits such as the pairs d o m i n a n t / s ubmissive and
overemphasised /underemphasised ego boundaries . The
regendering alternative would not need to deny difference
or assume the n e u t r a l i t y  of the body, to deny that
differently-sexed bodies might give rise to different
experiences and different orientations to the world ,
a l t h o u g h  it would resist the attempt to treat such
difference as lacking a social context and as giving rise
2 9to fixed essences not open to change . Nor. does it have 
to try to create a unique human character ideal, as opposed 
to a multiplicity of such ideals, or to organise sexual 
difference along lines o-f two sharply differentiated 
sexes.
Such a position can also allow room for certain ways of 
affirming or valuing the feminine, in at least some senses 
of this highly ambiguous phrase, that is for affirming as 
h u m a n l y  v a l u a b l e  certain traits and areas of life
previously treated as of little consequence, traditionally 
a s s i g n e d  to women and excluded from the masculine
character or from more prestigious areas of human life.
Such upward revaluing of traits such as nur turanc e is an 
important part of the ecofeminist position . But it is 
important to note the ambiguities and the difference
between, first, valuing all and only feminine traits and 
valuing them because or on the grounds that xthey are 
feminine, regardless and in ignorance of what they will
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actually turn out to be (the position corresponding to the 
femini z i n g  strategy discu s s e d  e a r l i e r ) , and second 
revaluing, on a selective basis, certain important traits 
and areas of life which have been devalued because of their 
association with women and with nature.
It is important to note the differ e n c e  too between 
affir m i n g  feminine traits as part of a dualised and 
patriarchal structure, and affirming them in a way which 
challenges such a structure. For example affirming feminine 
traits as confined to women and as exclusively possessed by 
them leads to an essentially conservative position, and it 
is important for a radical ecofeminism to show how its 
position differs from this conservative affirmation of 
feminine traits and roles, which may involve showing how in 
affirming them it gives them a different significance from 
the one they had in a dualised, patriarchal context. 
N u r t u r a n c e  for example, a trait often affirmed in 
ecofeminism, has been devalued because of its links to 
both femininity and animality, and in a patriarchal 
context where it has been confined to women and the private 
sphere, is such that women’s exclusive nurturance confirms 
and supports male control of the world. But a critical and 
non-conservative ecofeminism must affirm it in ways which 
do not do this, which remove it from the dualised context, 
making it a virtue for men as well as women, and giving it 
the significance of nurturing the natural world and 
others not confined to the nuclear family. By such 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  of context and significance, traits 
allocated to the feminine in a patriarchal context can 
develop into real and radical strengths in a non- 
patriarchal context0 . But although such traits can 
develop from traditional feminine traits given an 
appropriate transformation of social context, they are not 
identical with them , and representing them as the same 
traits (as "affirming the feminine" suggests) can be 
misleading about the sense in and extent to which they 
are feminine. For they are neither the same as those in 
the traditional context, and hence "feminine” in that sense 
of being part of the traditional characteristics and
93
virtues of womankind, nor feminine in the sense that it is 
not possible for men to share them or aspire to them.
Where does all this leave the ecofeminist argument and the 
notion that women are ” closer to nature"? W o m e n ’s 
historical treatment as aligned with natures has shaped the 
characteristics of feminine identity and given women and 
nature a shared status in the eyes of men and as recipients 
of a masculine selfhood defined against both . But there 
are problems in embracing such a feminine alternative, to 
the extent that it has involved the confinement of women to 
activities such as reproduction and denial to them of 
capacities for reason, intelligence and control of life 
conditions, that is, their exclusion from the valued 
features of human life and culture. So a different concept 
of closeness to nature from the traditional one has to be 
i nvoked if such a po sit ion is to be no t only ecofeminist 
but f eminis t .
The argument that women have a different relation to nature 
cannot rest on appeal to a single quality of empathy or 
nurturance or mysterious power shared by all women from 
Helen Caldicott to Mrs. Thatcher, for there is no such 
quality. But differences between men’s and women’s concerns 
and kinds of selfhood (identity) are real and have arisen 
from the difference in the experiences , concerns , and 
areas of life each sex has been taken as responsible 
for -- from the kinds of lives they have tended to lead. 
Women’s lives have on the whole been lived in ways which 
are less directly oppositional to nature than those of men, 
and which emphasise as virtues qualities of care and kinds 
of selfhood which may have much to contribute to the 
development of an alternative way to relate to nature.
But on the other side of the dualism, women’s alignment 
with nature has been matched by the development of a 
masculine identity centreing around distance from nature 
and such ’’natural" areas in human life as reproduction, and 
around control, domination and inferiorisation of the 
natural sphere. Such distance has been obtained by the
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location of value in the area of human character and
culture that has been taken as both m a sculine and
distinguishing of humans from the non-human world. This is 
the model of human life and identity ecofeminists reject, 
as a model both for men and for women liberated from the 
constraints of the traditional position. It is this model 
we must try to understand and construct an alternative to.
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Chapter Four : Dual ism and Human Identity
We should think of the most authoritative part of our 
soul as a guardian spirit given by* god, living in the 
summit of the bodyr, which can properly be said to lift 
us from the earth toward our home in heaven ; for we are 
creatures not of earth but of heaven, where the soul was 
first born, and our divine part attaches us by the head 
to heaven, like a plant by its roots, and keeps our body 
upright .
Plato, The Timaeus .
I am a poor wayfaring stranger,
Travelling through this world of woe 
There’ll be no trouble , toil or danger 
In that bright land to which I go.
I ’m going there to meet my mother 
I ’m going there no more to roam 
Oh I ’m just going over Jordan 
I'm just going over home.
American Spiritual.
ECOFEMINISM AND HUMAN / NATURE DUALISM
The historical account ecofeminism has provided gives a key 
role to the concept of dualism . In this chapter I attempt 
to sharpen up this notion ; I argue that a dualism should 
be understood as a division involving a power relationship 
which determines a certain kind of* logical structure , and 
as one in which the relation of domination/subordination 
shapes identity. I focus especially in this chapter on the 
key role of the concept of the human and the role of 
dualism in shaping human identity with respect to nature. 
My thesis is that dualism has systematically distorted the 
western account of the human self in nature, affecting the 
account of the human (Chapter Four), the account of the 
self (Chapter Six) , and the account of nature (Chapter 
Five). The distortion parallels in certain crucial ways 
that of masculine/feminine dualism, so that the resulting 
model of h u m a n - n a t u r e  relations can be regarded as 
and roc entric.
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I attempt first to clar i f y  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  for
ecofeminist positions with regard to nature and the key
role of the concept of the human, which I argued in Chapter
TimeThree, is thrown up for renegotiation at the same.as the' A
dualism of male and female, masculine and feminine. What 
is actually being rejected in the various ecofeminist
positions can be made clearer and the positions more
read i l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  if the further arguments and 
assumptions needed to connect the different sorts of
d u a l i s m s  are more fully set out. The historical 
inferiority of women and nature has been based on a nest of 
assumptions, but particularly the following key ones (A) 
and (B), which are complementary.
(A) l. The identification of the female with the sphere of 
physicality and nature.
2. The assumed inferiority of physicality and of nature 
and the mind/body dualism upon which the division is based, 
and other dualistic assumptions concerning this sphere.
(B) l. The corresponding identification of the male with 
the sphere of the mental or of reason.
2. The a s s u m p t i o n  of the s u p e r i o r i t y  of the
mental(reason) and the identification of the mental(reason) 
with humanness.
The fact that there are two parts to each corresponding set 
of assumptions and not just one helps to explain why a 
t h o r o u g h g o i n g  devel o p m e n t  of feminism leads in the 
direction of a critical ecofeminism, and why the attempt 
to make a radical challenge to the masculine/feminine 
dualism should also involve challenging and renegotiating 
the human/nature dualism and the mind/body dualism both are 
closely linked with. "Feminism is simply a belief in the 
full humanity of woman and her right to define herself", 
writes Simone de Beauvoir. But it cannot be quite that 
simple. For the notion of humanity itself must come up for 
revision at the same time, along with the notion of human- 
nature and of what it is to be fully and authentically 
human, the notion of human virtue. And the question of
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human relations to nature must come up as part of the re­
examination of what it means to be (fully) human. All 
these concepts must be up for r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  and 
renegotiation because the whole notion of humanity itself 
has been strongly linked to the masculine/feminine and 
mind/body dualisms. And if the model of what it is to be 
human is basically masculine, then only a shallow feminism 
could rest content with affirming the "full humanity" of 
woman without challenging this model. The human/nature 
dualism then must be up for renegotiation along with the 
masculine/feminine dualism.
Mind/body dualism plays a key bridging and underpinning 
role in both of these dualisms. As noted in Chapter Three, 
the model of what it is to be human is basically masculine 
because the characteristics taken as distinctive of the 
masculine are also the ones which are used to define what 
is d i s t i n c t i v e l y  human ; the key human feature is 
identified as the possession of qualities assigned to the 
masculine identity. Especially important here are the 
mental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of mind, of soul, spirit, 
consciousness, rationality or intelligence, and this sphere 
has been generally identified also with masculinity. Thus 
for example the authentic human self is identified in the 
Cogito as the thinking substance. The use of the term 
"man" and of masculine pronouns to indicate what is human 
then is no accident at all. Humanity, in terms of these 
characteristics is masculine, and woman, to the extent that 
she is identified with the body, must be a lesser, reduced 
or imperfect version of humanity.
Thus for Simone de Beauvoir woman is to become fully human 
in the same way as man, by joining him in distancing from 
and in transcending and controlling nature. She opposes 
male transcendence and conquering of nature to w o m a n ’s 
immanence, being identified with and passively immersed in 
nature and the body, immersion in the sphere of necessity 
as opposed to freedom. The "full humanity" to be achieved 
by woman involves becoming part of the superior sphere of 
the spirit- and dominating and transcending nature and
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physicality, becoming part of the sphere of freedom and 
controllability, in contrast to being immersed in nature 
and in blind uncontrollability. Woman becomes "fully 
human" by being absorbed in a sphere of freedom and 
transcendence conceptualised in terms of both human and 
male dominance.
The Cha11 enge to the Model of the Human
Thus any really thoroughgoing challenge to the male/female 
dualism must involve also a challenge to this framework 
and to other key parts of these intertwined dualisms, 
especially the human / nature dualism. The challenge must 
extend in a number of directions ; first, it must be a
challenge to the assumption of the primacy of the sphere of 
mind and the rational in contrast to the inferior realm of 
nature and the feminine , and to the d e v a l u a t i o n  of 
qualities associated with this sphere in western culture, 
as compared to those thought to be associated with the 
human. Eut it cannot stop there , for this could then
amount to a rever se-va1ue s t rategy of the sort discussed
and rejected in Chapter Three for male /female dualism, in
which the dualistic d e f i n i t i o n  of the items so
distinguished is not questioned , but only their respective 
values. Such reverse-value positions are a special case
of a group of strategies which aim simply to improve the
status of the sphere of nature in relation to that of the 
human, but without otherwise disturbing matters. They are 
m i n i m u m  effort strategies, and u sually face serious 
problems on account of their i n c o m p l e t e n e s s  and
instability, problems comparable to those faced by the 
reverse-value strategy for feminine attributes already 
discussed.
There are a variety of strategies in the area of thinking 
about wilderness especially which attempt to affirm nature 
as the dualised other, without challenging its dualised 
conception or dualised definition in' relation to the human.
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In the romantic tradition for example wilderness is 
usually given higher value, especially as compared with an 
earlier tradition in which it was viewed negatively, but 
the concept often remains defined in polarised terms, and 
is affirmed as a complement to the human sphere and in a 
way which does not challenge its dualistic construction. 
This reverse-value strategy remains that of much thinking 
on the environment and even of environmental philosophy eg, 
the attempt to simply upgrade the value of nature via 
value theory or ethics . Although this is part of what is 
needed (as in the case of affirming the feminine) on its 
own and without an attempt to understand the dualistic 
process which has led to devaluation, it -is inadequate and 
incomplete.
The challenge to the human/nature dualism must then extend 
to the conceptualisation of both sides of the division, 
especially to its conception in terms of an oppositional or 
polarising structure, and the way this has influenced both 
the view of the human identity and jd f what is 
characteristically human, and the view of the contrasting 
side of nature and its characteristics. This explanatory 
framework of dualism can put a number of concerns of 
environmental philosophy in a new light , especially the 
account of nature in terms of mechanism, as well as the 
account of the essence of the human self and of human 
identity in relation to the natural order.
DUALISM -- THE LOGIC OF HIERARCHY
A central ecofeminist thesis is that Western though t and 
society has been characterised by a set of interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing dualisms^. The hiunan/nature contrast 
is one of the most important of these dualisms, and it 
can only be properly understood in this context, that is, 
as part of the interrelated set, with crucial connections 
to other elements, and and having a common structure with 
other members of the set. The understanding of dualistic 
structure produced by feminist studies can cast a great
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deal of light on these dualisms. The notion of dualism has 
been used a good deal in epistemology and metaphysics, but 
usually without getting properly to grips wi.th its central 
features, which are political, that is , they concern the 
operations of power and domination.
Key elements in the dualistic structure in western thought 
are the following sets of contrasting pairs:
intellect, mind / body, nature
rationality / materiality, physica 1ity. nature
mind, spirit / na t ur e
human / nature
ma 1 e / f ema1e
A further set is given by the following pairs : -
reason / emo tion
transcendence / immanenc e
f reedom / ne c e s sit y
product ion / reproduct ion
publie / privat e
culture / nature
Deconstructing these sets of dualistically related pairs
is an important task for c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h y ,
especially feminist philosophy. The interrelationship of 
the elements of the structure means that the cultural 
meaning and characteristics of each of the elements of 
contrasting pairs is determined not in isolation but at 
least in part by the other members of the set. They form a 
web, an interlocking structure.
Not all items in the list are equally closely related. 
Three which are closely related are the human/nature, 
masculine /feminine, and mind /body pairs, and these are 
the pairs my discussion will mainly concentrate upon. Thus 
for example, the concept and characteristics of masculinity 
play a key role in delineating the characteristics of the 
human, which is also taken to coincide with the sphere of 
mentality or rationality,in contrast to the excluded
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c o n t r a s t i n g  sphere of the feminine, the physical, the 
emotional,and the natural. Similarly, the mental or 
rational is treated traditionally as characteristic of the 
masculine rather than the feminine-, so that rationality or 
(more broadly sometimes mentality) characterises both 
masculinity and humanity. These pairs are connected then by 
a series of linking postulates, and when so connected form 
a web. Linking postulates are assumptions normally made 
or implicit in cultural grounding which create equivalences 
or mapping between the pairs. For example , the postulate 
that all and only humans possess culture maps the 
c u l t u r e / n a t u r e  pair onto the h u m a n / n a t u r e  pair: the 
postulate that the sphere of mentality is masculine maps 
the mind/body pair onto the masculine/feminine pair, and 
the assumption that the sphere of the human coincides with 
that of intellect or mentality maps the mind/body pair 
onto the human/nature pair, and via transitivity, the 
human/nature pair onto the masculine /feminine pair. Most 
conventional linking postulates are resoundingly false but 
culturally influential —  hence these webs are not to be 
understood as linked by entailment and implicatdonal 
detachment from true premisses ,but by conventional (if 
usually implicit) assumption. It is part of my argument 
that the concepts of humanity, rationality, and masculinity 
form such a web, a set of closely related concepts which 
provide for each other models of appropriate relations to 
their respective dualised contrasts of nature, the physical 
or material, and the feminine. They are linked by the 
shared logical structure of dualism as well as by a number 
of other features. As I shall argue below, this is one way 
to interpret some of the insights of ecofeminism.
The connection of these three pairs —  the dualisms of 
humanity, rationality and masculinity -- appears clearly in 
many ancient sources. For example Aristotle ,in a famous 
passage naturalising domination , links them together, 
and gives his version of each hierarchy’s place in a chain 
of hierarchies. :
It is clear that the rule of the soul over the body',
and of the mind and the rational element over the
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passionate, is natural and expedient ; whereas the 
equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is 
always hurtful . The same holds good for animals in 
relation to men ; for tame animals have a better nature 
than wild, and all tame animals are better off when 
they are ruled by man ; for then they are preserved. 
Again , the male is by nature superior, and the female 
inferior; and the one rules , and the other is ruled: 
this principle of necessity extends to all mankind. 
Where there is such a difference as that between soul 
and body, or between men and animals ( as is the case of 
those whose business it is to use their body , and who 
can do nothing better ), the lower sort are by nature 
slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors 
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he 
who can be, and therefore is, a n o t h e r ’s and he who 
participates in rational principle enough to apprehend , 
but not to have such a principle, is a slave by nature. 
Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend such a 
principle ; they obey their instincts. And the use made 
of slaves and of tame animals is not very different 
for both with their bodies minister to the needs of 
life.... 3
Features of Dual ism
There are several important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the 
relationship between members of contrasting pairs which 
make it appropriate to call it a dualism rather than just 
a distinction or a dichotomy. It is not just the fact that 
there is dichotomy, that distinctions are made between two 
kinds of things which is important in establishing a 
dualistic relation —  indeed it is hard to imagine how 
anyone could get along without making at least some of 
these d i s t i n c t i o n s  —  it is rather the way the 
distinctions have been treated, the further assumptions 
made about them and the relationship imposed upon them 
which make the relationships in question dualistic ones.
AThus by no means every dichotomy results in a dualism
A dualism is more than a relation of difference or non­
identity, it is a relation of radical exclusion, distancing 
and opposition, between orders construed as higher and 
lower, as inferior and superior, and where the appropriate 
relation between these orders is taken to be not simply 
difference but domination. Because the other is treated as 
not merely different but as inferior, part of a lower
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order, it demands not merely distinctness but exclusion. 
This exclusion relation has special characteristics. For 
distinctness, for non-identity or otherness, there need be 
only a single characteristic which is different, possessed 
by the one but not the other, in order to guarantee 
distinctness according to the usual treatment of identity 
(e.g.in Leibniz’s Law). Where items are constructed or 
construed according to dualistic relationship however, such 
construction tries to magnify, to emphasise, or even to 
maximise the number and importance of differences, and 
hence to achieve ap p r o p r i a t e  separation. The aim of 
d u a l i s t i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n  is p o larisation, to maximise 
distance or separation between the dualised spheres and to 
prevent them coming into contact. Emile Dürkheim has noted 
this radical exclusion relation as important in religious 
thought in the distinction between things sacred and things 
prof ane.
”Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect 
and i sol ate ; profane things those to which these 
interdictions are applied and which must remain ajt a
distance from the first . (my italics)
Profane things are thought of as threatening to sacred 
things , and the power they represent . Such a dualism of 
sacred and profane often occurs in the context of a 
powerful priesthood or religious ruler.
Dualistic construal of difference usually treats it as 
providing not a mere difference of degree within a sphere 
of overall similarity, but as providing a major difference 
in kind , even a bifurcation or division in reality between 
utterly different orders of things. Dual i s m  denies 
continuity, treating its pairs as comprising ” two worlds 
between which there is nothing in common" . Again
Dürkheim’s discussion of the treatment of the sacred / 
profane distinction reveals some of the character of such 
construction . ^
"There is a break in continuity... since we picture a 
sort of l o gical c h a s m  b e t w e e n  the two, the m i n d  
irresistibly refuses the two things to be confounded, or 
even to be put into contact with each other; for such a 
promiscuity, or even too direct a contiguity would 
contradict too violently the dissociation of these ideas 
in the mind.
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Dualism aims to maximise the number, scope or significance 
of distinguishing characteristics, but it does not do this 
in a random way, but usually by cl a s s i f y i n g  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as b e l o n g i n g  exclusively, as far as 
possible, to one side or the other.
The polarising treament of gender characteristics in 
western culture provides a good model of such dualistic 
construal, and of how common or bridging characteristics 
are ignored, discouraged or actually eliminated by such 
conceptual/social construction. The reason for the intense 
and u b i q u i t o u s  social demand for sex marking is 
insightfully discussed by Marilyn Frye : to the extent 
that the demand for this sexual dualism of just two 
s h a r p l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  sexes is a social creation 
unsupported by any natural order (sharp sexual dimorphism 
does not exist in newborn humans or elsewhere in nature) 
it requires constant vigilance and that individuals be
coerced and bullied in order to maintain it . The 
function of such polarisation is to naturalise domination :
For efficient subordination , what’s wanted is that the 
structure not only not appear to be a cultural artifact 
kept in place by human decision or custom , but that it 
appear n a t ur a 1 —  that it appear to be a quite direct
consequence of the facts about the beast which are 
beyond the scope of human manipulation or revision. It 
must seem natural that individuals of the one category 
are dominated by individuals of the other and that as 
groups, the one dominates the other. To make this seem 
natural, it will help if it seems to all concerned that 
members of the two groups are very different from each 
other, and this appearance is enhanced if it can be made 
to appear that within each group, the members are very 
like one another. In other words, the appearance of the 
n a t u r a l n e s s  of the dominance of men and the 
subordination of women is supported by anything which 
supports the appearance that men are very like other men 
and very unlike women , and that women are very like 
other women and very unlike men.
As well,the gender example illustrates the way in which the 
different dualistically construed pairs of contrasts set 
out above provide conceptual assistance for, and act as 
models, metaphors and props for each other.
A further important feature of dualistically construed
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opposites discussed by a number of feminist writers is that 
since the superior member of the pair is defined primarily 
by exclusion of the other and of characteristics associated 
with it , it requires the other in order to define its 
boundaries and identity. Thus one member of a dualistic 
pair , that construed as superior , defines itself against 
or in opposition to the other, by exclusion of the
latter's inferiorised characteristics. Because of this , 
dualistically construed pairs are logically related and are 
c o n s t r u c t e d  as c o m p l e m e n t a r y  , in that each has 
characteristics which logically require a corresponding and 
complementary set in the other ; for example, a master 
l o g i c a l l y  requires a slave and vice versa, and 
characteristics such as submissiveness require in the other 
the c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
dominance, its polarised opposite or dual ( dualised 
other). Their relation is constructed in such a way that 
each is incomplete without , or could not exist without, 
the other , its complement. Nevertheless, it is essential 
to not.e that dualistic opposites normally present false 
choices —  they do not exhaust the alternatives. Their non­
exhaustiveness is a result of their polarisation of 
characteristics, and denial of bridging or common ground. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s  d u a l i s t i c a l l y  -co n c e i v e d  opposites are 
conventionally treated as if they were exhaustive, because 
within the framework of the dualistic classification the 
common ground is not conceivable, since the polarising 
classification erases it. Hence escaping a dualistic 
frame w o r k  is no easy matter, and usually involves 
renegotiating the concepts involved. If dualism imposes a 
polarising conceptual framework, reconceptualising the 
alternatives involves some sort of conceptual shift, a 
reintegration, at least into the same order of being. The 
old dualistic categories are thus often spoken of as 
transcended in a new single category or characteristic 
which may combine features of the old dualised pair in a 
new, non-polarised way; or a distinction may be maintained 
but be treated differently , not in dualising ways. An 
example of such transcendence is discussed below in the 
case of the transcendence of the conventional alternatives
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of egoism and altruism by interrelatedness of interest (see 
Chapter Six below).
Dualism then imposes a conceptual framework which polarises 
and splits apart what can be c o n c e p t u a l i s e d  in more 
integrated ways. It is not just that it exaggerates and
stresses difference over similarity, although this is a 
major dualistic strategy, but that it does this in the 
service of defining the one against or by exclusion of the 
other, conceived as belonging to a different and lower
order. Dualism is intimately related to hierarchy , which 
provides of course the motivation for the polarising 
exercise and for the maximisation of differentiating , or 
supposedly differentiating, characteristics, as well as 
for the definition of the identity of the one by exclusion 
of characteristics of the inferiorised other. Dualistic 
categories naturalise hierarchy and d o m i n a t i o n .  The 
slave is what he or she is in virtue of his or her nature 
(thus in Aristotle’s account the slave is a slave by 
nature) as part of a lower order of being, and the 
appropriate characteristics for a master are those whi ch 
make him as little like the slave as possible ; he should 
not participate, for example in manual (or in feminine) 
labour, but should represent culture, cultivation of the 
mind and c o n t r o l l i n g  rationality. Features such as 
c leanliness may also reflect such polarising construction; 
Eooker T. Washington in Up From Slavery relates how the 
exaggerated and genteel cleanliness of the slave owners’ 
establishments served to mark them off from the "animal- 
like” slaves, whose enforced filthiness (they were provided 
with no means to wash) served the joint function of marking 
and justifying their condition, and of linking them to 
animals. Thus the slave’s being is part of a lower order 
in which other linked inferiors also have their being—  the 
slave is body, the slave is animal, the slave is feminised.
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Examples o f dual ism : dualism and gender
How do these dua1istica11y-construed concepts work out in 
the case of the pairs mind/body, male/female, and 
human/nature ? One way is through the assumption that there 
are two quite different sorts of things, e.g. mind and 
body, humans and nature, male and female. In the case of 
humans and nature it is assumed that there are two 
completely different sorts of substances; humans are 
completely different from everything else in the immediate, 
kno w n  cosmos. S c i e n t i s t s  discuss whether we have 
"company" in some remote reach of the universe or whether 
we are "alone", ignoring our close relationship to other 
earth beings. We can see this assumption at work in the 
passage from William James quoted on pl44, where nature is 
said to be "a moral multiverse. . . .and not a moral 
universe", and such that "with her as a whole we can 
establish no moral communion" . I will discuss this 
dualised view of the human in detail in the next section.
In the case of dualistic construals of the mind/body 
division.it is assumed again that they belong to quite 
different orders, so much so as to give rise to the 
classic problem of how they can interract. The sphere of 
mind, of rationality and intellect is similarly assumed 
to be quite different from the sphere of physicality. And 
in fact it is widely assumed to be the possession of mental 
attributes which makes humans completely different from 
animals.
As I argue below, both Platonic and Cartesian accounts of 
the mind/body relation are examples of dualis tic accounts 
of the sort characterised above. Thus the body is, in 
Plato’s account, a sharply distinct lower realm, to be 
dominated and controlled by a superior reason. This is 
pictured in the analogy of the two horses in the Phaedrus, 
in which one horse (the spirit ) is white, noble and easily 
guided, while the other (the body and natural appetites) is 
ugly and difficult to control, while the controlling
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1 2charioteer himself is Reason . In Descartes’ account
the gulf between mind and body becomes even sharper- as 
bridging characteristics involving apparently both body and 
mind such as sensation and perception , get allocated to
one or the other as part of the polarisation process. The 
cultural background to these accounts is one in which the
mental and especially the rational, is identified as 
associated with the masculine, and the contrasting inferior 
sphere ( the body, the senses ,the emotions ) as feminine, 
and in which men exercise power over women .
Mind/body dualism provides the basis for a series of
further hierarchies which are its offshoots. Thus, as in
Aristotle’s passage, the gulf between the rational and the 
non-rational and the inferiority of the latter explains the 
supposed inferiority not just of women, but also of 
slaves, people of other races and cultures ("barbarians") 
and of those who perform manual as opposed to intellectual 
tasks, all of whom can be treated as less rational and as 
closer to the sphere of nature, and especially as closer to 
anima1ity.
But perhaps the clearest and best documented example of 
dualistic construction is in the sphere of gender, where 
the dualistic construction of traditional gender attempts 
to impose a rigid and polarised division upon a continuum 
of biological characteristics. Areas of overlapping or 
common ground and bridging or overlapping attributes are 
minimised, discouraged, or treated with suspicion. As 
Marilyn Frye notes:
Persons .........with the power to do so actually cons truet a
world in which men are men and women are women and there 
is nothing- in between and nothing ambiguous ; they do it 
by chemically and/or surgically altering people whose 
bodies are indeterminate or ambiguous with respect to 
sex. Newborns with "imperfectly formed ” genitals are 
immediately corrected by chemical or surgical means, 
children or adolescents are given hormone "therapies" if 
their bodies seem not to be d e v e lo p in g  to what 
physicians and others declare to be the norm for what 
has been declared to be that individual 's sex. Persons 
with a u t h o r i t y  r e c o m m e n d  and s upply cosmetics and 
cosmetic regimens , diets , exercises and ail manner of 
clothing to revise or disguise the too-hairy lip . the
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too-1 arse breast , the too-slender shoulders , the too-
large feet, the too-great or too-slight stature.
Individuals whose bodies do not fit the picture of
exactly two sharply dimorphic sexes are often enough
quite willing to be altered or veiled for the obvious
reason that the world punishes them severely for their
failure to be the "facts which would verify the
doctrine of two sexes. The demand that the world be a
world in which there are exactly two sexes is inexorable
and we are all compelled to answer to it emphatically,
unconditionally, repetitiously and unambiguously. Even
being physically ”normal for o n e ’s assigned sex is not
enough. One must be female or male, actively. Again,
the costumes and the performances. Pressed to acting
feminine or masculine , one colludes . ... in the creation
of a world in which the apparent dimorphism of the sexes
is so extreme that one can only think that there is a
great gulf between female and male , that the two are,
essentially and fundamentally and naturally, utterly
different. One helps create a world in which it seems
to us that we could never mistake a woman for a man or------ ^
a man for a woman. We need never worry.
Sexual dualism is supplemented by gender dualism. A 
properly masculine character maximises distance from the 
feminine and minimises presence of attributes associated 
with the feminine, such as emotionality (other than anger) 
and submissiveness . Masculine identity is constructed via 
excl u s i o n  of the feminine , and not merely by its 
exclusion, but its rejection as inferior. Dualistic 
genderisation constructs masculinity and femininity in 
terms of sets of characteristics which are construed as 
both o p p osite and complementary, for example 
dominant/submissive, active/passive, transcendent/immanent,
( that is, rising above and being in control of 
circumstances,nature and life , versus being subject to or 
immersed in them), rational/emotional, egoistic/altruistic, 
oriented to self-realisation/oriented to others, autonomy 
(sharp self boundaries) / relinquishment of self (self- 
merger) . In fact although each requires the other as 
(dualised) other, the alternatives are not exhaustive, and 
the result is a set of systematic false dichotomies (see 
Chapter Eight below). The result, as in dualistic 
construction generally, is a splitting and a loss of 
wholeness, a loss of possibility for a more integrated way 
of being in the world, and an emphasis on hierarchy . As 
we shall see, this applies also in the case of the human
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/nature dualism, which I now turn to.
DISCONTINUITY AND THE RATIONALIST TRADITION
One key aspect of the western account of nature is the view 
of nature as sharply discontinuous from or ontologically 
divided from the human sphere. This leads to a view of 
humans as apart from or "outside of" nature, usually as 
masters or external controllers of it. Attempts to reject 
this often speak alternatively of humans as "part of 
nature", but rarely clarify what is involved and often seem 
to be affirming what should be obvious , that our fate is 
interconnected with that of the biosphere, that we are 
subject to natural laws . On the divided self theory it is 
the essentially or authentically human part of the self, 
and in that sense the human realm proper, that is outside 
nature, not the human as a physical phenomenon. But this 
also helps explain why ecologists have so often to repeat 
and stress this "obvious" point, that humans are part of 
nature and are just as dependent as any other species on a 
healthy ecosystem. We do not really believe it because 
Western culture has provided a concept of human identity 
which locates the truly, essentially or authentically human 
outside of nature , and treats it as only accidentally 
connected to or dependent on nature.
In the dualism of human and nature what is 
characteristically and authentically human is defined 
against what is taken to be natural, nature or the physical 
or biological realm. This takes various forms. A major 
difference in kind is often assumed to exist between humans 
and nature, and in a situation of both similarities and 
dissimilarities or discontinuities between humans and non­
humans it is discontinuity which is characteristically 
stressed in western thought. The characterisation of the 
genuinely, properly, characteristically or authentically 
human, or of human virtue, in polarised terms to exclude 
what is taken to be characteristic of the natural is what
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1 fiJohn Rodman has called "the Differential Imperative"‘ , in
which what is virtuous in the human is taken to be what 
maximises distance from the merely natural (of which more 
below). A key part of this tradition is the maintenance of 
sharp dichotomy and polarisation, and this is achieved by 
the rejection and denial of what links humans to the 
animal . What is taken to be a u t h e n t i c a l l y  and
characteristically human, defining of the human, as well as 
the ideal for which humans should strive, is not to be 
found in what is shared with the natural and animal (e.g. 
the body, sexuality, reproduction, emotionality, the 
senses, dependence on the natural world ) but in what is 
thought to separate and distinguish them —  especially 
reason and its offshoots. Hence humanity is defined not as 
part of nature (perhaps a special part) but as separate 
from and in opposition to it. Thus the relation of humans 
to nature is treated as a dualism. The process closely 
parallels the formation of other dualisms, such as
i nmascu1ine/feminine , reason/emotion , criticised in 
feminist thought.
But this is not the only connection,because what is 
involved here is the rejection especially of those parts of 
the human character identified too as feminine —  also 
identified as less than fully human, giving the masculine 
conception of what it is to be human. Masculinity can be 
linked to this exclusionary and polarised conception of the 
human, via the desire to exclude and distance from the 
feminine and the non-human. The features which are taken 
as characteristic of humankind and as where its special 
virtues lie, are those such as • rationality, freedom and 
transcendence of nature (all traditionally viewed as 
masculine) which are viewed as not shared with nature. 
Humanity is defined oppositionally to both nature and the 
feminine. These features are taken as outside the realm 
of nature, and these are the ones to be maximised ; thus, 
the definition of the authentically human, of the real 
human self and of human virtue polarises humans and nature 
and maximises distance from nature. Thus too humans are 
often viewed in the rationalist tradition as a "paradox" of
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a genuinely human, free, godlike mind trapped in an alien, 
animal body. The situation closely resembles that of 
male/female polarisation , which has indeed provided a 
model , and there are further important connections with 
gender which I shall discuss later. The upshot is a deeply 
entrenched view of the genuine or ideal human self as not 
including features shared with nature, and as defined 
against or in opposition to the non-human realm, so that 
the human sphere and that of nature cannot significantly 
overlap. Nature is sharply divided off from the human, is 
alien , and usually, hostile and inferior. Furthermore this 
kind of human self can only have certain kinds of 
accidental or contingent connections to the realm of 
nature. I shall call this the Discontinuity problem or 
thesis.
Western thought systems have been remarkable for the strong
influence of both dualism and discontinuity since Greek
times. Nowhere has it been more influential than in the
view of the human relation to nature. It has been
especially strong in the rationalist tradition, although
not confined to it , because that tradition has chosen to
stress as the basis of its account of human virtue and life
features which it assumes to be peculiar to the human. In
the rationalist tradition nature has been regarded as
something not akin to the human sphere, as discontinuous or
ontologically divided from the human, something with which
humans have no fellowship. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas
approvingly quotes St. Augustine :
"When we hear it said "Thou shalt not kill " we do not 
take it as referring■ to trees, for they have no sense, 
nor to irrational animals, because they have no 
fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 
"Thou shalt not kill” refer to the killing of a 
man. "... and by a most just valuance of the Creator, 
both in their 
to our use”.
Aquinas is equally explicit : ” irrational creatures can
have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by 
reason. " Since Greek times it has been assumed that
there are two completely different sorts of things or 
substances in the world, humanity and the world of nature.
ife and their death /animalsJ are subject
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Humans are usually assumed to have a monopoly of mental
characteristics, and especially of rationality. Thus
Aristotle says "for other animals than men have the power
19of locomotion , but in none but him is there intellect. 
Platonic Dualism
Plato’s views on the nature of the human self, human 
virtue, and the status of the world of nature, as well as 
much of the rest of his philosophy, illustrate many of the 
features of dualism set out above. They emerge in three 
areas, in his account of the relation of soul or reason to 
body, in his later theory in his account of the relation 
of soul (the authentic and enduring aspect of self) to the 
other lower aspects of the self (nature within) , and in 
his cosmological account of the significance of the 
sensible world of nature.
The explicit contrast in Plato is not so much between the 
mind or soul as male and the body as female , but of the 
mind or soul as divine and the body as human. Thus 
Socrates is presented as asserting
the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and 
immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and 
indissoluble, and unchangeable ; and the body is in the 
very likeness of the human, and mortal, and 
unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and 
changeable .
The identification of these contrasting orders as gendered, 
(the superior side being male) is not explicitly made in 
Plato, although it is implicit in the analogy of the Cave 
and in Plato’s treatment of the emotions in the theory of 
the divided self in the Republic, where Plato is explicit 
in treating the extirpation of "feminine" softness and 
lack of control as the aim of education. Others in 
the Platonic tradition do explicitly add the gendered 
contrasts : thus the Pythagoreans included femaleness on 
the inferior side of their table of opposites, and Philo 
explicitly aligns the male / female contrast with the 
contrasting orders of Plato :
There is in the soul a male and female element just as
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there is in families, the male corresponding to the 
men, the female to the women. The male soul assigns 
itself to God alone as the father and maker of the 
universe and the Cause of all things. The female clings 
to all that is born and perishes; it stretches out its 
faculties like a hand to catch blindly at what comes in 
its way, and gives the clasp of friendship to the world 
of created things with all its numberless changes and 
transmutations, instead of to the divine order, the 
immutable , the blessed, the thrice happy. ^
Sense perception , associated with the body and the realm
of the changeable, is also strongly associated with the 
9 3feminine . If the body is not explicitly identified as 
feminine in Plato himself, it was so identified as part of 
the cultural background of his time, and for Plato himself 
the body is clearly part of the "region of the changeable" 
—  the realm of nature —  and in the earlier theory of the 
Phaedo is treated as in opposition to the genuine self, the 
soul. In this dialogue the body is treated in highly 
negative terms-- the body is a hindrance and a distraction. 
The philosopher, who represents Plato’s ideal of human 
life, desires death because it enables escape from the body 
and its entrapment. The body is described in entirely
negative terms as a prison for the soul (the true self) 
which is fastened to it and as the source of endless 
trouble by reason of its requirements and liability to 
change and disease . It is of no help in the attainment 
of wisdom and we are said to "make the nearest approach 
to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse
p £with or communion with the body." It is to be maximally
distanced from , and death is the goal of the philosopher 
because it is the ultimate separation from nature .
P l a t o ’s treatment of the issue in terms of the more 
sophisticated theory of the divided self continues the 
dualistic theme, but now as a dualism lying within the 
self. Non-rational qualities previously treated as alien 
to the self are now treated as properly parts of the self , 
which is as much the site of political struggles and 
conflict between distinct and opposing elements as is the 
state itseli . But the base elements (represented in the 
story of the charioteer in the Phaedrus as the "bestial"
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black horse) continue to be those linked to bodily appetite 
and to animality. And the right relation between the 
elements, or health, is defined in terms of appropriate 
distancing, control and subordination of this element —  
nature within -- by reason and its allies within the 
self. just as the right order in the universe is the 
control of the world of nature by Reason, the "world soul".
Plato's Cosmogony
Plato’s inf eriorisation of external nature can be seen in
his cosmogony. In the Phaedo Plato gives his views on the
inferior and corrupt .state of the world of nature that we
know and see around us. Just as the pure and incorruptible
Forms lie beyond the inferior objects which participate in
them, so beyond the world we know there is another far, far
2 9better, much purer and fairer:
and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he 
would acknowledge that this other world was the place of 
the true heaven and the true light and the true earth.
For our earth, and the stones, and the entire region
which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded. as in the
sea all things are corroded by' the brine, neither is
there any perfect or noble growth, but caverns only, and 
sand, and an endless slough of mud; and even the shore 
is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this 
[other] world. And still less is this our world to be 
compared to the other.
This other world,which of course lies above our world, and 
to which ordinary humans have no access, is, he tells us,
decked with various colours, of which the colours used 
by painters on earth are in a manner samples. But 
there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are 
brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of 
wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the 
white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or 
snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up, 
and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of
man has ever seen.... and in this fair region everything
that grows —  trees, and flowers, and fruits —  are in a 
like degree fairer than anyr here ; and there are hills, 
having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and 
more transparent, and fairer in colour than our highlyr 
valued emeralds and sardony'xes and jaspers, and other 
gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there
all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer 
still. The reason is that they' are pure, and not, like 
our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt 
brinyr elements which coagulate among us, and breed 
foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well
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as in animals and plants.
According to Plato the world of nature is,quite literally, 
a hole, its condition and status linked to that of the 
feminine via the metaphor of the Cave, their mutual 
association with the body, and numerous other features. It 
is also a dump, a latrine , place where refuse from the 
higher world above accumulates. Platonic philosophy not
only devalues nature, it is profoundly anti-eco1ogica1 and 
anti-life, truly a philosophy of death (as Nietzsche says, 
but for different reasons) . Change itself , the basis of 
life, is proof of inferiority, and only the changeless
immaterial Forms can avoid c o n t a m i n a t i o n  by it 
Biological change, the decay of organisms and change into 
other organisms, is viewed with disgust as disease and 
f ouIne s s .
The Cave
The discontinuity, split or break between two different 
realms of reality, which appears both as a division 
within the human self and between the true self and nature, 
is the theme of the famous Cave Analogy of Plato . In 
the analogy, Plato sharply contrasts two realms, the cave 
and the world outside. The split is both ontological and 
epistemological, and in both of these realms Plato insists 
on the primacy of Reason (represented by the world 
outside,and by light, a cultural analogy which persists 
strongly to this day) over the "entrapment” of the Cave.
The Cave Analogy of course works at a number of levels, 
which is part of its source of power, and which confirms 
part of the argument of this chapter of the way in which 
the key set of dualisms, humans/nature, mind/body, and 
male/female act as exchanges for and support for one 
another, forming a web. The Cave is, first of all, the 
world of the senses, of i n f o rmation coming from the 
material body, the world of physicality and changeability ; 
it is the world of Appearance. This is contrasted with the 
blinding light of Reason, with the sublime, eternal and 
incorruptible world of the Forms contemplated by the
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philosopher -- the world of Reality. It is then broadly a 
contrast, in specifically Platonic terms , between the 
non-material sphere of mind (reason, Ideas, the Forms) and 
the material sphere of the body and nature. The division 
between these spheres is a sharp one. As Irigaray notes, 
it is significant that the passage between is difficult and 
hidden :
This is a key passage, even when it is neglected, or 
even especially when it is neglected, for when the 
passage is forgotten, by the very fact of its being re­
enacted i_n the cave , it will found , subtend, sustain 
the h a r d e n i n g  of all dichotomies, categorical 
differences, clear-cut d istinctions, absolute 
d i sc on t i n u i t i e s ,  all the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s  ofO 1
irreconcilable representations. .
The Forms are the insubstantial, non-material ideas which
underlie and explain what goes on in the world of the
senses, of Appearance. This provides the basic element of
Transcendental philosophy, that what is basic, important or
real transcends the given, the world of materiality, the
world of nature, which by implication, is inferior,
incomplete, lacking significance of its own , a •source of
re-entrapment and error. Its meaning and its value , to
the extent that it has any , come from outside, from the
other sphere .
At another level of interpretation, the Cave is the mother, 
the feminine. What is to be transcended, left behind, in 
the journey from the Cave is precisely the feminine and 
what is associated with it —  traditionally materiality, 
the body, the senses, "primitive” stages of human and
individual existence. What is to be attained, the end of 
the journey out of the Cave, is the masculine identity, and 
what is associated with it, reason, ( which can also be 
the contrasting item in the above set of contrasts) and
human cultural identity. This level of interpretation 
connects with the psycho-analytic level. The Cave as 
Plato describes it is the uterus, and the journey is the 
oedipal one to the establishment of the masculine identity 
by differentiation from the inferiorised feminine and all 
that is associated with it. What is to be reached , the
sphere of the eternal, unchanging forms "assure freedom
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from the cave, the womb, the unending cycle of birth and
o odeath, the realm of necessity and of women (mothers)."
At a third level of interpretation what is left behind, 
transcended, is both nature without and nature within. 
This applies both in the case of the earlier theory in 
which nature is external to the real self or soul, and to 
the later theory of the divided self, in which nature is 
both external and internal. Later rationalists adapted
this story by the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the rational or 
conscious controller ( the charioteer in the horse story of 
the Phaedrus) as the genuine, true or authentic self, and 
of these features as defining of the human self. To later 
Platonists such as St. Augustine, the real person, the real 
carrier of identity and of humanity, is the reasoning part 
or the soul; the remainder is a trap, (like the Cave) a 
sphere to be controlled and dominated by Reason. The Cave 
then represents the division both within and without, 
between the authentically human sphere and the sphere of 
nature, the n o n - h u m a n  sphere. The Cave A nalogy is a 
powerful and culturally central image which establishes the 
dualistic division of realms, and important features of the 
western story of nature and of gender. It sets out the 
general dualistic structure to which the interwoven 
dualistic pairs of humans/nature, mind/body, and male/ 
female, can be fitted.
The Differential Imperative:Self, Other and Continuity
The Cave Analogy thus treated establishes the ontological 
gulf between the human (or the properly human) and 
nature. It also defines a human task, the accomplishment 
of which delineates if not the human in the descriptive 
sense, at least the human in the normative sense, the 
fully and properly human . the human identity . The task 
is to rise above and distance from both the feminine and 
nature within and nature withov.it, and the appropriate human 
attitude to this sphere is one of distance, control and
127
domination. The complement to this is a theory of human 
virtue aptly labelled by the American philosopher John 
Rodman ” the Differential Imperative". He characterises
this as follows:-
The basic concept upon which the whole edifice of 
classical thought was built —  the concept of human 
virtue or excellence —  was defined by isolating the 
distinguishing characteristics of the human species from 
those of other forms of being, especially the brute 
beasts, our next of kin. Human virtue was not only 
that which all humans shared (however unequally) ; it 
was also that which distinguished humans from wolves, 
sheep and grape vines . All variations on the theme of 
human virtue -- whether articulated as the ability to 
think, speak, know justice, choose, know and worship 
God, or (much later) to create technology —  are rooted 
in the formal presupposition that, at least at the 
species level, one becomes better by maximising 
o n e ’s species-specific differentia. , To put it more 
strongly, species differences ought to be maximised, and 
the most virtuous human being is the one who most fully 
transcends his animal and vegetative nature. The 
existence of a paradigmatic presupposition of axiomatic 
status is demonstrated by the almost universal tendency 
of m a i n s t r e a m  classical writers, both pagan and 
Christian, to assume the Differential Imperative as 
self-evident, and by the total absence of any argument 
for the equally logical alternative, that, given both 
differences and similarities with other forms of being 
and given some capacity to go one way or another, 
humans ought to act so as to maximise characteristics 
shared with other forms of being.
In accordance with its logically arbitrary assumption 
that the good life involved the maximisation of species- 
specific traits, classical moral and political thought, 
preoccupied with ”the good for m a n ”, engaged in 
continual putting down of the animal realm, both within 
man and without. In this respect, classical philosophy 
reflects the human ecology of agricultural civilisation. 
Just as agricultural man feels threatened by wild beasts 
and seeks either to domesticate or eliminate them, so he 
is threatened by the stirrings of the wild beast within 
whose taming (or even, in the Pauline version, whose 
extirpation) seems essential to achieving the life of 
virtue. This strand of classical thought has persisted 
well into modern times, surviving various Primitivist 
and Romantic rebellions, and becoming increasingly 
repressive as the area of external wildness has shrunk 
under the impact of human expansion, and as human 
r a t i o n a l i t y  has been reduced from the Platonic 
conception to the narrower conception aracteristic of 
modern economic/technological society.
The result is an identity which stresses separation of
humans from nature , rather than their continuity with it.
But the Differential Imperative is not logically arbitrary
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nor is it the only tactic involved in the modelling of
TOhuman /nature relations as analogous, the relations ofA
master and slave, mind and body, male and female, although 
it is an important one. The Differential Imperative 
is the result of the dualisation of the human /nature 
relationship.
The treatment of the human /nature distinction as a dualism 
continues, as Rodman notes for the Differential Imperative, 
into post-classical times . Later rationalists for example 
drew the division between the human self and nature even 
more sharply than the Platonic division. For Descartes the 
self is pure thought .
From the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth 
of other things it followed very evidently and very 
certainly that I existed , while on the other hand , if 
I had only ceased to think, although all the rest of 
what I had imagined had been true, I would have had no 
reason to believe that I existed; I thereby concluded 
that I was a substance , of which the whole essence or 
nature consists in thinking, and which in order to 
exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; 
so that this "I”, that is to say , the mind by which I 
am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, even 
that it is easier to know than the body, and moreover, 
even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all 
that it is.
A self defined as pure thought is one which "needs no 
place” and has no dependence on the body and nature, and 
indeed is entirely self contained even with respect to 
other humans. The authentic self so defined has nothing at 
all in common with the body and nature, since these are 
treated as totally lacking in mind-like attributes (see 
Chapter Five below). Nor does it have anything in common 
with the forms of existence defined as feminine. The 
authentic human self is defined as alien to both nature 
and the feminine.
The Differential Imperative continues to influence accounts 
of what is central to human life and character. For much 
contemporary European philosophy derived from Lacan , for 
example, the Symbolic Order is the realm of culture and 
language definitive of human being, and entry into it is 
i d en tified with the process of h u m a n i sa t io n  and the
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assumption of social identity. These are features assumed
to be not only exclusive of the natural and the feminine
3 5but only achievable via their subjugation. Although
ostensibly engaged in deconstructing the rationalist 
tradition, such a p o s ition continues to offer us a 
definition of human being and culture which is defined in 
opposition to both nature and women, and to those forms of 
life associated with them.
Mary Midgley makes a similar point to Rodman in her
characteristically succinct style: "Man grounds all value
3 Gin attributes unshared with animals.” But of course
this is not a feature of "Man" but of particular cultures, 
unshared by others. But Rodman’s and Midgley’s perception 
of the Differential Imperative as extending into value 
theory and involving especially the account of human virtue 
is important. In these terms the Differential Imperative 
operates at the level of both ideals of human character and 
through the selection of characteristics which are to be 
valued, stressed, and developed as appropriate to the human 
being, for example, rational self-control as against 
satisfaction of needs thought of as animal. More often 
however , the Differential Imperative operates covertly 
through the concept of the human itself, which is often 
implicitly normative . The strongly normative character of 
the concept of the human is indicated by the use of terms 
such as "fully human","less than fully human". These terms 
are not descriptive—  rather they select some things humans 
can do as proper to the human and some as not. Or an area 
discontinuous from the dualised animal is demarcated as 
authentically human or genuinely human ; this move gives an 
account of the nature of the human which involves implicit 
value assumptions. As in the Aristotelian case, the 
account of the nature of human being is closely intertwined 
with the account of what is proper to humans, and in this 
space the Differential Imperative grows. What is proper to 
the human , what expresses the true nature or essence of a 
human being, what is defining of human identity , is thus 
conceived of in opposition to the animal or natural, as 
precisely what is supposedly not possessed by animals —
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that is the rational, the spiritual, the transcendent , the 
area of freedom.
A modern version of the Differential Imperative is found 
especially in existentialism where the animal , inherited 
nature is treated as an alien constraint on the true self, 
which is seen as free. On this view the instinctual,
animal part of the nature of human beings represents the 
sphere of necessity, and limits options and choice ; our 
humanness consists in our ability to get as far away from 
this as possible , to maximise the area of choice and of 
culture over the area of nature , and hence minimise and 
distance from the sphere of necessity. Again, human 
identity is defined in terms of o p p o s i t i o n  to and 
maximising distance from nature, in this case represented 
not by the body but by instinct. Mary Midgley attempts a
resolution of the nature / culture dualism this exhibits, 
arguing that once we have distinguished two different ways 
of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  instinct (open instinct, where an 
instinctual base is open to cultural elaboration , and 
closed instinct , which is a fixed and unchangeable pattern 
of behaviour not open to social mediation ) , there is no 
necessary conflict between our human identity as natural, 
instinctual beings and our human identity ' as cultural and 
free beings. The conflict and choice between nature and 
culture here is the result of the dualistic construction 
of human identity.
MASCULINITY, DUALISM AND REACTIVE DIFFERENTIATION
Rodman and Midgley have noticed that humans and nature are 
defined in the tradition outlined above as discontinuous, 
apart, and even more, as oppositional. We have noticed 
that the relationship has the features of a dualism —  an 
oppositional distinction in which nature is inferiorised as 
well as d i s ta n c e d from and which defines ide nt i ty  
accordingly . When we put this together with some further 
feminist insights we can fill out the picture further. The 
relationship parallels that of separation as described by 
certain types of feminist psychoanalysis , rejection of the
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other as inferior and definition of the self via exclusion 
of and d istancing from its char a c t e r i s t i c s .  This 
corresponds closely with the separation process in the 
formation of masculine identity as theorised by object- 
relations theory. Nature is "spat out" in the formation
of this m a s c u l i n i z e d - h u m a n  identity , just as the 
feminine, the mother is "spat out " in the formation of 
individual masculine identity. So the account of this 
dualised human identity as masculinised is justified for 
two reasons —  first that the characteristics ascribed to 
humanity as so understood are those of masculinity rather 
than femininity, and second, that the processes of identity 
formation are parallel. And this should not be surprising. 
If w o men are ta k.e n to be identi f i e d  with nature, a 
masculine identity formed by exclusion of and in reaction 
to the feminine/ natural within will also normally be one 
formed by the exclusion of the feminine / natural without. 
These observations reunite two of the apparently disparate 
strands of ecofeminism noticed in Chapter Two, the one 
having its emphasis on difference and the separation of the 
individual masculine identity from nature and the feminine 
within , and the other placing its emphasis on dualism and 
the separation of the human identity from nature (without) 
and the feminine in cultural construction.
W e s t e r n  c u l t u r e ’s stance towards the natural world 
c o r r e s p o n d s  closely to that d e scribed by feminist 
psychoanalysis as "false differentiation" in the case of 
the formation of individual i d e n t i t y .0 According to
object-relations theory, this style of differentiation is 
also characteristic of the formation of masculine identity 
in specific social contexts , eg where motherhood is 
exclusive to women and is devalued . Such an identity is 
marked by an o v e r e m p h a s i s  on self b o u n daries 
( h y p e r s e p a r a t e n e s s ) , an oppo s i t i o n a l  or reactive 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of self, and a refusal or inability to 
recognise the subjecthood or agency of the other. Reactive 
separation , like dualism, aims to maximise distance, 
forming character on the principle "I am not like her who 
nurtures and cares for me ". Thus such an identity is
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premissed on being as little as. possible like the opposite 
identity, which is thus repudiated or "spat out", and it 
expels characteristics perceived as characterising the 
other from its own makeup. Because such a separation is 
never properly resolved, the masculine identity so achieved 
is precarious and requires constantly to be assured that it
is unlike the despised feminine. Thus as Flax explains:
The longings for symbiosis with the mother are not 
resolved. Therefore, o n e ’s own wishes, body, women and 
a n y t h i n g  like them (nature) must be p a r t i a l l y  
objectified, depersonalised, and rigidly separated from 
the core self in order to be controlled . °
False differentiation contrasts with a different type of 
separation which separates but is able to recognise not 
only the distinctness of the other , but also the other’s 
continuity with the self, the agency or autonomy of the 
other. This i's a separation which does not separate from 
the other as an alien being, does not "negate" the other, 
and the resulting self is distinct from the narcissistic 
self . As Nancy Chodorow writes
The ability to perceive the other as a self...requires 
an emotional shift and a form of emotional growth. The 
adult self not only experiences the other as distinct 
and separate. It also does not experience the other 
solely in terms of its own needs for gratification and 
its own desires.
The psychoanalytic account , although not without its 
problems . has considerable explanatory scope and 
u n i fying power in this context. If the cultural 
identification of the feminine and the natural which is 
characteristic of western culture transfers such attitudes 
from the mother to nature, this early self-formation 
process determines the stance towards nature, the world, 
the m/other, in general. The theory is able to provide an 
explanation of many features of dualism and of both the 
central features of the formation of western masculine 
identity and of cultural attitudes to nature of western 
society which unifies into a single process the key, but 
apparently disparate, features. These are as follows:
1 .Dualism :The account provides an explanation for the
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dualistic treatment of nature and women as alien to the 
human and the masculine self, and the reactive and 
oppositional formation of both human and masculine identity 
in terms of p o l a r i s a t i o n  or m a x i m i s i n g  distance. A 
consequence is an explanation of the way the resulting 
gender and human species identity is formed by exclusion of 
the oth e r ’s characteristics . This explanation then 
includes in its scope both the Differential Imperative and 
the Discontinuity thesis.
2 .Human Egoism versus Human Altruism. We can either see 
the dualist process as an institutional and cultural form 
of self/ other formation, or we can see a certain distorted 
formation of self in relation to other as a dualism of self 
and other. And of course they can be seen in both ways. 
The latter is suggested by Jessica Benjamin , and both
she and Nancy Chodorow provide a theory of the self which 
connects insightfully with the usual account of ego choices 
as egoist or altruist. Thus self/other dualism yields a 
false choice: the choice of self as submerged, as
relinquished versus self as overseparated (Benjamin), or 
hyperseparated (Chodorow). The second yields the excessive 
emphasis on autonomy and self boundaries characteristic of 
the masculine stance and of egoism, while the first 
connects with a corresponding distortion, that of self­
merger or self r e l i n q u i s h m e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the 
feminine stance or of altruism understood as the sacrifice 
or denial of self and its interests. These are mapped by 
Jessica Benjamin onto the sadism/ masochism contrast. The 
pairs form a false choice , for while the first denies 
c o n n e c t e d n e s s  or r e l a t i o n a l i t y  of self, the second 
submerges the self in the other, in relationship. As we 
shall see , this false choice is a key one and is repeated 
over a range of areas. It is especially important in 
determining the dominant masculinized attitude to nature as 
an ego i s t - ins t r umen t a 1 one, and the false choice of this 
instrumental approach versus an altruist-non-use one. Both 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  stances are theorised in object- 
relat i o n s  theory as d i s t ortions of the a d e q u a t e l y  
s e p a r a t e d  self c o nceived in n o n - dualist terms as
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relational, having relations to others which are not merelr^ 
accidental but are characterising or essential, but not as 
constituted entirely by such relations or defined purely 
in terms of relations to others .
3 .Objectification and Mechanism: This includes both
mechanism, as the treatment of nature as non-agentic and
the failure to recognise its capacity for autonomy and for
s e l f - d i r e c t e d n e s s ,  of the p o s s e s s i o n  of independent
purposes and goals. and the treatment of women in similar
terms as passive and as neither capable of or entitled to
self-direction (See Chapter Five below). What is involved
here is not so much the recognition of nature as a single,
unitary "self", as the recognition of multiple other
"selves" in nature, other beings with their own needs,
purposes and destinies, distinct from the needs, purposes
and destinies of the recogniser (and of humans) . The
failure to recognise the other as another self is also an
important element in backgrounding, the treatment of both
women and nature as the unconsidered background to human
4 3and masculine life.
4 .Instrumentalism : The reactively separated self does
not perceive the other as another self, with needs and
goals of its own, or as like to itself, continuous with
itself. Such a self also lacks essential (as opposed to
accidental) relations to others . Hence it must treat the
other as an instrument, a means to its own ends, since it
does not recognise other ends. Such a self "experiences
the other s olely in terms of its own needs for
g r a t i f i c a t i o n  and its own desires". This self also
corre sponds closely to the self-interested individual of
market theory, the rational maximiser of interests defined
without essential reference to others, as Ross Poole has 
4 4argued. Instrumentalism is a key feature of the western
treatment of nature which connects closely with the 
treatment of the other in mechanistic terms as lacking 
agency and goals of its own, and also with discontinuity, 
the treatment of the other as alien to and non-continuous 
with self. It is also a key feature of the treatment of
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women, whose worth is traditionally assessed in terms of 
criteria of virtue which turn on usefulness to males, and 
who are not treated as having autonomy and worth in their 
own righ t .
5 . D e v a l u a t i o n :  Like i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m ,  this is
overdetermined, that is a number of the features listed 
above lead to devaluation. For example, if an item is 
d e v a l u e d ,  this p r o v i d e s  m o t i v a t i o n  for the sort of 
separation from it described under "false differentiation", 
for maximising distance from it , trying to be as little 
like it as possible, and denying its continuity with the 
self. Conversely, what better way to achieve maximum 
separation and distancing than to separate and devalue, 
defining o n e ’s own selfhood against the devalued item. 
Devaluation is also linked to instrumentalism and to denial 
of selfhood to the other.
Psychoanalytic theory as developed by Chodorow and others 
provides a powerful explanatory framework in the case of 
feminist analysis, helping explain for example, the 
c o n n e c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the m a s c u l i n e  i d e n t i t y  and the 
characteristics of the public sphere of life , as well as 
many other features of note. Here it provides a powerful 
and u n i f y i n g  e x p l a n a t o r y  f r a m e w o r k  for v i e w i n g  the 
Differential Imperative and the western approach to nature 
generally, one which makes the connection to gender central 
and not peripheral and reveals the important respects in 
w h i c h  the f o r m a t i o n  and s t r u c t u r e  of d u a l i s e d  h u m a n  
identity parallels the formation and structure of dualised 
masculine identity.
DISCONTINUITY, HUMAN IDENTITY AND DEATH
The understanding of the meaning of human identity is 
strongly linked to the understanding of the meaning of 
death . The treatment of death in a culture reveals
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important features of the way in which human identity is 
understood. The western understanding of human identity as 
d i s c o n t i n u o u s  from nature is reflected in its 
understandings of death and the significance of human life.
We have seen that Plato in the Phaedo treats death as 
welcome to the man of true virtue, as the final separation 
from the physical realm of the senses, of nature and the 
body, which is entrapment and pollution for the soul. The 
real self is the soul, and continuity for the self is 
provided by its continuation in the world of the forms ; in 
fact if the real self is d i sc o nt in uo us  from nature 
continuity can only be provided by the soul’s persistence 
in a spiritual realm also discontinuous from nature, which 
furnishes the significance of and locus of continuity in 
human life . This formation of identity ensures that it is 
not merely discontinuous from and outside nature , but is 
oppositional to it, and is in conflict with the basic 
conditions and fact of its physical existence.
This o t h e r - w o r l d l y  o r i en t at i on  goes down through 
Christianity and appears in the doctrine of salvation as 
the true purpose of human life and in many other aspects 
of Christian doctrine, but especially in the treatment of 
death as the gateway to a better existence in the 
form of eternal life . The other-worldly orientation was 
especially marked in periods of high Platonic influence 
such as the middle ages. For both Platonic and Christian 
systems, the meaning of death is that the meaning of human 
life is elsewhere , not to be found in the earth or in 
human life as part of nature, but in a separate realm 
accessible only to humans, (and only to certain chosen of 
these) , the world of the forms and the world of heaven 
The salvation awaiting them beyond and above the world of 
nature , a fate marked out for humans alone, confirms their 
different nature as separate from the world of nature and 
their destiny as apart from that of other species —  their 
status and identity as outside nature.
This of course is no longer the modern view. The modern
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humanist view dispenses with another world beyond the earth 
as the source of significance and continuity for human 
life . The other world stands revealed as a human
reflection and invention ; there is no significance outside 
"man himself":
Alas, my brothers , this god whom I created was man-made 
and madness, like all gods ! Man he was, and only a 
poor specimen of man and ego : out of my own ashes and
fire this ghost came to me, and, verily, it did not come 
to me from beyond. What happened, my brothers ? I 
overcame myself, the sufferer; I carried my own ashes to 
the mountains; I invented a brighter flame for myself. b 
But the modern denial of the otherworldly is usually
absurdly incomplete ; like the affirmation of the underside
of a dualism (in this case the dualism of human and divine)
it leaves too much of the old structure intact, preserves
what it reacts against in. the dualised identity of what is
affirmed , and fails to construct a real alternative. It
has dispensed with the other world, disconnected from and
opposed to nature, as the basis for human identity, but
this disconnection and opposition itself now becomes the
basis of human identity . Science, progress, technology
provide an a l t er n a t i v e  basis for a human identity
constructed still as outside nature, in which humans are
external controllers and manipulators of it, and in which
humanness is now demonstrated by maximising the extent of
its control . Science builds an concept of human knowledge
in which what is known is taken as object, an alien other
to be dominated, seen but never recognised as subject. The
original location of masculinised human identity in the
sphere of the immutable , divine order has been lost, but
it has not been relocated in the opposing, excluded order
of the earth and of living things, "with all its numberless
changes and transmutations" from which classical thought
sundered it .
Modernity has not yielded then a single position on human 
significance to replace that of otherworldly religion . 
Rather there are a number of sons contending for the mantle 
of the Father to confer meaning and identity ; science,
progress. technological conquest, the economy. They offer
T©different solutions the problem of identity and continuity,A
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but usually ones as hostile to the natural world as the 
old identity based in denial of human connection to nature. 
For example where this identity is based in power over and 
domination of nature it founds itself in an hierarchical 
order —  one which is only too readily carried over to the 
human sphere —  and creates the religion of progress, the 
need to express and confirm this identity in an endless and 
escalating process of conquest of those conditions and 
beings cast as natural. Where it is based in the
conception of human identity as "economic man" whose main 
identifying feature is the drive to the satisfaction of 
wants, identity is confirmed and expressed in a process of 
endless and escalating consumption of commodities. But a 
human identity based in discontinuity from and opposition 
to nature and which fails to recognise a larger order 
persisting over time of which humans are a part has only a 
tenuous hold on continuity and significance , and often has 
to a b a n d o n  any hope of c o n t i n u i t y  or s i gnificance 
altogether.
In t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  religions , death confirms and 
necessitates human continuity in terms of persistence of 
the human essence in a larger order beyond the world of 
changeable things. Its meaning is that the decay of the
body is of no significance, for the human essence is not 
tied to the body or to the world of changes , but is 
embedded in this other spiritual order which persists 
Death expresses continuity with this spiritual order, but 
the discontinuity of the human essence from the contrasting 
order of nature .
C o n t e m p o r a r y  western identity has rejected this 
otherworldly significance and basis for continuity, but has 
given it no other meaning, provided no other context of 
continuity or embeddedness for human life . In particular 
it does not give death the significance of unity with and 
embeddedness in nature, for the human essence is still 
conceptualised as discontinuous from nature ; and to the 
extent that death can express a unity with nature, it is a 
unity with an order of nature conceived as dualised other ,
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as itself stripped of significance, as mere matter. Death
thus has the o v e r a l l  m e a n i n g  of s e p a r a t i o n  of the
individual from any larger order of significance. For
contemporary identity, the meaning of death comes to be
that human life has no meaning, or often, what is hardly
different , that it has any meaning anyone chooses to give
it . There is no continuity , and no larger order to which
death provides the key. Death is a nothing, a void, a
terrifying and sinister terminus, whose only meaning is
that there is no meaning, a view e x p r e s s e d  frequently
enough in contemporary literature:
What are the roots that clutch , what branches grow 
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
You cannot say or guess, for you know only 
A heap of broken images , where the sun beats ,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief, 
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only 
There is shadow under this red rock,
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),
And I will show you something different from either 
Your shadow at morning striding behind you 
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet YQU  ; .
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.
This problematic of a human identity formed in reactive
separation from nature and in the denial of connection to
a larger containing order of significance parallels here
also the separation difficulties of r e a ct i v e l y  formed
masculine identity, for which generational continuity over
time as well as non-ac c i den t a 1 c o n n e ct i o n  to the other
remains problematic. Dualism and a n d r o c e n t r i s m  thus
c o m b i n e  in the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a c o n t e m p o r a r y  h u m a n
identity alienated from nature.
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Chap t e r F i ve Dual ism and the Metaphys i c s o f Nat u r e .
There exists nothing in the whole of nature 
cannot be explained in terms of purely corporeal 
totally devoid of mind and thought.
Descartes
wh ich 
causes
Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference —  a 
moral multiverse . . . and not a moral universe. To such 
a harlot we owe no allegiance; with her as a whole we 
can establish no moral communion; • and we are free in 
our dealings with her several parts to obey or to 
destroy, and to follow no law but that of prudence in 
coming to terms with such of her particular features as 
will help us to our private ends.
W i l l i a m  James " Is L i f e  Worth 
Living?” , The Will to Be 1ieve, Longmans Green & Co , 
New York, 1896, pp43-44.
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
Just as reason and human are problematic concepts, so is 
the contrasting concept of nature . It is notorious as one 
of the most complex and many-layered concepts currently in 
use, and it is even more problematic for feminists, since 
assimilation to nature has been-made the basis for so much 
of women’s oppression in western culture. Attitudes to the 
concept range from the view that its multiple meanings 
indicate its richness and significance to the the view that 
we should simply abandon the concept, which is widely 
treated with suspicion anyway, as a relic of the past. I 
want to suggest instead reasons for retaining it but 
treating it with care and working to erase its dualistic 
construction.
"Nature" is defined as one half of a complex set of 
contrasts : for example it is contrasted in the human case 
with the unlearned or with the culturally variable 
(as in "Is competitiveness part of human nature or is it 
the product of particular and changeable cultures?"), with 
the domestic or domesticated (where a plant or species is 
said to be a natural variety), the synthetic ("Is it a 
natural or synthetic fibre?"), and with what is fabricated 
by humans or what is the result of human influence or 
interference. These are all different, for we can ask for
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example whether a particular area is in its natural state 
or whether it has been m o d ified somehow by human 
intervention, and this is different from asking whether or 
not it is synthetic, artificial or domestic, and certainly 
quite different from asking whether or not it is the 
product of a particular culture or a product of human 
nature. And these are only some of the senses.
Nevertheless, if we set aside the "human nature" sense, 
which raises some special problems, there is a common 
thread to many of these uses, and this thread is that 
"nature" operates as a contrast term with some particular 
aspect of the human . This may admit of degrees ; "natural 
yoghurt" is not yoghurt which the cow itself produces 
and which you can pick up in the fields, but a type which 
is less processed , or which is produced by a process 
regarded as "more natural", which involves less human 
interference with the original state of the thing or less 
processing. Although decades of use for advertising and 
p r o m o t i o n  purposes has produced a maze of absurd, 
stretched, vague, fanciful and downright dishonest uses of 
the concept of the natural, it remains important and 
indispensable in many areas.
If the key sense and contrast seems to be that in which the 
non-human sphere counts as "nature" in contrast to the 
human sphere, . it would seem to be simpler and clearer to 
substitute the term "non-human" for these uses, thus 
enabling us to dispense with the ambiguity and vagueness of 
the concept of nature in these cases . But this strategy 
has its problems , for the contrast class to the human is 
then defined entirely as the other, by exclusion and 
negation of what is human . There is then no continuity, 
overlap or inclusion, and the resulting concept resists 
analysis in terms which admit the human sphere as embedded 
in nature . Such a characterisation focusses exclusively 
on d i ff erence from a field of both sim il a ri ty  and 
difference ; it focusses on the human, and files nature away 
as "the rest". And the sphere of "nature" then is a 
polarity, which has to be seen as entirely lacking in human
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influence, as totally separate from the human, as alien. 
Such a d e f i n i t i o n  of nature is a refuge for the 
discontinuity account of human relations to nature.
The Discontinuity Thesis typically operates in this context 
to generate a false choice in which, on the one hand, 
humans are treated as indistinguishable from nature and 
totally immersed in it, and on the other as completely 
separate and opposed to it . The choice takes the form of a 
dilemma, the two horns of which are:-
(1) so emphasising human immersion in the natural or non- 
human world that no distinction can be made between 
the human and the natural, and there is no basis for 
recognising the difference and independence of nature and 
the non-human world or for viewing humans as capable of 
despoiling nature or acting against nature.
(2) s e p a r a t i n g  humans and nature so totally in 
characterising the natural that nothing is really natural 
which has any human element, so that nature "proper" 
becomes totally alien, and is defined as "the not-human", 
as the other . Such a view raises an unbridgeable wall 
between human and nature, a wall which prevents any real 
interaction, because interaction results in some kind of 
modification, and on the exclusion definition any kind of 
modification of an area causes it to be a human artefact, 
and hence not natural. Therefore humans can never really 
interact with nature, because as soon as there is 
interaction it ceases to be nature. "Genuine" nature 
remains forever elusive and alien, on the other side of a 
definitional wall, and all that humankind can really 
interact with is some reflection of itself. This horn of 
the dilemma then leads into one form of the problem of 
alienation. The dilemma then posed is that between an 
excessive emphasis on continuity and community with nature 
denying the possibility of difference between the non-human 
and the human, on the one hand, and of raising an 
unbridgeable wall between the human and the natural, 
denying the possibility of continuity and community on the
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other.
1
The dilemma is summed up nicely in two popular arguments. 
These collapse the distinction, as it were, from different 
directions, one leading to the conclusion that everything * s 
really natural, the other to the conclusion that nothing 
is. H. J. McCloskey’s Ecological Ethics and Politics suras 
up the first argument : "If man is deemed to be an insider, 
part of Nature, noth i n g  he can do could be unwise, 
irrational, wrong, contrary to Nature", and also the
\ 2second : "Wilderness proper would seem to be that which 
is completely untouched and unaffected by man. So defined, 
there probably is little, if any wilderness left." The 
first argument, that everything’s really natural, would 
only work if humans were not only "part" of nature but 
indistinguishable from it ; it emphasises human continuity 
with nature and the non-human to the point of insisting 
that humans and their works are indistinguishable from 
nature, thus collapsing the distinction in one direction, 
and adds the further very dubious assumption that the 
natural (in human action) is morally good. The second 
argument, that nothing’s really natural, emphasises the 
apartness of nature to the point of insisting that there 
can be no human influence at all on the genuinely natural.
These a rguments are symptoms of the problem of 
discontinuity, which under 1ies the false choice in which 
humans are treated as either indist i ngu i s hab 1 e parts of 
nature or as outside it, completely separate from it . The 
exc1 usionary understanding of nature gives rise to a series 
of problems which bedevil concepts such as wilderness and 
natural area, especially in relation to the indigenous 
people whose habitat these areas often are and who, like 
all species, modify the areas concerned, but usually not in 
ways which produce the degree of ecosystem simplification 
characteristic of industrial-technological society. On an 
account less influenced by discontinuity , we should be 
able to count an area which is still shaped largely by non­
human processes as natural even where there has been some 
human influence. We do need to be able to recognise nature
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as other, but we should not be obliged by definition to 
treat it as alien.
But it is not the use of "nature" as a contrast terra which 
creates problems so much as the way the contrast is treated 
-- as limited or as unlimited -- and this tends to take 
the form of additional assumption rather than being settled 
by the established sense of "nature" itself. The crucial 
issue is how those aspects of the human sphere that are 
shared with nature are treated, whether the contrast is 
treated as absolute and rigid or as allowing continuity and 
overlap between the human sphere and nature. This applies 
both to nature without and nature within. Is "nature 
within", those characteristics of humans that are shared 
with non-humans, to be kept sharply separated, feared, 
denied, denigrated (as the beast within), kept under 
control (especially by reason), and not fully admitted to 
the status of human or not admitted at all, as in the 
rationalist tradition ; or is it integrated , valued and 
accepted, treated as a vital part of human life and 
culture ?
The use of the terminology "nature" does not settle these 
questions , unlike the "non-human" terminology, which 
settles them the wrong way, not admitting the area of 
common ground. For on the view which admits human 
continuity, the contrast of human and nature is a limited 
one ; nature is not properly described as "non-human" -- it 
is also human. The concept derives its power precisely 
from the links it draws between human and n o n - h u m a n  
spheres, between nature within the human sphere and nature 
without. Dualism has used the concept of nature to spread 
devaluation and domination from the non-human sphere to 
those parts of the human sphere it associates with the non­
human, and vice versa . But the concept of nature is not to 
be blamed for this, and it has potentially a powerful 
linking and integrative function, which can reverse the 
process of denial of links and continuity between human and 
non-human spheres which dualism began, and which we must 
now end.
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THE DUALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE AS MECHANISM
D u a l i s m  has not only shaped our c o n c e p t i o n  of human
identity and the conception of the relations between humans
and nature, but has also shaped the western conception of
nature as mechanism. The mechanistic conception of nature
is the result of a dualising process which has denied to
nature any common ground with what are taken to be the
salient features of the human sphere , with the
characteristics considered to be mental especially. Just
as the genuine human self is construed in polarised and
oppositional terms as without qualities shared with the
animal a n d natural spheres, so nature is construed as
bereft of qualities apropriated to the human. Thus the
dualistic process destroys bridging characteristics f rom
both ends, as it were, of the dualism, and writes out
continuity. One product of this d u a l i s a t i o n  is the
mechanistic account of nature, and the contrast between the
human and non-human realms as absolute and unbridgeable,
one which has been aptly described as "consciousness versus
3clockwork". The clockwork account of nature given by 
mechanism and some forms of materialism represents nature 
in terms of the lower half of a dualism, the upper half of 
which (spirit) has been discarded, but the lower half of 
which (matter) has been retained in its dualised form.
For the earlier rati onal ist tradition the responsibi 1 i ty. 
for upholding the Differential Imperative lies with the 
account of the genuine human self as rational and as 
excluding those feminine-associated characteristics shared 
with nature or dominating these as representing a baser 
aspect of self. Thus the Differential Imperative provides 
an account both of the nature of the human and of what it 
should strive for, of virtue or of what is to be valued in 
human society and individual life. With Enlightenment 
rationalism the emphasis shifts away from this virtue-
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based account to a theory of consciousness as the focus of 
the self, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for m a i n t a i n i n g  the 
Differential Imperative shifts to an account of nature, 
both within and without, as pure mechanism devoid of 
elements of mind or consciousness . The Differential 
Imperative is no longer based in an account of human virtue 
but rather in the mechanistic view of the world identified 
with a scientific outlook.
Both environmental philosophy and ecofeminism have recently 
made moves to challenge the mechanistic model of the 
natural world. There has been a growing realisation öf 
a serious conflict between this mechanistic model of the 
world and an ecological outlook, and of a close connection 
between mechanism and instrumentalism. For if something is 
conceived in mechanistic terms, as lacking the qualities of 
autonomy and agency which are required for us to be able to 
accord respect to it as its own thing, it can be seen as 
just being our thing. If it lacks its own goals and 
direction, it can be seen as something utterly neutral on 
which humans can and even must impose their own goals, 
purposes and significance, for it has none of its own, 
exhibiting only "plasticity and indifference". Thus a 
mechanistica11y-coneeived nature lies open to, indeed 
invites the imposition of human purposes and treatment as 
an instrument for the achievement of human satisfactions.
It is no coincidence that this view of nature took hold 
most strongly with the rise of capitalism, which needed to 
make nature available as a market commodity and resource 
without significant moral constraint on availability. A 
view of nature as passive and without a value or direction 
of its own often underlies and is implicit in early liberal 
arguments for the legitimacy of private property. For 
example, Locke’s argument justifying private property in 
terms of the "mixing" of owned labour with natural 
resources in the state of nature, basically assumes not 
only that the natural world is "unowned" (unless so mixed 
with labour) by other humans, but also that it does not 
"own" itself, that it is simply available and is without
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v a l u e  o r  d i r e c t i o n  on i t s  own a c c o u n t ,  a nd  t h a t  t h e s e  
t h i n g s  a r e  adde d  i n  by human l a b o u r  .  ^ W i t h o u t  s u c h  an 
a s s u m p t i o n ,  t he  "mi x i ng"  a n a l o g y  i s  no t  a t  a l l  c o n v i n c i n g ,  
f o r  why s h o u l d  t he  a d d i t i o n  of  l a b o u r  make i t  p o s s i b l e  to 
s i mp l y  annexe  t he  n a t u r a l  wor l d ,  w i t h o u t  c o n s t r a i n t s  o t h e r  
t h a n  t h o s e  a r i s i n g  f rom t h e  n e e d s  o f  o t h e r  h u ma n s ?  I f  
n a t u r e  has  v a l u e  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  on i t s  own a c c o u n t ,  t he  
r e s u l t  of  " mi x i ng"  would be more l i k e  t h e  mi x i ng  of  one 
p e r s o n ’ s l a b o u r  w i t h  a n o t h e r ’ s or  w i t h  what  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n  
owns.  Ther e  would be t hus  no c a s e  f o r  s i mp l e  a n n e x a t i o n ,  
f o r  c l a i m i n g  t he  "mixed"  human l a b o u r  t o  be dominant  i n  
g i v i n g  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  and o v e r r i d i n g  t he  c l a i m  of t he  i t em 
t o  be " i t s  own t h i n g " ,  t o  i t s  own s i g n i f i c a n c e  and v a l u e .
I t  i s  no c o i n c i d e n c e  e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  m e c h a n i s t i c  mode l  
o f t e n  makes  u s e  of  f e m i n i n e  i m a g e r y ,  o f  p a s s i v i t y  a n d  
i n v i t i n g  d o m i n a t i o n .  The h i s t o r y  of  t h e  r e p l a c e me n t  by 
t h e  m e c h a n i s t i c  m o d e l  o f  a n  e a r l i e r  o r g a n i c  m o d e l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  some s o c i e t i e s  i s  w e l l  d o c u m e n t e d  by 
Ca r o l y n  Merchant  i n  h e r  book The Deat h  of  Na t u r e  and she 
a l s o  b e g i n s  t o  e x p l o r e  i n  t h a t  b o o k  t h e  c o m p l e x  a n d  
i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n n e c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  v i e w s  o f  n a t u r e  a s  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  c o n t r o l  and m a n i p u l a t i o n  and vi ews  of  women 
i n  s i m i l a r  t e r m s .  Her book,  which i n v e s t i g a t e s  some of  t he  
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n n e c t i o n s  be h i n d  t he  r i s e  of  mechani sm and t he  
c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  f e m i n i s m ,  h a s  p r o v i d e d  some o f  t h e  
m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  a new a c c o u n t ,  w i t h o u t  
howe ve r  i t s e l f  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  a c c o u n t .  Some o f  t h e s e  
c o n n e c t i o n s ,  b e t w e e n  t h e  v i e w  o f  n a t u r e  a s  f e m i n i n e ,  
p a s s i v e  and i n d i f f e r e n t ,  as  n e u t r a l  and l a c k i n g  agency ,  and 
an i n s t r u m e n t a l  vi ew of  n a t u r e ,  a r e  s t r i k i n g l y  summed up i n  
t he  i l l u m i n a t i n g  modern p a s s a g e  qu o t e d  a t  t he  b e g i n n i n g  of  
t h i s  c h a p t e r  .
M e c h a n i s m  t h e n  i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s e e n  a s  a p r o b l e m  i n  
c o n t e m p o r a r y  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  a 
p o s i t i o n  d e e p l y  e n t r e n c h e d  and  l i t t l e  q u e s t i o n e d  i n  t h e  
modern wor l d  v i ew and i n  ma i n s t r e a m p h i l o s o p h y ,  where i t  
has  no t  been  s e e n  as  a probl em.  Thus f o r  i n s t a n c e  G i l b e r t  
Ry l e  i n  The C o n c e p t  o f Mi n d , i n  a b r i e f  and  r e m a r k a b l y
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superficial discussion of the problem0 , simply dismisses 
the problem of mechanism as a bogey, a baseless fear, on
the grounds that there are other kinds and levels of
explanation (in this case for human behaviour) than those 
in terms of the laws of mechanics. He neither gets to
grips in depth with what mechanism is, nor considers 
whether it might be a problem in the non-human sphere, but 
this dis c u s s i o n  still appears to be the main one in 
orthodox modern philosophical literature.
I now try to outline in more detail some of the features 
which go to make up the mechanistic model of nature as a
preliminary to going on to discuss some alternatives to it.
I want to outline initially just a cluster of 
characteristics which fall into groups, and then later 
suggest some conceptual connections between them.
Scientific/mechanistic paradigm of nature
1 . Non-agentic: nature lifeless, dead, inert, passive, non-
conscious, non-agentic, non-autonomous, non-creative, non­
initiating, action imposed by external force from without 
(action the product of instinct in the case of animals) , 
motion not in bodies, object not subject.
2 .  n e u t r a l : indifferent, meaningless, no interests,
significance of its own. Significance, value imposed from 
outside by human c o n s c i o u s n e s s  .(This leads to the 
instrumental position.)
3. non-teleological : lacks all goals, purposes of its own:
lacks mind-like qualities. Goals, direction/imposed from 
out side by human consciousness.Outcomes are indifferent 
with respect to that item.
4. non-f ree : humans free, nature determined, non-free, non-
sentient, no capacity for choice.
5 . evaluative aspects : characteristics 1-4 enable the
contrast of nature as inferior with the superiority of 
human c o n s c i o u s n e s s  or human r a ti on al it y  and human
6
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creativity and freedom (immanence vs. transcendence).
The mechanistic paradigm can be taken as the rational or 
’‘scientific” one in the historically descriptive sense that 
such explanation has characterised what has been thought 
of as "science", and in the normative one that explanation 
accepted as rational or scientific is supposed to be in 
these terms, but its adequacy to account for what goes on 
in modern physics has been questioned. I will not be 
concerned with this claim here, which mainly turns on the 
non observer-independent status of data in quantum theory, 
and on aspects of the replacement of Newtonian theory which 
challenge some parts of feature 1 (especially that of 
motion being imposed from outside) and Newtonian atomism. 
Rather I will address the issue of teleology and mind-like 
qualities raised by item 3, which in turn has a bearing on 
most of the other items, and is , I think, a more central 
feature for mechanism.
It is evident that most of the terms in which nature is 
conceived in the mechanistic model are negative and are 
attributed to nature in contrast to something else. It is 
also evident that that something else is mind, or what is 
usually identified with it, the human mind. A large part 
of the problem of mechanism then seems to be an aspect of 
the mind/nature dualism (in turn closely connected with 
the mind/body dualism), that is, the view that the world is 
sharply divided into two completely different sorts of 
things or substances, mind and its contrast,- nature. 
Nature is entirely mindless, Thus according to Descartes 
"There exists nothing- in the whole of nature which cannot 
be explained in terms of purelyr corporeal causes totally 
devoid of mind and thought”. So it is especially this 
view of nature as a discontinuous realm totally devoid of 
mind and mind-like characteristics that an attempt to 
provide an alternative to the mechanistic model would need 
to examine. This assumption, along with the supreme value 
accorded rationality, has been and continues to be a major 
part of the basis for the as sumption of human superiority 
to nature and ri gh tful domination of it . In its more
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extreme form it sets up a total discontinuity between 
humans, the sole possessors of mind or consciousness, 
supposedly the sole possessors too of other "mental" 
characteristics such as purposes and interests, and non­
humans, which are conceived in mechanistic terms as lacking 
all these characteristics. That is, it contrasts the human 
and mentalistic with the non-human and mechanical, the 
contrast of consciousness versus clockwork.
The Historical Basis of Mind / Nature Dualism
The historical basis for mind/nature dualism closely 
parallels that for human/nature dualism discussed above in 
Chapter Four . This division between the human- 
mentalistic on the one hand and the natural /mechanical on 
the other, arising from views which see the human essence 
as mental and see the mind as sharply distinguished from 
and as utterly different from the rest of nature, has its 
source in the Greek rather than the J u d e o -C h r i s t i a n  
t radition.
In Greek Orphic and Pythagorean thought doctrines of the 
separation of soul and body initially led to stress on 
vegetarianism, reverence for life and the continuity of 
human and non-human life forms, because of the influence of 
the doctrine of transmigration of souls through different 
life forms. Later however, these positions settled into 
the more enduring course of rejecting both the body and the 
world of nature as inferior, as a prison or trap for the 
soul. For the Pythagoreans, the great separation between 
the soul and body became a separation between the soul and
ophysical nature generally.
The Aristotelian tripartite division of the world in terms 
of the rational mind, which is of course seen as exclusive 
to the human, the soul, which characterised animate beings,
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and the rest of inanimate nature, was less harsh, but still 
led to a strongly hierarchical order with humans at the 
pinnacle and the rest as inferior. Thus intellect (taken 
to be the central feature of mind) was not merely a 
distinguishing characteristic and the characterising 
feature of the human, but a superior one and justified the 
human position at the peak of the natural order, which was 
conceived in hierarchical terms as an order where the 
inanimate served plants, plants served animals and animals 
served man. The purposiveness and teleology discerned in 
nature was made a part of the h i e r a r c h i c a l  order or 
division of nature.
Nevertheless in Aristotelian thought the human sphere was
marked out by rationality, and there was a rational order
in nature. The form/matter distinction was applied to give
a view of nature as consisting of both matter and form, and
the form component —  the rational principles which were
discernable in and shaped matter -- was mind-like. Thus the
ra t i o n a l i t y  of pri n c i p l e s  in nature p a r a l l e l l e d  the
rationality which-was treated as the central feature of the
9 .mind. Despite the emphasis on hierarchy, the Aristotelian 
position left much more room for a sort of continuity than 
is typically left in the rationalist tradition. It was the 
Platonic position which had the dominant influence in 
defining human identity.
The Pythagorean position strongly influenced Plato. For 
Plato, as we have seen, the sensible world of nature and 
the body was distinct from and inferior to the world of 
Ideas (the Forms) just as the body was distinct from and 
inferior to the mind. The Platonic account of the material 
world as alien to humanity’s true nature in turn strongly 
influenced Christianity, which was able to develop such 
extremes of rejection of the world of materiality as that 
of Gnosticism . Although the position was in conflict with 
the n o n - a l i e n a t e d  view of creation of the Hebraic 
scriptures,. Gnostics of the Second Century held that 
human’s true or higher nature was not of the sensible world 
but of the spiritual and originated in Heaven, and the
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sensible realm of the body and nature where humans must
live as in a prison was a creation of the devil. Origen
held that the first and original creation was not material
at all, and that material creation appeared only after the
fall. Later Neo-Platonic thinkers of the medieval period
such as St. Augustine identified the world of nature and of
the body as lower, a perishable world of inferior, half-
destroyed value , to be treated as an instrument to gain
salvation in -the immutable and spotless world of heaven,
identified with the Ideas. Christianity has, as Rosemary
Ruether points out, encompassed two conflicting positions
concerning the alienated character of creation, the Hebraic
and the Greek, but for most of its history the view of the
material world as alienated, as evil or at best having
meaning and significance as an instrument to a separate
higher spiritual realm , has triumphed. These views of
nature are the precursor to later mechanistic views, in
which redemption is attained through science, and emphasis
on the domination of nature without replaces Christian and
10Platonic emphasis on the domination of nature within .
Descartes and Human / Nature Dualism
As far as the D i f f e r e n t i a l  Imperative is concerned,
D e s c a r t e s  is plainly the heir of the Platonic and'
rationalist flight from and devaluation of the body, nature
and the feminine, and of a number of other rationalist
features such as the definition of the real person as alien
to the body and nature. But these objectives are now
achieved in terms of mind and consciousness, rather than in
terms of the earlier conception of human virtue . in terms
of rationality. His account dispenses with the subtleties
of the divided self, of the higher and lower parts of the
soul as elaborated by medieval philosophers, and the
division between the rational and ir rationa1 parts of the
soul becomes (as in early Platonic thought) a division
between mind and body. The non-rational is no longer part
11of the soul but pertains to the body.
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On this account mind, the inner mechanism which explains 
the operations of the mechanically-conceived human body, 
also divides humans utterly from the rest of nature, from 
which mind is totally distinct. The mind, and its major 
feature consciousness, is an on/off concept -- it is either 
fully present or it is not present at all. There is no 
room for distinctions of kind or for differences of degree, 
either something "has a mind" or it does not, and having a 
mind requires consciousness. Cartesian consciousness was 
(and still is) a confused amalgam of the different concepts 
of thought, pondering, perception and heeding concepts, 
such as attention, all run together, and since some of
3
these features (e.g. pondering) appeared to be peculiarly 
human, the confusion facilitated the belief that the whole 
apparatus was.
The theme of the Differential Imperative, of the need to 
divide human nature from mechanistic animal nature and 
nature more g e n e r a l l y  , is one D e scartes returns to 
frequently, and is plainly one he took very seriously. He
J
writes :
For next to the error of those who deny God, which I 
think I have already sufficiently refuted, there is none 
which is more effectual in leading feeble spirits from 
the straight path of virtue than to imagine that the 
soul of brutes is of the same nature as our own...
But initially it would seem that a theory of mind as
consciousness would provide some basis for a recognition of
human continuity with other sentient beings at least. So
one problem for the Differential Imperative given the
identification of mind with consciousness is what to do
about human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  such as perception,
experiential characteristics, sensation and emotionality
which crucially involve the body and are shared with
animals . D e s c a r t e s  solves this problem for the
Differential Imperative with a theory of perception which
distinguishes between sensations construed as modes of
thought, and sensations construed as modes of matter.
Sensation is part of the self , of the "I” , for "certainly
I seem to see, to hear, to feel heat. This cannot be false;
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this is strictly what in me is called sensing ; but this is
1 o
strictly speaking nothing else but to think". It is
sensation construed as a type of consciousness or thought 
which gives knowledge, and not sensation as a bodily 
phenomenon.Thus he writes: " For I now know that, properly
speaking, bodies are cognised not by the senses or by the 
imagination, but by the understanding alone. They are not 
thus cognised because seen and touched, but only insofaras 
they are apprehended under s tandingly". ^  Not only does
this free experience of sensation from any commitment to 
the body, and make possible the dualistic polarisation
between thinking mind and mechanical body, but it means 
that animal sensation can be construed along completely 
mechanistic lines as purely bodily on the (somewhat 
question-begging) grounds that animals lack the capacity 
for thought. The latter claim results from the running 
together into the notion of "thought” of the different 
notions of awareness, noticing, consciousness, judgement, 
pondering, and reasoning, so that it is possible to move 
from the claim that animals lack the capacity for reasoning 
(itself construed narrowly as calculation) to the claim 
that they lack consciousness or awareness. This last 
claim is clearly false.
What Descartes did then was to apply the polarisation 
c o nd it i on  of dualism to eliminate con ti n ui ty  by 
reinterpreting the notion of "thinking" in such a way that 
mixed mental/physical bridging operations, such perception 
and emotion, become instead, via their reinterpretation in 
terms of "consciousness", purely mental operations, thus 
enforcing a strict and- total division between mental and 
bodily activity, between mind and nature. The intentional, 
mental level of description is thus stripped from the body 
and strictly isolated in a separate mechanism of the mind. 
The body, deprived of such a level of description, becomes 
an empty mechanism which has no agency or intentionality 
within itself, but is driven from outside by the mind. The 
body and nature become the dualised "other" of the mind.
The same Cartesian strategy is applied in the case of the
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natural world. Nature is taken to have no agency within 
itself. Because agency is stripped from a thus 
mechanistically - conceived nature, it has to be reinserted 
into the picture from outside by God t who drives nature 
just as the mind drives and controls the actions of the 
body. G od’s position vis a vis nature corresponds to the 
m i n d ’s position vis a vis the body. Thus there is an 
intimate linkage between the dualism of mind and nature and 
the dualism of mind and body.
All these features of Cartesianism make for a great and 
unbridgeable division between the sphere of the mental, 
identified on the general level with the human and on the 
individual level with the self, and the sphere of nature. 
Consciousness now divides the universe completely in a 
total cleavage between the thinking being (identified with 
the human) and nature, and between the thinking substance 
and "its" body. Mind and Nature become utterly different.
Modern Philosophica1 Positions
Both in the romantic reaction and in contemporary and 
modern philosophy Cartesianism has been under attack. 
Where do contemporary anti-Cartesian positions and analyses 
of the mental stand on the m i n d / n a t u r e  d i c h o t o m y  ? 
Unfortunately most do little to bridge the gulf in a 
satisfactory way and some dig it in even deeper. Many 
contemporary positions attempt to resolve the division in 
favour o f viewing not only nature but also the human i n 
mechanistic terms (the romantic tendency has always been to 
go the other way and view nature in humanised terms). 
These positions, which have been popular and distinctively 
contemporary positions, attempt to reduce the mental to the 
bodily or mechanistic, as in physical ism (mind/brain 
identity theory), to bodily behaviour (various forms of 
bodily behaviourism and stimulus-response theory), or to 
complex organisational machine states (functionalism). In 
these positions the dichotomy is resolved in favour of 
breaking down the. mind/nature and mind/body dualism, but at
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the price of a total, and not merely partial mechanistic 
conception of the world. Needless to say this does little, 
from the point of view of working out an environmental 
philosophy, to overcome the basic problem. If these 
positions remove the basis for the total division between 
the human and non-human, it is in a way which removes the 
basis for respect and moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n  both for the 
human and for the non-human sphere by the reduction of the 
characteristics such as possession of goals, purposes and 
w e l f a r e  on w h i c h  that r e s p e c t  may be based. Such 
positions extend the disrespect accorded a lifeless nature 
to the human, rather than going the other way and extending 
the respect due to se1f-directed beings to the non-human.
Descartes had placed great emphasis, in developing his view 
of a n i m a l s  as m a c h i n e s ,  on s p e e c h  and the s u p p o s e d  
i n a b i l i t y  of a n i m a l s  to speak, for he t h o u g h t  that 
appropriate speech was the outward sign of reason . A 
popular modern approach which inherits this disposition 
also analyses the mental largely in terms of linguistic 
capacities, and this also strengthens discontinuity. For 
this approach characterises language in such a way as to 
make it peculiar to humans (e.g. Davidson, Malcolm and 
Chomsky). And where basically linguistic accounts of mind 
are supplemented by conventionalism, as -in Wittgenstein, 
the result can be a total division between the human and 
non-human which is more thorough even than in Cartesianism, 
making it. not only false but m e a n i n g l e s s  to attribute  
mental characteristics to the non-human.Thus Wittgenstein 
says "We only say of a human being- and what is like one
17
that it thinks ", suggesting that the central concept is 
human and that others are applied by a process of extension 
only. It is a matter of the "language game" then that 
these concepts are applied to the human and not beyond, or 
only beyond by extension. This is taken to be a brute fact 
of language, which radicals and reformers can bemoan but 
cannot change. The approach is a deeply conservative one. 
But the line between the human-linguistic and the animal 
non-1inguistic is difficult to draw and even more difficult 
to hold, and the neat division between these spheres
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constantly threatens to break down in the' light of further
work on animal communication. Both language and mind have
such strong analogues in the animal sphere that the attempt
to confine them by definition to the human sphere must be
seen as invalid, question-begging and prompted by the
motive of preserving human-nature discontinuity. Several
philosophers recently have challenged this view of animals
1 Ras incapable of thought and/or language .
But despite attacks in the last forty years, Cartesianism 
and especially consciousness, its main concept, in the main 
retains its hold on the philosophical imagination. Thus 
the defence against the reduction positions is usually 
undertaken in terms of the privacy of the mental and the 
immediacy of consciousness, the mysterious inner quality 
which marks out the mental and which divides the world in 
the Cartesian view into two completely different sorts of 
things, the conscious human and the n on- conscious non­
human .
\
This model of the human as a conscious being totally 
disconnected from a dead and soulless nature has of course 
produced since its rise in the E n l i g h t e n m e n t  period 
numerous reactions aimed at overcoming or bridging the 
gulf, especially in the romantic movement. This attempted 
to add life to a dead, and meaningless clockwork world, in 
which humans were seen as forever adrift and homeless, in 
various ways - e.g. emphasis on aesthetic value of nature 
and through the reading into the landscape of human 
emotion, (which could however never be more than a tragic 
and futile attempt to love what does not respond) ; or 
through the discerning of a "hidden presence" in the 
landscape; in a religious or mystical vision which took 
nature as sublime; and of course in a spiritualisation of 
nature through the reduction of matter to spirit, as in 
G erman Idealism; or through the view of nature as 
enspirited through the presence of an immanent deity or 
through a pantheistic position. Often such positions 
are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons . Nature may be 
treated as fully sentient and as having through its
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possession of spirit human q u a lities i.e. there is no 
recognition of difference, nature is anthropomorphised in 
fact or fancy, and the human is taken as the basic model. 
Such a position does not succeed in genuinely escaping the 
dualistic model. Or nature itself may still be conceived 
as a non-agent, and agency and teleology are added from 
outside, from a god or spirit which acts as an extra 
ingredient, a hidden presence throughout the whole, which 
inhabits the shell and animates it. Such a position 
should be seen as still within a dualistic framework, and 
as affirming nature as dualised other.
NATURE, PROCESS, AND PANPSYCHISM
I turn now to the examination of some leading contemporary 
criteria of the mental to see how the issue of mind/nature 
discontinuity fares. We shall see that for the most 
important criteria there are difficulties in providing an 
account which vindicates the discontinuity as sumption. It 
is important to note first that although' discontinuity is 
usually presented as the alternative to panpsychism, that 
is, the thesis that mind is present everywhere, and present 
especially in nature, this is only correct if we make the 
on-off assumption concerning mind , that it. is either 
totally present or completely absent. Such an assumption 
of course is itself closely tied to the d i s c o n t i n u i t y  
assumption. Once this is questioned —  and we will see 
later that there is good reason to question it —  it is no 
longer at all clear that the failure of discontinuity leads 
to panpsychism, rather than to the view that mind-like 
qualities are to be found in nature, that there is no basis 
for an absolute break or an u n b r i d g e a b l e  gulf marking 
humans as mind-havers off from the rest of the universe. 
There has been little explicit d i s c u s s i o n  of either the 
discontinuity or the on-off assumption in the literature —  
rather both have unquestioned status as desiderata in 
accounts of mind , such that their absence is taken to
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provide a reductio ad absurdum i of such accounts . These
are very major and very questionable philosophical 
assumptions about the human relationship to the rest of the 
universe, but so insulated has mainstream philosophy become 
from such questions that the making of such assumptions 
passes unnoticed.
A contemporary position which however genuinely attempts to
replace the m e c h a n i s t i c  model and to break down the
mind/nature dichotomy is the Whiteheadian one, which has
re c e n t l y  begun to enjoy some vogue in envir o n m e n t a l
philosophy e.g. in the work of Birch, Hare and some Deep
Ecologists. This attempts to argue that mind and nature
are of the same stuff or substance and to reject the great
cleavage of mind and nature, by arguing both that mind is
matter-like and that matter is mind-like. In a suggestive
2 1and i n t e r e s t i n g  article Jay McDaniel attempts to
s y n t h e s i z e  a W h i t e h e a d i a n  p e r s pective with both an 
ecological approach and recent work in quantum mechanics. 
He argues that submicroscopic matter should be understood 
as partly life-like and as creative and sentient, free and 
capable of decision in the sense that it is able to 
a c t u a l i s e  some p o s s i b i l i t i e s  rather than others and 
sentient in the sense that it is able to ’’take other things
into account", to "feel" the presence of external
2 2determinants and thereby be influenced by them." 
Thus a c c o r d i n g  to McDaniel s u b m i c r o s c o p i c  matter is 
partially life-like.
McDaniel, following Whitehead, argues that matter and mind
should both be viewed as events or processes, which are
continually unfolding or perishing, and thus are not of
distinct kinds. The human mind is viewed as a series of
energy events, as a quantum. Thus "To speak of the mind
as a series of actual occasions or energy events is to say
o 3
that mind is made of the same "stuff" as matter."
This seems to presuppose some sort of reductive account of 
mind, but this is only part of the argument. McDaniel 
goes on to argue that matter is mind-like on five grounds
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of alleged similarity between human consciousness or 
experience and matter. Mind and matter have in common 
characteristics of freedom and choice, subjectivity i.e. 
"taking into account" although not n e c e s s a r i l y  in a 
conscious way, decision and creativity ("I create my own- 
r e s p o n s e  to the data a f f e c t i n g  me" in subjective 
experience), emotion and retrospection (memory), and the 
immediacy or continual perishing of subjective experience.
M c D a n i e l  concludes: "Inasmuch as mind involves
spatiotemporal properties, it is matter-like. And inasmuch 
as matter involves creativity and sentience, it is mind­
like. "Matter" and "mind" are simple names for different 
types of actual occasions of experience.
This is a valiant attempt to present in a clear form a 
complex position which deserves to be taken much more 
seriously in the orthodox philosophical world than it 
usually is, but the position is not ultimately convincing 
as it stands. I sketch very briefly some reasons why I 
think this, before going on to outline what I take to be an 
alternative, more defensible route to the same conclusion 
that mind and nature are not as utterly discontinuous as 
the mechanistic paradigm holds.
First, the fact that both mind and matter can be 
interpreted as events or processes does not as it stands 
show that they are not of radically different kinds, since 
such an interpretation seems quite consistent with holding 
that there are utterly different kinds of processes. That 
they c ou Id both be described as events or processes would 
not show that they were of the same kind any more than say 
the fact that both matter and mind could be described as 
"things" would show they were of the same kind. Some 
further argument is needed here that is lacking.
Second, it seems that the conclusion depends on a series 
of low redefinitions of concepts such as "sentience" and 
"decision". Take "decision" for example. The real basis
for the claim that there is "decision" in matter is that
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there is actualising of some possibilities rather than 
others. From this it is argued that something must have 
made a "decision" even if not consciously. But there is a 
great deal more packed into the concept of "decision” than 
the mere actualising of one among several possibilities, 
notably the notion of agency as well as, more debatably, 
that of consciousness. Different possibilities come about, 
but something makes a decision as an agent, (and usually a 
conscious agent - although perhaps not necessarily as a 
conscious agent). This further ingredient of agency is not 
established before the description of the situation as one 
of "decision" is applied, yet it appears to be crucial to 
the case. Similar points can be made where the notions of 
"freedom", " choice", "taking into account", "memory" and 
"emotion" are concerned. It seems th-at what has
really been shown is that there are n o n - a g e n t i c  
analogues of certain sorts to these notions which are 
applied to subjective experience, but which can only in 
some colourful or extended sense be applied to matter. But 
this of course is a valuable insight if the point of the 
exercise is to draw attention to continuity rather than to 
show that what is involved in each case is exactly the 
same. (McDaniel is somewhat unclear about his objectives 
here , a problem he shares with Other Whiteheadians.) Yet 
what is crucial here, and what remains to be clarified is 
in exactly what sense the m a t t e r - a t t r i b u t e s  one is 
justified in asserting are analogues of the mental ones. 
If an account of this can be provided, McDaniel’s argument 
does seem to have shown that even experiential criteria of 
mind , which seem an unpromising area in which to search 
for continuity, can provide some basis for continuity with 
what is usually thought of as unsentient nature. And of 
course they do provide a substantial basis for continuity 
with sentient nature, with animals of many kinds, if the 
Cartesian moves sundering experience into body-experience 
and m i n d - e x p e r i e n c e ,  and c ol l ap si n g the latter into 
rational thought, are rejected.
Another problem is that the position really depends upon 
buying the C a r t e s i a n  picture of c o ns ci ou sn e ss  and
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experience (subjectivity) as the mark of the mental and 
relies on extending these criteria outwards to matter. In 
order for matter to be mind-like it must have properties 
which resemble that of consciousness. This usually leads, 
as both McDaniel’s thesis and those of others such as Birch 
and Bookchin make clear, to some sort of hierarchy of 
nature based on richness of experi e n c e  or orders of 
consciousness in which the natural world is conceived of as 
inferior in these respects to the human mind i.e. it has 
mind-like properties, but only to a very minor degree. 
(Thus McDaniel asserts "the degree of freedom of an atomic 
event is practically negligible compared to advanced 
organisms" °) . This builds in. a hierarchy, since it 
conceives the world of nature as similar to but of less 
degree than the human mind, rather than as simply 
different. Such a pos i t i o n  seems to offer little 
likelihood of giving a real chal1enge to the thesis of the 
inferiority of the natural world to the human sphere, 
depending as it does on the mere extension in a weakened 
form of properties which are exemplified most fully by the 
human mind. However such a hierarchy does not inevitably 
emerge from the experiential account of mind , but only if 
further assumptions assigning value in proportion to 
degrees of consciousness or experience are made, as in 
Birch, who employs a " richness of experience" criterion 
for determining an item’s value which is highly favourable 
to humans.
Intentional Criteria of the Mental
The main modern rival to such experiential accounts relies 
on a different analysis of and feature of mind from the 
feature of consciousness identified as central in the 
Cartesian model, namely the feature of intentionality. 
This approach also provides, perhaps even more clearly, a 
basis for the rejection of mind/nature discontinuity. This 
approach identifies the central characteristic of the 
mental not in terms of a special, hidden causal mechanism
168
or mysterious property,, consciousness, which accompanies 
all and only mental activity and nothing else and so 
divides up the world, but instead in terms of falling into 
a certain special logical category, that of relation to a 
content, which makes it intentional . The intentional is 
a sub-class of the intensional , an irreducible mode of 
discourse of a logical type which resists and does not 
require analysis in terms of its contrasting logical type, 
extensional discourse. The promise of breakdown of the 
dualism comes partly from the fact that this intentional 
logical type is not confined to the mental or to the 
d e s c r i p t i o n  of human activity but can also be found 
elsewhere in nature and is necessary to the understanding 
not only of mind but of nature. In fact as we shall see, 
no clear boundary can be drawn between the intentional and 
the intensional, which can a c c o r d i n g l y  be viewed as 
yielding mind-like properties. Furthermore the position 
makes possible distinctions of kinds and levels of mind­
like properties within the total range, in place of the 
on /off concept of mind emp h a s i s e d  esp e c i a l l y  by 
Cartesianism. But so entrenched is mind/nature dualism 
that these very features of the analysis have been seen as 
weaknesses because they tend to break down discontinuity. 
On the sort of account given here these features would be 
viewed as strengths.
The contrast of mind versus machine is drawn very much in 
terms of the intensiona1/extensiona1 contrast. Thus we 
have a mechanistic description in good Skinnerese if we 
shear off all intensional elements and confine description, 
for example of something moving, to movement and 
extensional terms —  ’’the hand moved 3 feet to the left, 
foot 1 inch up etc” and a non-mechanistic one making use of 
mental concepts if we describe it as action e.g. "She 
(tried to) turn on the light and fetch the ball". The 
latter description is both intensional and intentional. 
The intensional feature seems to be the key one in the 
cluster of concepts which go to characterise mechanism. 
Thus the possession by an item of autonomy and agenthood 
appears to be closely connected with the item’s being able
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to be described in intensional and especially teleological 
terms, as the p o ssessor of goals, purposes, or more 
broadly, directions which make the item particularly its 
own thing, with its own way of being and ability to 
initiate action . Teleological (and hence intensional) 
description appears to be the key to the attribution of 
agency.
In terms of this model then it is possible to see why 
the Whiteheadean picture breaks down both mechanism 
and discontinuity . Description in terms of events and 
processes is a way of describing the physical universe 
which allows both for directions and potentialities, for 
both teleology and the actualisation of possibilities. It 
is an intensional way of describing the physical universe. 
Events and processes must be understood teleologically, as 
having directedness or tendencies in terms of which they 
unfold, and in terms of the potentialities which they 
realise i.e. they must be understood in t ens i ona 1 ly. This 
is' what provides the basis for the further feature in the 
Whiteheadian description -- agency. Similarly it is the 
intensional features of submicroscopic phenomena which seem 
to provide the basis for describing their features as those 
of "creativity" and "sentience", and shows the operation of 
"freedom" “choice" and "decision" f "taking into account", 
the terms which McDaniel uses. The solid basis for these 
description applications, the feature of physical matter 
which makes it analogous to or continuous with items to 
which these intensional descriptions apply, is again the 
teleological feature and the feature of the actualisat ion 
of alternative possibilities and the change of behaviour in 
accordance with a discernible goal, purpose or direction 
(adaptation or "taking into account"). The feature which 
the descriptions have in common with their analogues is 
intensionality, and the fully "mental" analogues appear to 
differ mainly in d i s p la yi n g further concepts of 
consciousness and attention. The real basis for continuity 
in the Whiteheadean picture, to the extent that it does not 
just depend upon metaphor, seems to be the redescription of 
both phenomena in terms of suitably corresponding analogues
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which are analogues because they share intensionality, one 
being perhaps often a more "conscious" or "subjective" 
description of the same general intensional kind as the 
other.
On this sort of account the roots of Cartesian mind/body 
dualism lie in the attempt to conceive the person initially 
not in the unified, intensional terms in which we often 
describe him or her as an agent, as the performer of 
purposive, intentionally-described action, but in terms of 
a mechanistically conceived body plus a set of separate, 
hidden interior mental causes. The problem lies in the 
attempt to conceive the person i n itially in purely 
extensional terms, as a body engaged in bodily movement for 
example, rather than in intensional terms as an agent 
engaged in purposive action e.g. attempting to jump the 
gate, earning a living, fixing the light. Mechanistic 
explanation starts with a stripped down concept of the
body, stripped of all but e x t ensional "scientific"
*
characteristics such as moving in certain ways, rather 
than as expressing mental characteristics or intentions. 
It becomes necessary to postulate a further set of hidden 
separate inner mental causes which explain the movements 
of the m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y - c o n c e i v e d  body. Because the 
mechanistic extensional story in terms of movement is 
patently inadequate, the Cartesian tries to make up the 
difference by adding an extra hidden ingredient, a separate 
mind, marked out by a special property, consciousness, also 
hidden from view. Intentiona1ity becomes concentrated in 
this alleged organ and stripped out of everything else; 
e.g. out of "behaviour" of the body, which is then treated 
as a bare mechanism, instead of being expressed in 
unified, intentionally-conceived action. There it is 
treated as a hidden causal agency or mechanism, the mind. 
But if our basic description of action and agency is not 
mere "behaviour" but is a unified one in which the 
a g e n t ’s action is d e scribed i n t e n s i o n a l l y  or 
intentionally, by reference to a content (e.g. as having 
been done for the sake of something) , the Cartesian moves 
are illegitimate. Intentionality, which is a necessary
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condition for the mental, is expressed in action, but is 
not the cause of it. The dualistic position also confuses 
purposes (to be analysed intensiona1ly) with causes (which 
it assumes are to be analysed extensionally.
The basic notions we operate with, according to this story, 
are unified ones and resist, if properly analysed, the 
mind/body split. The fact that we can observe intentional 
action helps to close the gap which the mechanistic account 
opened up between e x t e r n a l l y  obs e r v a b l e  behaviour, 
conceived of in mechanistic terms as movement, and the 
unobservable but postulated inner causal mechanism of the 
mind. On this view mind is expressed in the (often if not 
invariably) observable, intentionally-describable activity 
of a unified agent or person.
But the same sort of insight can be applied to mechanistic 
models of nature, and to the r e sulting m i n d / n a t u r e  
dichotomy. The roots of mechanism in each dichotomy, the 
mind/nature and mind/body, are the same. The deadness or 
lifelessness of nature, mechanistica1ly-coneeived nature, 
like the deadness of tbe body, consists in the withholding 
of intensional descriptions, the stripping off of both 
i n t entional and intensional characte r i s t i c s ,  and 
confinement to "neutral" extensional ones which make nature 
a dull and meaningless affair.
Just as there are degrees and levels of intensionality, so 
there are degrees of mechanism corresponding to the denial 
of these. Cartesian mechanism, which denies mind or mind­
like qualities to all but humans , is an extreme form 
outdone only by modern forms of behaviourism and S-R theory 
whi ch deny intensionality even to humans . Less extreme 
forms are widespread, for example forms attributing mind­
like qualities to sentient beings, including some n o n ­
humans, but denying them beyond that. A further position, 
a d vo ca t ed  here, sees mind-like qualities as spread 
throughout nature, and as necessary to its understanding, 
but as being of different levels and kinds. These enable 
distinctions to be made between different sorts of mind-
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like qualities, and different sorts of beings which have 
them. The result, if not properly d e s c r i b e d  as a 
continuum, is a complex of distinctions, a web of 
difference within an overall ground of continuity,and the 
rejection any absolute, cosmic dichotomy or break between 
the human and natural spheres based on the possession of 
mind. Nor is this break retained but relocated elsewhere, 
as in the case of the absolute divorce between animate and 
inanimate nature, or sentience -and the rest, 
characteristic, for example of utilitarianism and many 
other modern views.
ANIMISM, TELEOLOGY AND MIND
Thus an alternative to mechanism does not need to amount 
to an animistic "respiritualisation” or "reenchantment" of 
nature. A l t h o u g h  some forms of animism are ways of 
stressing continuity, animism can also result from basic 
acceptance of the dualising of the world in terms of 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  or the spiritual or mental, and then 
attempting to extend this outwards to cover a wider class, 
so that nature becomes spiritual or subjective. There are 
many ways to readmit i ntension a 1ity and to reconceive 
nature without dualism , hut there is no need for this 
kind of anthropomorphically-conceived spiritualisation to 
make the world come alive. The need for an extra, hidden 
anthropomorphica11y-coneeived spirit to bring the dead 
machine of nature to life is like the need for an extra 
hidden mechanism to direct the mechanically-conceived body 
and make it come alive to explain its movements. The 
treatment of spirit as an extra ingredient added to nature 
involves the reflection onto nature of mind/body dualism, 
the attempt to take up i n t en s i o na 1 i t y in terms of the 
add i t i o n  of an extra ingredient of spirit to a 
mechanically-conceived base. Just as in the mind/body
case, the necessity arises because the body is treated 
mechanically and dualistically in the first place, .stripped
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of its intensional and agentic attributes. Or , it is the 
result of the application of a dichotomising, on/off 
conception of mind, together, perhaps, with goodwill 
towards the natural sphere, which results in the 
unfortunate consequence of denial of difference, the 
humanisation of nature.
Just as the alternative to mechanism in the raind/body case 
is not the addition of a spiritual or mental cause (which 
position is rather its complement or alter ego) but rather 
the reassertion of the unified concept of an agent acting 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  and thus e x p r e s s i n g  mind , so the 
alternative to mechanism in the mind/nature case is not the 
addition of spirit, but rather its conceptualisation in the 
unified organic (and intensional) terms of directedness and 
growth, and of teleological concepts generally. The life 
we try to bring back to nature with the hidden extra 
ingredient of spirit is already there if we resist the 
attempt to remove, reduce and replace intensional concepts 
such as direction, need, potentiality and purpose which we 
can often easily and naturally apply to it. Thus to see 
the natural world in non-mechanical terms is already to see 
something with its own purpose, direction and significance. 
When these concepts are applied the world is populated not 
by humans and what is left over, but by a vast variety of 
other beings which are different from but continuous with 
the human , including trees, (self-directing beings with 
an overall "good" or interest), forest ecosystems 
(interrelated wholes whose interrelationship of parts can 
only be understood in terms of stabilising and organising 
principles, which must be understood teleologically, and 
which are intensely alive with beings engaged in 
purposive, se1f-directed activity such as nest-building, 
chasing, food-seeking, and gathering, preening and so on); 
and mountains, which are the product of a lengthy 
unfolding natural process, and with a certain sort of 
history and direction as part of this process and with a 
certain sort of potential for change. In fact we also 
constantly describe nature in terms of the notion of agency 
as well as that of function, both parts of the non-
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mechanistic organic model. To resist mechanism is then 
partly to resist the insistence that we abandon or reduce 
such accounts and instead describe the world just in terms 
like its being"x feet long, coloured brown and containing z 
board feet of timber", that we refuse to reduce ourselves 
to a "dead” , "neutral" extensional account of nature.
An important part of obtai n i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to a 
mechanistic paradigm and of breaking down mind/nature 
dualism is the reinstatement of teleology as an important 
and i r r e ducible set of concepts, but neither an 
a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c  A r i s t o t e l i a n  teleology nor an 
anthropomorphic animistic one is required or desirable for 
that purpose. Broadly teleological concepts (the concepts 
of X happening for the sake of something else), like other 
intensional concepts such as possibility, potentiality and 
necessity, are applicable fairly generally to the natural 
world, and are necessary to its proper understanding. 
There is a family of teleological concepts, and while some 
of these require consciousness or the capacity to make 
choices and are only applicable to higher animals (e.g. "it 
tried to jump the gates") others can be applied without any 
anthropomorphism or animism to non-conscious beings. 
Notions of growth, of f l o urishing for example, are 
imp l i c i t l y  t e l e o l o g i c a l  and applic a b l e  without 
consciousness, and some , concepts such as function or 
direction, are applicable to natural systems and processes 
generally,. e.g. notion of natural processes "doing their 
own thing", unfolding in their own ways, according to their 
own internal directions. Thus on this picture there is no 
great division or break-off point between mind and nature 
in terms of teleology, but rather a continuity in a family 
of related intensional concepts applicable at varying 
levels and in varying ways to the natural world generally 
as well as to humans.
Similarly the on/off Cartesian concepts of consciousness 
and the on/off concept of the mental each become 
problematic on such a theory. It has only been possible to 
see consciousness as peculiar to the human and. as also
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peculiar to the mental because it is such a confused 
amalgam of different concepts. Some of the groups of 
"consciousness” concepts may apply only to humans or higher 
animals (e.g. pondering, being able to give a detailed 
verbal account), while others such as the noticing, heeding 
and awareness members of the family can be applied fairly 
generally to animals.
Mechanism and the Intentionalist Program
The on/off concept of mind, as either completely present or 
as completely absent, and the associated sharp contrast of 
the h u m a n -menta 1 i st i c and n o n - h u m a n -m e c h a n i s t i c  , is 
rejected on such an account. But such a development of the 
intentiona1ist position would diverge sharply from that of 
Brentano, Chisholm and others in its identification of 
intentiona 1 ity as the mark of the human mind. This 
identification has in fact proved to be a major problem 
area for the intent ional is ts , since it has proved to be 
extremely diff i c u l t  to find a logical c r i t e r i o n  of 
intentionality which will pick out all and only mental 
operations and which do not collapse the notion back into 
the wider notion of the intensional, thus destroying 
discontinuity.Successive proposals have failed.
Thus Chisholm in a series of papers published between 1952 
2 9and 1967 attempts to make good the Brentano criterion of
intentionality, initially characterised as intentional 
inexistence, as the mark of the psychological. He moves 
through a series of ever more tortuous modifications of the 
original criterion of intentional inexistence, relying on 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  ad hoc and less s i g n ificant logical 
distinguishing features all of which ultimately fail and 
which involve him in a major translation and reanalysis 
program of the kind only too familiar from phy s ical i s t i c 
and reductionistic positions like those of Quine and Smart. 
The rock that even the more sophisticated later criteria 
based on scope and quantification constantly perish on is
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that of s e p a r a t i n g  the intentional off from the 
intentional, distinguishing mental and psychological 
functors from causal dispositional, modal, deontic, alethic 
and teleological functors, to name a few. Although the 
search for a logical criterion which separates these is not 
successful, that does not of course show that there is not 
such a logical characteristic. What does seem clear 
however is that the increasingly minor logical differences 
appealed to cannot be seen as corresponding to any really 
significant philosophical division, certainly not as cosmic 
a division as that alleged to hold between mind and nature. 
So even if a logical feature separating psychological 
functors from other intentional ones can be found, it does 
not support the view that there is a major difference in 
kind between the sphere of the psychological and the sphere 
of the non-psychological but i n t ensional. Thus far the 
intentiona1ist program started by Brentano and carried on 
by Chisholm and others, in which the reducibility or non- 
reducibility of mind has been made to seem to depend on 
finding a feature which sharply distinguishes the mental 
from the physical, the intentiona1/psycho1ogica1 from the 
non-intentional, can be seen as a failure.
This failure of the century-long attempt to conclusively 
mark off mind from nature via internal logical features is 
now recognised. As a recent reviewer of the problem, C.B. 
Martin, writes :
A number of the marks of intentional ity including- forms 
of di rectedness are intrinsic to causal dispositions and 
are to be found throughout all of nature. Less 
obviously, use is intrinsic to systems of dispositional 
states capable of complex, directed, combinatorial 
regulative adjustments and control. Such systems are to 
be found in non-psychological , non-mental things and 
even in inorganic nature.
Martin treats this as implying panpsychism, and as a reason 
for abandoning intentionality and for relocating the 
central features of mind in the senses , bu t as I have 
argued this is only c o m pelling if d i s c o n t i n u i t y  is 
unquestioned. An a l t er na ti ve  con cl u si on  is that 
intentionality, like the experiential criterion itself, 
provides a basis for the recognition of continuity between
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mind and nature, and thus also between the human and 
natural spheres.
There is no need to abandon intent ional i ty if the attempt 
to sharply separate off the intentional from intensional is 
abandoned as misconceived, and as resting on the assumption 
of the need for a sharp mind/nature dichotomy. Instead the 
intentional can be thought of as simply a particular 
relational subclass of the intensional, and as such not 
sharply divided from but similar to and continuous with the 
i ntensiona1ity needed to desoribe and understand all of 
nature , and both the human and non-human spheres . The 
view of the mind as the exclusive property of humanity 
falls too under such a treatment, along with the dualism 
between the human-menta1istic and non-human mechanistic. 
Such a view can distinguish different kinds and grades of 
intensionality, from complex highly intensional fully 
psychological activities such as believing Godel’s theorem 
and understanding Wittgenstein, (perhaps confined to the 
human), to feeling prickling sensations and noticing 
changes, choosing the wrong way or trying to jump the gate 
(which are all applicable to non-humans), through to having 
an overall life-goal, for the sake of which its parts are 
organised (applicable to living organisms generally) , 
through to the unfolding, development and directedness 
implicit, in natural processes. Intensionality is common to 
all these things, and does not mark off the human, the 
mental, or even the animate (although different grades of 
i n t e n s i o n a l i t y  may corres p o n d  to different t y'p es of 
things), and is just as necessary for the understanding of 
natural and physical laws as it is to the under s tanding o f 
the human sphere.
The Differential Imperative has distorted our view of both 
human similarity to and human difference from the sphere of 
nature, and the use of criteria which are supposed to 
distinguish the human and the mental sphere. When this 
framework of discontinuity is discarded , it can be seen 
that the intensional criterion , like other criteria of the 
mental and of what is supposedly distinctive of the human,
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does not support a picture in which nature is alien but 
rather one in which nature can be recognised as akin to the 
human ; human difference, like that of other species, 
appears against an overall b a c k g r o u n d  of similarity, 
forming a web of continuity . Meehanistic views of nature 
represent the kind of reactive separation from the other in 
which the other is treated as alien, a non-self whose 
kinship is denied and which can only be made non-alien by 
being brought to reflect the seifs own image. We can as 
humans indeed recognise ourselves in nature, and not only 
as we do when it has been made over, commoditised and 
domesticated, made into a mirror which reflects back only 
our own species’ images and our own needs. We can 
instead recognise in the myriad of beings in nature other 
selves whose needs and purposes must, like our own, be 
acknowledged and respected .
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Chapt e r Six: Ego and Inst rume n t
Civilised Man says: I am Self, I am Master, all the
rest is Other —  outside, below, underneath, subservient.
I own, I use, I explore, I exploit, I control. What I 
do is what matters. What I want is what matter is for.
I am that I am, and the rest is women and wilderness. to 
be used as I see fit.
Ursula K. Leguin Women/Wilderness, in Judith Plant
(ed) Healing' the Wounds .
THE ROOTS OF INSTRUMENTALISM
W e s t e r n  culture c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  treats nature in 
instrumental terms , as a mere means to human ends, as a 
"resource", as expendable where human interests require it, 
and as having its- significance and value conferred by or 
through human interests. Nature, it is assumed , has no 
significance and value of its own, unlike humans , who 
are supposedly ends in themselves, and for whom purely 
instrumental use is supposededly proscribed . So deeply 
e n t r e n c h e d  is this framework that even many 
conservationists work unquestioningly within it, and 
challenges to it often only succeed in extending slightly 
the class which is to be counted as master.
Instrumentalism is a key feature of the western treatment 
of nature which connects closely with the treatment of the 
other in mechanistic terms as lacking agency and goals of 
its own, and also with discontinuity , the treatment of the 
other as alien to the self. It is also a key feature of 
the treatment of women, whose worth is traditionally 
assessed in terms of criteria of virtue which turn on 
usefulness to males, and who are not treated as having 
autonomy and worth in their own right.
The instrumental treatment of both nature and women can be 
linked to dualism and the reactively-separated self. Such 
a reactively separated self does not recognise the other 
as another self, with needs, goals and a value of its own
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which must be considered and respected. It "experiences 
the other solely in terms of its own needs for 
gratification and its own desires" , in Nancy Chodorow’s 
words, and this is very much how western culture has 
experienced nature. The reactively separated self also 
lacks essential (as opposed to accidental) relations to 
others, and its ends make no essential reference to the 
welfare or desires of others . Hence a tally of its 
desires and ends would show that others figured only as 
instruments, a means to its own self-contained ends, since 
it does not recognise or incorporate the ends of others, 
except accidentally and as a means to its own ends, as in 
enlightened or rational self interest
What I shall argue here is that i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m  is 
overde t ermined , that is, that a number of the factors 
discussed above are closely linked to it, including the 
formation of the self through false differentiation, 
dualism , discontinuity and mechanism. Instrumentalism is
' fintimately related to power, domination and hierarchy. I 
shall argue also that the instrumental role of nature is 
shared by women, and that it forms a further feature 
supporting the thesis that the relation of humanity to 
nature is masculinised.
Kantian ethics held that no-one (ie no human) should be 
treated as a mere means, and that one should act to others 
always as if they were ends in themselves. Kant held that 
this did not apply to non-human animals however, (and even 
less to the rest of nature) which lacked judgement (ie 
reason) and "must be regarded as man’s instruments". He 
writes:
Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a 
means to an end. That end is man. We can ask "Why do 
animals exist?" But to ask "Why does man exist ?" is a 
meaningless question ." ^
The treatment of all humans as ends became an important 
part of humanist ethics. But despite the gender-neutral 
presentation of the humanist doctrine that all humans have 
intrinsic value, and none are to be treated as mere
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instruments or means to the ends of others, in fact the 
traditional role of women (as well as of other inferiorised 
groups) is highly instrumental, and this feature forms a 
further link between the treatment of women and that of 
nature.
The creation story of Genesis places E v e ’s being firmly
within the instrumental mode She is created so as to
provide various goods for Adam , not to fulfil her own
ends . The instrumental treatment of women’s existence i s
however often more heavily disguised, and is written into
the notion of wha.t it is to be a good woman. Greek
criteria of virtue , for example, are such as to make what
is virtuous for women what suits and serves men. Women as
wives were valued for their chastity, their frugality and
their silence, and were not e ncouraged to develop
2p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  Cri t e r i a  of excellence might vary
according to the different category of usefulness into 
w h ich a woman was fitted, but were still clearly 
instrumentally conceived, as the following statement from 
Demosthenes in the lawsuit Against Naera reveals:
For this is what living with a woman as o n e ’s wife means 
—  to have children by her and to introduce the sons to 
the members of the clan and of the deme, and to betroth 
the daughters to . husbands as o n e ’s own. Mistresses we 
keep for the sake of pleasure, concubines for the daily 
care of our persons, but wives to bear us legitimate
chi l d re n  and to be faithful g ua r di a ns  of our
3
households.
Martin Luther expresses a lengthy Christian tradition of
instrumentalism , writing in his Vindication of Married
4
Life‘ that man does not exist for the sake of woman, but 
that woman exists for the sake of man. Liberal political 
vision builds theories on the assumption that man’s good 
is his own happiness , and that w o m a n ’s good is m a n ’s. 
Romantic love works hard to disguise or soften starkly 
instrumental relations, and few would now admit to a view 
as explicit as Rousseau’s clearly instrumental vision of 
the ideals of womanhood:
The whole education of women should be relative to man.
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To be pleasing in his sight , to win his respect and 
love, to be useful to him, to make themselves loved and 
honoured by him, to train him in childhood, to tend him 
in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life 
pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for 
all time, and this is what she should be taught from her 
infancy. ^
Nevertheless, instrumental criteria are part of the ideals 
of womanhood and the traditional female role of service to 
others, and of finding meaning and significance in and 
through others . Such criteria assume that some people 
exist as means to the ends or purposes of others, and 
write inequality and hierarchy into the very formation of 
the gendered self and self ideals. Here for example it is 
very useful to assume that women are naturally passive and 
lacking in goals and purposes of their own or to induce 
them to be so, for then there are no conflicting ends to 
cut across the imposition of male ends. This is not to 
say though that there is not positive value also in some of 
these traditional ideals , especially when reinterpreted or 
transformed as ideals for both sexes of connection to 
others and of relational selfhood ; but they have an 
ambiguous face, and must serve as at least a warning of the 
pitfalls of any uncritical or romantic gynocentrism (see 
Chapter Eight below) based on indiscriminate affirmation of 
the feminine . But when thus transformed into an equal and 
s y mm etrical r e l ation they lose their instrumental 
character, for the essence of instrumentalism is asymmetry, 
that one party is by nature merely a means, requiring an 
end to provide its justification, while the other is by 
nature an end in itself which , not standing in need of 
acquiring significance or justification by reference to 
another, is its own justification and has intrinsic value 
on its own account.
The meaninglessness and lack of significance modern culture 
finds in the world is tied both to mechanism and to its 
conception in instrumental terms. As Ross Poole notes," 
the world lacks meaning (is "disenchanted” in W e b e r ’s 
poignant phrase) just because it is conceived as a means
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to ends which are independent of it".® The assumption of 
the passive and mechanical character of nature has, as 
noted earlier, a similar function in p romoting 
instrumentalism in the case of nature as the assumption or 
production of passivity in women. If the object can be seen 
as without ends or purposes of its own, arising from its 
own nature, it can be seen as available for use , as 
inviting the imposition of human ends and purposes. As 
Rosemary Ruether puts it :
No internal moral doubts or external demonic fears need 
inhibit its full exploitation for the ends desired by 
"man" (ruling males). The world had been thoroughly 
"thingified" as an object for use.
Thus mechanism paves the way for the "resource” approach to
nature c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of capitalism, and even more
8emphatically stressed in much Marxist thought.
Instrumentalism is also closely connected to dualism. The 
underside of an instrumenta1ly-conceived pair is usually
treated as a means to the end of the controlling, dominant 
side. Theorists of the Frankfurt school have noted that 
the operation of instrumental reason involves the use of 
power and control. Thus the lower realm of the body and 
nature serve the higher realm of intellect or reason, 
accounted an end in itself, and in much Christian as well 
as Platonic thought the lower realm is to be used as an 
instrument to gain salvation, identified with the higher 
realm. An important exception is one Christian view which 
takes nature to be valuable not because it is useful for 
human purposes, but because it is G od’s creation, and 
hence valuable on this account. This position still stops 
short of accounting nature valuable for its own sake 
however.
Discontinuity connects with instrumentalism via the need to 
make a sharp separation between the kingdom of means and 
the kingdom of ends, and to maximally distance them. That 
the means and ends be seen as of different kinds, as non- 
continuous, of radically different natures, is essential 
to maintaining and justifying means/ends dualism . There 
are then no threatening ambiguities or confusions about
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which item belongs where, no chance to find oneself on the 
wrong side of the boundary, as the eaten instead of the 
eater, the used instead of the user . A sharp boundary 
instils the necessary confidence about who is the other, 
and who is Self, for whose wants and needs the universe 
is conveniently available. It erases too the possibility 
of identification or sympathy, as Was so clear in the case 
of Descartes and his followers.
INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE SELF
Instrumentalism is, above all, a way of relating to the 
world which results from a certain kind of selfhood, that 
of the egoistic individual. The reduction of the world to 
the status of instrument is , as Marilyn Frye has written , 
the work of the arrogant eye:
Woman is created to be m a n ’s helper. This captures in 
myth Western C i v i l i s a t i o n ’s p r im a ry  answer to the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  q u e stion of m a n ’s place in nature 
everything- that is is a resource for m a n ’s exploitation. 
With this worldview, men see with arrogant eyes which 
organise everything seen with reference to themselves 
and their own interests. The arrogating perceiver is a 
teleologist, a believer that everything exists and 
happens for some purpose, and he tends to animate 
things, i m a g i n i n g  a t t i tu d es  toward h im s el f as the
animating motives.... the arrogant perceiver does not
c o u n t e n a n c e  the p o s s i b i l i t y  that the Other is 
independent, indifferent. The feminist-separatist can 
only be a man-hater ; Nature is called "Mother”.
The arrogant perceiver does not have to believe nature
exists to serve him, to be an Aristotelian teleologist in
the sense that he thinks nature is actively imbued with
the purpose to serve man. He may merely believe that it
lacks purposes of its own so that he is entitled to impose
his own upon it, or that if it has purposes of its own
that he is entitled to replace them with his own, to annexe
it and to annihilate its agency, its independence of
purpose. What he believes is that nature is available
the purposes of the other are either not conceded or are
not conceded any legitimacy or importance compared with his
own. Instrumentalism is thus tied to the perception of the
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other as inferior, empty of purposes which command respect, 
as well as to perceptions of it as mechanism, empty of any 
purpose.
The self which complements the instrumental treatment of 
the other is one which stresses sharply defined ego 
boundaries , distinctness, autonomy and separation from 
others —  which is defined against others, lacking 
essential c o n n e c t i o n s  to them. This corresponds to 
o b j e c t / r e l a t i o n s  account of the masculine, falsely 
differentiated self, which experiences the other solely in 
terms of its own needs and its own desires. It corresponds 
al'so to the self-interested individual presupposed in 
market theory, as Ross Poole has argued. He has also 
shown how this kind of self is presupposed by the Kantian 
moral picture, where desire or inclination is essentially 
seif-directed and is held in check by reason (acting in the 
interests of universality and speaking in the name of the 
father). This self uses both other humans and the world 
generally as a means to its egoistic satisfaction, which is 
assumed to be the satisfaction of interests in which others 
play no essential role. If we try to specify these 
interests they would make no essential reference to the 
welfare of others , except to the extent that these are 
useful to serve pre-determined ends. There is no essential 
or ineliminable reference to the welfare of others, 
because this welfare does not figure essentially or 
internally in specifications of the self’s desired ends, 
which is specified in abstract terras as happiness , utility 
or profit.
Such a reactive1y-formed self denies dependence on the 
other, and the other’s necessity, contributions and labour 
are backgrounded , belittled or denied. Thus the falsley 
-differentiated masculine self typically backgrounds the 
feminine contribution to his life in appropriating 
achievement as his own, and the market self denies social 
dependency or backgrounds the social in the appropriation 
as private goods of what has acquired value only through 
the unacknowledged contributions of others . Nature
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above all is backgrounded , both in its treatment in the
market as an ’’externality” and in its treatment in western
culture as the taken-for-granted backdrop to human life
and achievement , noticed only when it fails to perform as 
1 3required.
For the egoistic self, others as means are interchangeable 
if they produce equivalent satisfactions -- anything which 
conduces to that end is as valuable, other things being 
equal, as anything else which equally conduces to that end. 
The interests of such an individual, that of the individual 
of market theory and the Chodorowian masculine self, are 
defined as essentially independent of or disconnected from 
those of other people, and his or her transactions with 
the world at large consist of various attempts to use 
others in order to get s a t i s f a c t i o n  for these p r e ­
determined private interests. Others are a "resource” and 
the interests of others connect with the interests of such 
autonomous selves only accidentally or contingently. They 
are not valued for themselves but for their effects in 
producing gratification. But of course this kind of 
instrumental picture, so obviously wrong in the case of 
relations to other humans, is precisely still the normal 
western model of what our relations to nature should be. 
Thus this self which treats the other as an instrument also 
corresponds closely to the self-interested individual of 
market theory, the rational maximiser of interests defined 
without essential reference to others.
THE RELATIONAL SELF
Now this kind of theory has been st renuously criticised in
the area of political theory from a variety of quarters,
both feminist and in the critique of liberalism , as
involving a non-relational "disembedded and disembodied
1 1"account of self.- It has been objected that it does not 
give an accurate account of the human self —  that humans 
are social and connected in a way such an account does not 
recognise. People do have interests which make essential
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and not merely accidental or contingent reference to those 
of others, e.g. when a mother wishes for her child’s 
recovery, the child’s flourishing is an essential part of 
her flourishing, and similarly with close others and indeed 
for others more widely ("social others"). But, the 
objection continues, this not only gives a misleading 
picture of the world which omits or impoverishes a whole 
dimension of human experience, but the dimension so 
omitted is an important and significant one, without which 
we cannot give an adequate picture of what it is to be 
human. Instead we must see human beings and their 
interests as essentially related and interdependent. As 
Jean Grimshaw writes:
The human self is "embedded” in a network of 
relationships with others , both at very immediate and 
intimate and at wider levels. Human needs and interests 
arise in a context of relationships with other people,' 
and human needs for relationships with other people 
cannot be understood as merely instrumental to ,isolable 
individual ends. For all these reasons, it is right to 
reject an "individualistic” account of the human self, 
if by that is meant that the doctrines of abstract 
individualism or psychological egoism, or the notion 
that the ”interests” of each human being are sharply 
separable from those of other people , are untenable.
People’s interests are relational, a fact of which
institutions such as the market take no account , but this
does not imply a holistic view of them —  that they are
merged or indistinguishable, that they cannot exist
separately . Although some of the mother’s interests entail
satisfaction of the child’s interests, this does not imply
that these interests are identical or even necessarily
similar , that she merges with the child or takes the
child’s interests to be her own . It is important that she
does not lose her sense of boundary in such a situation and
that she does retain her sense of the child and its
interests as independent of her ^ . There is overlap, but
the relation is one of intensional inclusion (her interest
is that the child should thrive, that certain of the
child’s key interests are satisfied) rather than accidental
overlap, and the child’s interests are specified as one of
her internal goals, rather than as merely external,
17instrumental to those goals .
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O b j e c t - r e l a t i o n s  theory provides an account of the 
formation of such a relational ego, as well as of the non­
relational one. Nancy Chodorow argues that the account of 
the main task of ego development as separation and the 
development of ego boundaries is mistaken and results from 
our cultural preoccupation with separation, and that the 
main task is the development of a relational ego structure 
formed by internalisation of aspects of close others.
Along with the earliest development of its sense of 
separateness, the infant constructs an internal set of 
unconscious , affectively loaded representations of 
others in relation to its self, and an internal sense of 
self in relationship emerges. Images of felt good and 
bad aspe c t s  of the mother or p r i m a r y  caretaker, 
caretaking experiences, and the mothering relationship 
become part of the self, of a relational ego structure, 
through unconscious mental processes that appropriate 
and incorporate these images.
The more the central core of self, she suggests , is built 
on relational rather than reactive autonomy, the less it 
has to define itself against the other in the fashion of 
the falsely differentiated self.
Egoism and A1truism
Such a relational account of self bypasses the traditional 
false dichotomy , associated with self/other dualism, 
between egoism and altruism. Egoism and a s s o ciated 
q u alities such as assertiveness, a drive to self- 
realisation and competitiveness have been part of the 
qualities traditionally deemed proper for, and in fact 
associated with, maleness; they are part of the masculine 
"public" sphere. In contrast stand "soft" feminine 
qualities of se 1 f-abnegation, self-denial, and putting 
others first which are an essential part of the traditional 
private sphere of the family. Many other traditionally 
feminine characteristics are associated with this e.g. the 
proscription of self-assertion for women and of confidence, 
and those qualities flowing from a mode of existence in 
which achievement and self expression must be obtained 
through others.
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The egoistic mode may be conceived of as one where the self 
is treated as of primary or intrinsic value, and the 
a l t r u i s t i c  as one where the self is treated as 
instrumental to the interests of others who have primary 
(i.e. non-instrumental) value. Usually in liberalism 
egoism and altruism are presented as an exhaustive set of 
alternatives. Conventionally egoism, the pursuit of one’s 
own selfish interest, is presented as an unfortunate fact 
of human nature, the family as a retreat from it. Where 
possible egoism is to be overcome by altruism; egoism is 
not seen as a good thing, but it is seen a natural thing 
and therefore to be accepted. Altruism, the pursuit of the 
interests of others, and the setting of one’s own interests 
aside in favour of theirs, is conventionally presented as 
the alternative course of virtue, if indeed one which can 
only realistically be realised as an exception , owing to 
’’h u m a n  nature". Eg o i s m  then is the dominant mode, 
altruism a subsidiary one, a praiseworthy exception. There 
is a glaring exception here however. Altruism is, in the 
conventional picture, superogation for men, but it is 
traditionally enjoined for women —  it is part of the 
whole ethos of the traditional instrumental feminine role; 
and this required renunciation of the self, this expected 
self-denial is one of the reasons why the traditional role 
is one which makes women perpetually guilty (about their 
failures to be good wives, mothers and so on, being able to 
put others first)
The guilt arises because there is some truth in the 
e g o i s t ’s view —  the p e rpetual denial of o n e ’s own 
interests and the putting of the interests of others first 
as a perpetual way of life would be quite unviable, and it 
is the difficulty of doing this, of treating oneself as an 
instrument for others, which helps account for the many 
problematic features of traditional mothers. e.g. self- 
sacrificing "Jewish" mothers of much literature who in fact 
wish to control and live vicariously through their children 
and other family members. Perpetual self-abnegation, 
where it can be achieved, is destructive of the self. Such
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is the classic complaint of the housewife or mother who 
feels that she herself has disappeared, that she is 
nothing. For what does it mean for something to be in 
o ne’s own interest? If it means anything it must mean that 
one has some sort of primary attachment to that interest 
or concern with it —  it wouldn’t be one’s own interest if 
one could simply give it away like an old boot with no 
concern at all. So the traditional feminine ideal of a 
life based on self-sacrifice and service to others creates 
severe problems. These problems are logical as well as 
personal and political, for the supposition that everyone 
behaves so as to serve the interests of others leads to the 
same absurd result as the supposition that all values are 
instrumental. Just as instrumental value requires a non­
instrumental goal, an end in itself, so altruism requires a 
set of primary , non-altruistic interests to sacrifice 
itselffor.
But it is equally unviable to suppose that only egoism 
exists, and although this is seen as basic to human 
nature and as underpinning the institutions of public life 
e.g. the market, and the liberal political system, this 
mode of e x i s t e n c e  can only survive because of the 
invisibility of the basic feminine contribution in the 
family. Masculine public sphere egoism must be 
complemented by invisible, feminine altruism in the private 
sphere. So egoism and altruism are complementary and 
require one another ; the pursuit of self-interest for some 
requires the denial of self-interest for others, each side 
being unviable without the other.
Charac terising The Re 1a tiona1 Self
The relational account of the self breaks this culturally 
-posed false dichotomy of egoism and altruism of interests 
(in the sense of altruism in which it means neglecting 
one's own interests) ; it bypasses both mascu l in e  
"separation" and traditional feminine "merger" accounts of
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the self. For like other d u a l i s t i c a l l y  conc e i v e d  
alternatives, the modes of egoism and altruism are not only 
complementary and unable to function unless the other 
exists, they are not exhaustive as supposed. What the 
conventional choice between egoism and altruism neglects is 
the third possibility of interdependence of interests, the 
case where people’s interests are conceived relationally, 
so that one’s own interest involves and is bound up with 
those of others not a c c i d e n t a l l y  as in the case of 
enlightened self-interest, but essentially. This is 
especially clear with those one is close to, for example, 
if you love someone your interests include an interest in 
their prospering. In this case the satisfaction of one’s 
own interests includes that of relevant others. The
I
question of altruism versus egoism does not arise, because 
people’s interests are not discrete and sharply separated 
in the way that the altruism/egoism contrast assumes. 
Hence the pursuit of such interdependent interests doesn’t 
have to be (and in fact can’t satisfactorily be) viewed as 
either egoism or altruism. It is neither pursuing one’s 
own interests (unless the concept of the self is stretched 
to include those to whom one’s interests are essentially 
related (the Self), a move which seems designed to preserve 
the appearance of egoism while abandoning its substance and 
otherwise has little to recommend it), or sacricifing or 
setting o n e ’s own interests aside in favour of others 
(since in pursuing the other’s interest one also 
pursues, non-accidentally , one’s own) . Interdependence 
of interest could become the dominant mode in a different 
sort of society , to one dominated by the market and other 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the public sphere which pre s u p p o s e  
egoism.^
The exact characterisation of the relational account of 
self and of what it contrasts with presents several 
options.
1. The atomistic position cannot be formulated as the 
position that the atomistic self has no non-contingent 
relations to others because whether or not relations to 
another are n o n - contingent will depend upon what
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description is being applied. An alternative possible
formulation is that all properties which are defining or
characterising of the self are non-relational. Relational
properties cannot be among those central to the self ; such
a self has no internal relations . Conversely, in the
relational account of self many core identifying properties
would be implicitly or explicitly relational, although not
every relation would count as identifying , central to the
self, nor would all identifying properties be relational,
for the sorts of reasons which emerge from the difficulties
feminists have seen in taking the self as defined
completely in relation to others , and of the need for an
area of self which is definitively one’s own, not made over
2 2to the service or care of others.
2. Another way to understand the atomistic position is as
the claim that inte r e s t s  can only be c o n t i n g e n t l y  
related. This position would be unable to accomodate 
internally related or nested interests, the case where my 
concern is that you flourish, because this would be non­
contingent. This condition would seem to be satisfied by
the atomistic individual of the market, and such a 
contingent relationship of interests or utilities would 
then be the essential assumption of the "hidden h a n d ” 
mechanism of the market. The market is a mechanism for
adjusting and coordinating a vast set of contingently- 
related interests.
3. A further way to understand the thesis which connects
more directly with instrumentalism is suggested by Ross 
Poole’s work. If we list the ends of the egoistic self, we 
will find that among these others and their welfare will 
never figure. This list makes no essential reference to 
the welfare of others, and others will figure only
contingently as means to this set of ends or end, which
will turn on pleasure or satisfaction.
We could, following this suggestion, divide a p e r s o n ’s 
interests into primarjr and essential interests (which may 
also be identifying) and secondary interests which relate 
to the primary interests as means to ends and which are 
only contingently and interchangeably related to the first
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set. Then the egoistic thesis would be that the welfare of 
others can only figure in the secondary set, never the 
first, primary set of ends. This formu l a t i o n  then 
encompasses the first two and explains how. this form of 
egoism connects with instrumentalism.
The alternative to atomistic individualism involves not 
only rejecting this assumption that the welfare of others 
can only be contingently related to one’s own, but also the 
neat, sharp division presupposed between the kingdom of 
ends and the kingdom of means, and that means are only 
contingently related to ends. Instead it would see ends as 
at least constraining means, and in specific cases as 
i nternally related, so that there is no general 
interchangeability between means which produce a given end, 
and hence no such rigid division between the two spheres. 
Such a division is characteristic of instrumentalism, and 
also reflects the the dualistic division of self (ends) 
and other (means).
>
The relational self position which emerges from feminist 
thought should be distinguished from the accounts of self 
(or Self) provided by deep ecology , which sometimes and 
in some respects do resemble it . Deep ecologists provide 
in this area as in a number of others , a range of 
different and conflicting accounts and some of these 
sometimes seem close to that of the relational self while 
others are substantially different . (Deep e c o l o g y ’s 
account of self is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter). For example Arne Naess’s version and that of 
some followers differs in treating all properties as 
relational, implicitly or explicitly, all relations the 
individual has as defining or constitutive of self, and the 
self as defined equally in relation to all other 
selves. These features of the deep ecological account 
arise from the mapping into the area of self of holistic 
ecological models and provide an unnec e ssarily holistic
sei
a s s u m p t i o n s  which despite d is claimers does tend to 
collapse the account of the individual entity into that of 
the whole . Such an account participates in the holistic
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side of the dualism of atomism and holism, which present a
false dichotomy closely related to that of egoism and
2 4altruism . To the extent that such an holistic account
results in the individual being essentially or internally
related to all others i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  it differs
substantially from the account of the individual as
primarily essentially related to particular others . Deep
ecology’s account of the ecological self tries to close the
substantial gap b e t w e e n  b i o l ogical depend e n c e  on
ecosystemic wholes (including the global ecosystem) and the
i n d i v i d u a l ’s identity (which selects relations to
particular others as central to self and others as less so
or not defining of self at all) by assuming all relations
to be (ideally any way) equally involved in the
formation of and constitution of self. This creates many
difficulties in dealing with particularity and with the
self as tied to those particular and close others (and
parts of nature ) which usually contribute especially to
*  ^the individual’s particular social or individual identity . 
The difference is crystallised in deep ecology’s conception 
of the problem as one of failure to identify with the
cosmos (or to make as wide a set of identifications as
possible) in contrast to the bioregional ist view of the 
problem as the failure to assume care and responsibility 
for particular areas of land and to form relationships 
which link aspects of nature to the self.
Another important difference is that the account of self
as self-in-relationship given here is not treated, as it
is in deep ecology, as a substitute for an ethic of nature
or for a recognition of and account of nature as possessing
a value and significance of its own , but rather is treated
as requiring and as complemented by a different account of
ethics and of value . Thus Arne Naess substitutes "the
maxim of self-realisation" for an ethical account of care
2 5and respect for nature , and Warwick Fox contends that
The appropriate framework of discourse for describing 
and p r e s e n t i n g  deep e cology is not one that is 
fundamentally to do with the value of the non- human 
world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with 
the nature and possibilities of the self, or, we might
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say, the question of who we are, can become, and should 
become in the larger scheme of things. b 
So deep ecology emerges as a reductionist position,
reducing and replacing questions of the ethics and value of
nature to and by questions of the formation and realisation
of the human self . This contrasts with the treatment
adopted here of the relational self as expressed in an
ethic of respect , care and responsibility and as thus
providing the foundation of a different account of ethics
(as given for example by feminist theorists such as
Carol Gilligan) and a different account of value, for
example of non-instrumental value assignments to nature as
reflective of relational rather than egoistic interest
(given below). Apart from the a d e quacy of such a
reductionist account (which is justified in Naess by appeal
2 7to good positivist principles of simplification ), it is 
ironic that a position claiming to be anti-anthropocentrist 
should thus reduce questions of the care and significance 
of nature to questions of the realisation of the human 
self.
A number of feminist thinkers (especially Carol Gilligan
2 8 ) have argued that this view of self as s e l f - i n ­
relationship can provide an appropriate foundation for an 
ethic of connectedness and caring for others. It is an
account which avoids atomism but which enables a
recognition of interdependence and relationship without
2 9falling into the problems of indistinguishabi1ity. Now 
the same account can also be applied to the case of human 
relations with nature. The standard western view of the 
relation of the self to the non-human is that it is always 
accidentally related, and hence can be used as a means to 
the self-contained ends of human beings. . Pieces of land 
are real estate, readily interchangeable as equivalent 
means to the end of human satisfaction. But of course we 
do not all think this way, and instances of contrary 
behaviour would no doubt be more common if their 
p o s s i b i l i t y  were not denied and distorted by both 
theoretical and social construction. But other cultures 
have recognised such essential connection of self to
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country clearly enough, and many indigenous voices from the 
past and present speak of the grief and pain in loss of 
their land, as essentially connected as any human other. 
When Aboriginal people for example speak of the land as 
part of them, "like brother and mother", this is I think 
one of their meanings. If instrumentalism is impoverishing 
and distorting as an account of our relations to other 
human beings, it is equally so as an account and guiding 
p r inciple in our relations to nature. An adequate 
environmental philosophy as well as an ecofeminist account 
must reject the view of nature as a mere instrument to 
human ends (including the end of "Self-realisation").
INSTRUMENTALISM AND HUMAN EGOISM
Having set instrumentalism in this gender, political and 
philosophical context, I now turn to an assessment of the 
role and justification of instrumentalism with respect to 
nature. It is commonly held that nature can only have 
value instrumentally, as a means to human ends, and that 
the notion that it might have value in some other way, on 
its own account or as an end in itself, is incoherent, 
involving a view of nature as having a value which is 
inherent or objective, located in natural items themselves 
with no reference to human interest . I shall argue in 
this section and the next that this choice between 
instrumental value or objective (detached) value is a false 
one, based on neglect of the relational self and of the 
possibility of interdependent, relational interests . It 
is part of a network of false choices which includes that 
between egoism and altruism, atomism and holism. This 
network of false choices is g enerated by self/other 
dual ism.
One very resilient argument which is supposed to 
demonstrate that values are, or must be, determined through 
the interests of humans or persons and instrumental to 
their interests goes as follows:
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A. Values are determined through the preference rankings 
of valuers (the no detachable values assumption).
B. Valuer’s preference rankings are determined through
valuers’interests (the preference reduction thesis).
C . Valuers are humans [persons] (the species
assumpt i on) .
D. Therefore, values are d e t e r m i n e d  through human
interests [through the interests of persons].
Hence, it is sometimes concluded, not only is it perfectly 
acc e p t a b l e  to reduce matters of value and m o r a l i t y  
concerning nature to human interest, there is no rational 
or possible alternative for doing so. The premisses are
rarely set out clearly , and when they are this initially 
persuasive argument can be seen to rest on fallacious 
assumptions and to be a variant of the argument for egoism. 
I shall argue that although the argument to conclusion D is 
formally valid, given only some conventional assumptions 
such as that the relation of determination is transitive , 
not all the premisses should be accepted and that their 
plausibility rests on crucial ambiguities and slides in 
much the same way as the argument for egoism.
The argument can be treated as the ma jor representative of 
a family of similar arguments, and my criticisms here will 
transfer to the variations. The first group of variations 
replaces or qualifies the determining relation. For 
example "determined through " or "determined by " may be 
replaced by "answers back to” , "reflect", "are a matter 
of", "can be reduced to ", "are a function of". And 
"determined" has to mean "fully determined" and not merely 
partly determined, otherwise the conclusion does not 
follow. Another variation is already indicated above by 
brackets —  the replacement of humans as a base class by 
persons. This increases the plausibility of premise C, 
which otherwise would be at best contingently true , but
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this is not good enough for the argument and should be 
rejected anyway, since some valuers may not be human and 
certainly not all humans are valuers. However Premise C is 
not the main problem . Even if premise C is stated in
analytic form, (as for example , valuers are valuers or 
valuing creatures) it still does not save the argument.
Premise A is also not unproblematic, although there are 
ways of repairing it . The really objectionable premise 
in the argument is neither premise A nor premise C but 
premise B. Suspicion of premise B may be aroused by 
noticing that it plays an exactly parallel role in this 
argument to that played in the familiar arguments for 
egoism —  that whatever course of action one adopts it is 
always really in o n e ’s own selfish interests— by the 
following crucial premise:
BE. A person’s preferences or choices are always
determined through self-interest.
The argument for egoism runs along the following parallel 
1ines :
A E . Agents always act (in freely chosen cases) in the
way they prefer or choose i. e. in accordance with 
their preference rankings.
BE. Individual preference rankings are always
determined through (reflect) self-interest.
C E . Agents are individuals.
Theref ore:
DE. Individual persons always act in ways determined
by s e l f - i n t e r e s t  (that reflect their own 
interest).
The argument has a popular parallel form in which the 
conclusion is that anthropocentrism is inevitable, because 
values must reflect a human outlook, human interests , and 
are in that sense "anthropocentric". This argument, like 
its egoist counterpart, depends critically on an ambiguity 
or slide on "interest", one a weak .indeed trivial sense of 
"interest" where interest is used as an internal accusative 
and whatever valuers value is said to be "in their
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interest", merely on the grounds that they do value it. The 
concept of a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m  is similarly and 
correspondingly ambiguous. The problem for the argument 
can be stated in the form of a dilemma. In the weak sense 
of "interest" premise B is trivially true, but the 
conclusion D must be weakened accordingly, and does not 
support a conclusion about anthropocentrism in any strong 
or damaging sense. That is , it licenses the trivial 
conclusion that human values reflect human values or 
outlook, but not that this outlook is necessarily species- 
selfish, or anthropocentric in the strong sense. The other 
is a stronger sense in which "in their own interest " has 
something more like its normal meaning of "own self 
interest", "to their own advantage", and would license a 
stronger conclusion about anthropocentrism, but in this 
sense premise B, that preference rankings reflect the 
valuer’s interest, is false. Both this argument and the 
egoist argument employ the slide from in their own 
interest to to their own advantage or for their own uses or 
purposes. The final conclusion of egoism, again parallel 
to the case for anthropocentrism, is not only that the 
egoistic and instrumentalist position is perfectly in order 
and thoroughly rational but that there is no alternative, 
no other possible analysis of any action.
Thus the argument is a form of human or group selfishness 
or egoism argument, the argument from Human Egoism one 
might say. The general criticisms of the Human Egoism 
argument too parallel those of egoism. Not only is premise 
B subject to similar objections to premise BE, but Human 
Egoism is no more acceptable than individual egoism , since 
it depends on the same set of confusions between values and 
advantages and slides on such terms as "interests" as the 
arguments on which egoism rests. This becomes apparent if 
we recast B and BE and set them side by side:
BE.- Individual value rankings are determined through 
individual self-interest.
B. Valuers’ (humans’) value rankings are determined 
through valuers’ (humans’) interests.
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But it does not follow that because people make choices 
according to their own preference rankings (which amounts 
to little more than the claim that their choices are their 
own choices) that these rankings are determined in their 
own interest; similarly in the human group case, because a 
group arrives at and chooses according to its own rankings, 
it does not follow that they merely reflect its own 
interest, or that it determines them in its own interests. 
Just as BE is refuted by examples of non self-interested 
behaviour, so B is refuted by examples of behaviour which 
does not just reflect the interest of humankind. As with 
the case of individual altruistic actions however, examples 
are controversial and egoistic motives of increasingly 
unlikely or remote kinds can be found. And of course 
sometimes these really are major or partial motives too —  
the drowning man , or the endangered species, is saved 
through desire for fame or to assuage guilt. But just as 
in the individual case, such an analysis is not compulsory. 
The egoist analysis of action trades heavily on the egoism 
/altruism false dichotomy, and the difficulty of finding 
purely d i s i n t e r e s t e d  action is supposed to show the 
correctness of a general egoistic analysis. But just as 
relatedness of interest breaks this false dichotomy in the 
individual case, so it does in the case of Human Egoism. 
The actions and desires of the human species and its 
members can reflect not only their own interest (egoism), 
or the interest of other species ( a l t r u i s m ) , but a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  their own interest and that of 
another, and a relationship of a non-contingent kind. And 
such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can hold between humans, both 
individually and in social groups, and nature, in whole or 
in part. My welfare or satisfaction may be essentially 
connected to the thriving of a particular set of 
ecosystems, to the welfare of particular animals, plants 
(and ultimately if more distantly to the thriving of global 
nature), just as much as to the thriving of human kin.
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The I nevit abi1ity o f Anthropocentrism
The view that the instrumental treatment of nature, 
equated with anthropocentrism, is somehow inevitable is 
however very resilient , and the constant rediscovery or 
reinvention of arguments for it indicates a number of 
different sources for it . Another related source is the 
assumption that because an item has value it follows that
the i tern i s one o f anthropocentric concern; however it
does not f ollow that it has value in virtue of being an
item o f a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c  concern. 3 3 r y ,  . -,Ihere is also a
perspectival form of the argument —  that for creatures
with perspectives the only non-arb i t rary way to set up
value is to value intrinsically other creatures with 
3 4perspectives ; thus humans inevitably have a human, and 
therefore anthropocentric , outlook. There is a lot to 
question here. We need to ask : why is " Humans, as
perspective havers, can only give non-instrumental value 
to other perspective havers " different from "Australians 
can only value other Australians, what is Australian" or 
"Australians inevitably have an Australo-centric outlook."?
One problem with this is that we all belong to a lot of 
different categories , • eg , I ’m an Australian, a woman, a 
human being. We can look at the world from any one of
these perspectives, and shift between them. This ability 
to shift is part of what provides the complexity and 
richness of per s p e c t i v a l  experience; none of the 
categories so obtained are absolute in perspectival terms, 
and except in ce'rtain cases they don’t exclude one another.
I
Now it’s not obvious why we can’t treat being human like 
this. I am a human, but I’m also an animal, a living
being, and beyond that again a physical self, and I can 
adopt all these perspectives -- they are inclusive rather 
than exclusive. Being an animal means that a lot of the 
things in my experience are the same as those of other
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animals -- being born , living , breathing the air. dying, 
the experience of drowning and exposure, of enjoying 
sunshine and warmth. (And are these not also truly human ?) 
So why c a n ’t we have the perspective of an animal, or a 
living being? Why c a n ’t we value the things that we share 
with other animals or living beings both in ourselves and 
in them? Of course there are limits to this ; as 
perspective havers we c a n ’t share the same perspective as a 
non-perspective haver, e.g. a rock, but as physical beings 
with a perspective we can have the perspective of being a 
thing of that sort , for example a physical object 
subject to ageing, so there is a sense in which we can " 
think like a mountain " .
But clearly we are not meant, in the above argument, to 
treat being a human /perspective haver like this —  rather 
it is treated as an absolute and oppositional category, 
which overrides all others. If y o u ’re a human that’s all 
you are, you c a n ’t be anything else. And isn’t this part 
of what m i g h t  be c a l l e d  c h a u v i n i s m ,  t r e a t i n g  some 
categories ( eg being Australian, being white) as absolute, 
and being unable to shift between perspectives, as v/ell as 
treating them as the norm, by comparison to which others 
are defined as defective. The argument seems to rest then, 
for one of its supports at least, on the oppositional 
account of what it is to be human which is part of the 
Platonic and rationalist legacy. Both these major supports 
for the inevitability of anthropocentrism , egoism and the 
oppositional or dualistic account of the human , should be 
rejected.
We have noted that anthropocentrism has weaker and stronger 
senses, some unobjectionable and perhaps inevitable, but 
others stronger and far from inevitable. Anthropocentrism 
is not the same as instrumentalism, but is very closely 
tied to it . Neither anthropocentrism nor instrumentalism 
automatically lead to the destruction of nature , any more 
than egoism automatically leads to the destruction of the 
other. For of course we can find many good reasons ,. in 
terms of advantage to humans or human goals, for treating
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nature with more circumspection and care, and increasingly 
prominent among these reasons is our own survival as a 
species. The rejection of the treatment of nature as 
instrument does not rule out appeal to these reasons, for 
the same reason as the rejection of the treatment of humans 
as nothing more than means does not rule out the 
possibility that they are also sometimes means. I may use 
a reference from a friend as a means to obtain a job I 
desire, thus employing my friend as a means to a desired 
end. But obviously this does not mean that I see or treat 
my friend merely as a means to my ends. Instrumental 
trouble sets in when there is reduction to means , the 
treatment of others as no more than means.
However if these reasons based in human self-interest are
seen as exhausting the case for care for nature, they
parallel the reasons for enlightened self-interest in the
individual case, that o n e ’s survival and well-being is
contingent upon the survival and well-being of others (for
3 5example to preserve trade) . But many voices have been
urging that, in the case of human egoism as in the case of 
individual egoism, these reasons drawn from a broadened 
instrumentalism and a broadened view of self-interest 
cannot be sufficient , cannot and should not exhaust the 
reasons for taking care of the other or our possible modes 
of relationship with it. (I am of course not suggesting 
that human egoism is a general feature of humankind or some 
sort of result of "human nature", for certainly there have 
been cultures which have not had this approach, which is 
distinctive of western culture. Rather it is that western 
culture treats the concept of the human in this way. ) 
Enlightened self-interest which is not based on genuine 
recognition of the other is unstable and always liable to 
lapse back into naked egoism and domination of the other 
when enlightened reasons are less in the fore. And even 
if the preservation of nature (in a suitably instrumental 
form) is recognised as in human interests, the results of 
even enlightened self-interest as a basis for our dealings 
with nature, although better than naked egoism, include a 
continuation of human arrogance ° , summed up in the view
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that all value and significance belongs in the first 
instance to humans and that what humans want is what 
matters, and the continued lack of sensitivity to the other 
and restriction of understanding of the other to a narrowly 
instrumental form . The results of an instrumental model 
are maintenance of the dualism of self and other, and a 
c o n t i n u i n g  impo v e r i s h m e n t  of the human self and its 
possible ways of relating to nature, as well as its own 
internal divisions.
Instrumental treatment of nature connects with the lack of 
certain human virtues such as s e n s i t i v i t y  to and 
recognition of others, and these have figured in the 
treatment of instrumentalism in ethical theory. But this
is not enough ; the inclination to instrumentalise or 
enslave others may indicate a character defect, a certain 
"lack of excellence", but it would be outrageous to suggest 
that this was the entire case against it. What has been 
largely lacking in the recent philosophical treatment of 
instrumentalism in the non-feminist, ethical literature is 
recognition or discussion of its political dimension, of 
its connections with domination. As we have seen, the 
structures of human domination, the structures of ego and 
instrument, are reflected, repeated and confirmed in the 
reduction of non-human nature to an instrument. This 
feature reveals important ways in which forms of intra­
human domination and forms of extra-human domination are 
linked, not just a c c i d e n t a l l y  but essentially. The 
domination of nature and the domination of humans are 
linked not only by the logical structure of dualism and by 
the exclusions of rationalism, but by the structure of self 
which flows from these. The same basic structures of self 
underlie the rational egoism and instrumentalism of the 
market and the public/ private division, the treatment of 
women as inferior others whose norms of virtue embody a 
thinly disguised instrumentalism, the treatment of those 
supposedly less possessed of "reason" as inferior and as 
instruments for their more "cultured" western neighbours 
(as in slavery, colonialism and racism), and the treatment 
of nature as lifeless instrument.
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fThe dominant western mode of relating to nature then maps 
the masculine/feminine dualism and the self/other dualism 
onto the human/nature dualism, and these correspond to the 
ego formation of false differentiation in which the other 
remains construed as a reflection of the ego’s own needs 
and wants, as instrument. Instrumentalism is part of the 
masculine model of the human ; to escape this masculine 
model, nature must be recognised as a genuine other with 
whom one must enter dialogue, and not given the 
status of being merely a reflection of human 
interests, even enlightened interests. Its agency and 
independence must be recognised and respected.
NATURE AND INTRINSIC VALUE
One way of elaborating philosophically an alternative model 
to instrumentalism is in terms of the notions of respect 
for nature and in terms of nature’s having intrinsic value, 
as well as through non-mechanistic accounts of nature. The 
spelling out of what such respect means in terms of 
treatment needs to be elaborated in specific cultural 
contexts. But at a minimum it means that nature does not 
count for nothing in the deliberations of ethical, social 
and political life, and that actions concerning it are not 
seen as unconstrained except by human interest and human 
goals.
But this alternative involving the admission of intrinsic 
values in nature is often seen as highly problematic, 
indeed counter to the whole spirit of modernity and its 
view that values are created by the human viewpoint. 
Instrumentalism is often taken to be inevitable because of 
the unviability of such accounts of value as inhering in 
nature itself . Thus , it is objected, either one accepts 
an instrumentalist account of values or one is committed to 
an intrinsic, detached or objective value theory which 
takes values to be completely independent of valuers and in 
no way determined by them. But, it is concluded, this
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coherent a l t e r n a t i v e  to 
be seen as mystical or 
anthropocentrism along with
This account assumes a choice between seeing value as 
instrumental or seeing it as detached, having no relation 
to valuers’ or their preferences. The alternative to 
instrumentalism is claimed to be a detached, objective or 
naturalistic theory of value (these terms being often but 
mistakenly identified with intrinsic value) . Of course 
the argument presents a false choice, for precisely the 
same reasons that I gave earlier in support of the the 
claim that premise B, that values are determined through 
v a l u e r s ’ interests, was false. To reject the
instrumentalist conclusion is by no means to be commi11ed 
to the view that valuers and their preference rankings play 
no role in determining values , and that values are a 
further set of mysterious independent items in the world 
somehow perceived or detected by valuers through a special 
moral sense. Valuers’ preference rankings may be admitted 
to play an important role in evaluations ; we are still not 
committed to the anthropocentric conclusion that values 
must reflect human interest unie ss we assume (wha t amounts 
to premise B) that these preference rankings reflect or 
can be reduced to valuers’ interests. What is overlooked
in the argument is precisely the possibility represented by 
the relational self, that valuer’s preferences do play a 
role but not in ways that simply reflect their own self 
interest, and which thus may permit the item to be valued 
for its own sake and not merely as a means to the valuer’s 
ends .
The dichotomy frequently presented between instrumentalist 
accounts of value and detached or objective theories in 
which valuers’ perspectives play no role is, for the same 
reason a false one . Instrumentalist theories are those
which attempt to reduce value to what is instrumental to or 
what contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories 
take the goal to be the furtherance of the interest of a
p o sition cannot provide a 
instrumentalism, and must 
irrational, and the critique of
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privileged class; for example the goal may be taken to be
determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage
or welfare of the class of humans, or of persons, or of
sentient creatures. . A n t h r o p o c e n t r i c  theories are
characteristically instrumentalist theories. In contrast ,
an item is valued intrinsically when it is valued for its
own sake , and not merely as a means to something further ;
and an intrinsic value theory allows that some items are
intrinsically valuable. Intrinsic theories then contrast
with instrumental theories, and what "intrinsic" tells us
is that the item taken as intrinsically valuable is not
valued merely as a means to some goal, that is, is not
3 9merely instrumentally valued. Accordingly detached value
theories are a type of intrinsic theory, but only one type. 
Something may be valued non-instrumentally, for its own 
sake, without its value being detached from all valuing 
experience.
The identification of intrinsic and detached value theories 
presupposed in the argument is no more than a restatement 
of the false dich o t o m y  n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l , therefore 
detached. The assumption that if preference or value 
rankings are involved at all the resulting assignments must 
be instrumental is a variation of the fallacious premise B 
reducing valuations to self-interest which plays a crucial 
role in the Human Egoist and Egoist arguments. The 
variation is that if valuations are involved they must 
reflect valuers’ interests ; therefore such values are 
instrumental because the items valued are valued according 
as they reflect v a l u e r s ’ interests ; and therefore 
according as they are a means to the end of satisfying the 
valuers’ interests. Because the argument is fallacious, it 
foilows that intrinsic value theories can allow for a 
third way between instrumental and detached theories, 
because of the possibility of value rankings which are not 
themselves set up in a purely instrumental way, 
attributing value to an item only according as it is a 
■means to some goal .
Instrumentalism, although unthinkingly accepted as a
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coherent theory, is not without serious problems of its 
own, especially given the claim that intrinsic values are 
incoherent and mystical. Instrumentalist positions take as 
v a l uable just what contr i b u t e s  to a stated end. 
Utilitarianism presents a clear example, with things valued 
according to their contribution to the single goal of 
happiness or pleasure . However in the more general case 
we are c o n c e r n e d  with of i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t  forms of 
anthropocentrism there may be a set of goals, not just a 
single goal such as that of maximising happiness , usually 
of humans. The anthropocentric assumption is that all­
goals reduce in some way to human goals, or at least can be 
assessed in terms of human concerns and interests. ^
Problems for instrumentalism arise when questions are asked
about the status of the ultimate goal itself, as Aristotle
noticed.^  Is this ultimate goal itself instru m enta 1 1 y
valuable or not ? The instrumentalist position which claims
intrinsic values to be incoherent relies for its
plausibility upon selecting a set of goals which are widely
accepted and which are implicitly treated as valuable ; it
relies at bottom on an implicit valuation which cannot
itself be explained in purely instrumental terms. Of
course a value assumption is not eliminated in this fashion
—  it is merely hidden under the general consensus that
such a goal is appropriate , that such an end is valuable.
But the strategy of successful instrumentalism is to avoid
recognition of the fact that the goal is, indeed must . .
0,00,1s D-n/ch ar€
be , implicitly treated as valuable, by selecting a set of^ 
so much part of the framework of contemporary thought, so 
entrenched and habitual as a valued item, that the value 
attached to the goal becomes virtually invisible to those 
who accept it.
We cannot rule out the possibility that this is what is 
behind the comfortable certainties of anthropocentric value 
theory which holds that goals can only coherently be 
determined in terms of human interest. Thus it is possible 
that the "self-evident" character of this assumption rests 
on nothing more than the shared beliefs of privileged
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humans about the paramount and exclusive importance of 
their own interests and concerns. The consensus 
features which instrumentalists appeal to (increasingly 
doubtful these days as more people challenge 
anthropocentrism) may be nothing more than the consensus 
of a privileged class about the goal of maintaining their 
own privilege, that is , a consensus of interests . This 
sort of agreement would show very little about the well 
groundedness of the position. In order for instrumentalism 
to be compelling, the goal must be implicitly treated 
within the theory as valuable ; for how can the value of an 
item be expl a in e d  and justified in terms of its 
contribution to an end not itself considered valuable? If 
the end is not treated as valuable the theory runs into 
problems of naturalism, for the statement that something is 
valuable then simply amounts to the factual/causal claim 
that it tends to produce a certain result, and it does 
not make a value claim at all. The special logical and 
epistemological character of value statements must be 
supplied by the treatment of the goal itself as valuable.
The fact that the goal of an instrumental account must be 
taken as itself valuable gives rise to two choices, 
presenting a dilemma for the position that intrinsic value 
is incoherent. In the first choice, the goal is taken as 
itself instrumentally valuable, which creates an infinite 
regress. For if the end or reason for which other items 
are ins t rumentally valuable is itself only instrumentally 
valuable, then there must in turn be some other end or 
reason in terms of which it is valuable, by definition of 
instrumental. A regress is thus begun, and if this regress 
is not to be viciously infinite, it must terminate in some 
end or feature which is taken as valuable just in itself, 
that is, with intrinsic values.
On the second choice , the goal is not taken to be 
instrumenta1ly valuable but i s admitted to be valuable in 
some other way. This amounts to adding an "except” clause 
to the original instrumental account so that all values are 
held to be instrumental with the exception of the goal, and
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this in turn implies that the goal is non-instrumentally, 
and hence intrinsically, valuable.
To sum up, the dilemma for the instrumentalist comes about 
in the following way . The goal of the instrumental theory 
must be implicitly judged to be desirable , for otherwise 
nothing could be justified by reduction to it. But if we 
ask whether this goal is also instrumental ly valuable or 
not, both possible answers refute the instrumental 
position. If the answer is yes and the goal is taken to be 
only desirable as a means to a further goal, then a regress 
is initiated and the same issue arises with respect to a 
new goal. But if the answer is no, that it is not only 
instrumentally valuable, then the instrumental theory is 
again refuted because intrinsic values have been admitted.
Whichever horn of the dilemma is taken, the outcome is the 
same. The instrumentalist must rely on treating the gOLal 
itself as i m p l icitly valuable in a way not purely 
instrumental, that is , as intrinsically valuable. The 
instrumentalist merely has a dishonest version of his or 
her opponents "logically incoherent” theory, one which 
makes use of intrinsic values but fails to own up to it. 
The logical and epistemological status of such a position 
is no better than that of the one he or she condemns, since 
the difference in the positions turns not on the logical 
incoherence or otherwise of intrinsic values, but on what 
is taken to be intrinsically valuable. From the point of
view of the philosophical status of intrinsic values, there 
is no difference betwwen admitting only one thing (for 
example human life) to be intrinsically valuable, and 
admitting a number of things (including nature) to be 
intrinsically valuable.
The abstract dilemma for anthropocentric instrumentalism 
is illustrated by P a s s m o r e ’s argument in Man 's
Responsibility Fof Nature. Passmore (1) wishes to say that 
there is no coherent alternative to instrumental values, 
that an item is valuable insofaras it serves human 
interest, and (2) wants to explain the unique value
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attributed to humans in terms of the production of valuable
civil i s e d  and cultural items. But (2) involves the
admission of values, that of civilised items, which cannot
be valuable in the way that (1) states, and indeed (2)
amounts to the admission of non-instrumental values. The
proposed account is inconsistent because if intrinsic
values are admissible in the case of civilised items, they
4 2cannot be logically incoherent in the way that (1) claims.
The sort of problem faced by Passmore is however not a 
readily avoidable one for the instrumentalist. For if the 
charge of arbitrary and unjustifiable anthropocentrism is 
to be avoided, and humans are not themselves to be awarded 
exclusive intrinsic value —  thus conceding the logical 
l e g i timacy of intrinsic values g e n e r a l l y  —  some 
explanation must be provided for the exclusive value 
attributed to humans. But any explanation capable of 
justifying this valuation in a non-arbi t rary way would have, 
to refer to properties of humans and would have to say 
something like ; "Humans are uniquely valuable because 
they alone have valuable properties x, y, and z. . .or 
produce valuable items A, B, and C . ..". (It is in fact not 
easy to find such properties which mark out exactly the 
class to be taken as intrinsically valuable, the class of 
humans, and are not either morally irrelevant or question- 
begging ). But this is to admit intrinsic value for the 
properties which explain the exclusive value of humans. 
The dilemma for the anthropocentrist is that he or she must 
either take the exclusive human-value assumption (the 
goal) as ultimate, which invites the charge of an arbitrary 
defense of_ privilege , or must attempt to explain it, in 
which case they will again end by conceding intrinsic 
value.
The case for instrumentalism with respect to nature must 
then be pursued in terms other than those in which it has 
been pursued, of the logical and philosophical incoherence 
of any alternative to its instrumental conception and 
treatment. There is no logical barrier to the treatment of 
nature as valuable in its own right, not merely as an
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adjunct to human life and instrument to human ends, and no 
barrier to developing ways to conceptualise it and relate 
to which differ from the arrogance expressed in Ursula 
Leguin’s phrase : "What I want is what matter is for."
Ethics and Instrumental ism: a Response to Janna Thompson
Alternatives to instrumental ways of viewing nature have 
been suggested by many recent environmental philosophers, 
and are also explicit in some versions of deep ecology , as 
well as being the direction in which many feminist
accounts of environmental philosophy point . The issue of 
intrinsic value especially has been highly contentious 
however, and looks like remaining so.
Janna Thompson’s "A Refutation of Environmental Ethics" 
(Environmental Ethics raises some important issues and
difficulties for intrinsic value theory. I shall argue 
that the objections she raises are of varying validity, 
some of them pointing to areas where ethics will not do the 
job required of it, but others themselves subject in turn 
to serious objection. The ecofeminist perspective shifts 
the centre of gravity in environmental philosophy away from 
ethics ; nevertheless an environmental ethic challenging 
the instrumental treatment traditionally accorded nature 
must be a part of any adequate account . A refutation, 
therefore, is a serious matter.
Among the problems in Janna Thompson’s argument is that it 
involves some quite major misrepresentation of the work of 
many of those criticised in her paper as holding an 
intrinsic value position with respect to nature. She 
states(p2):
But at a minimum those who find intrinsic value in 
nature are claiming two things:First, that things and 
states of affairs which are of value are valuable for 
what they are in themselves and not because of their 
relations to us (and in particular, not because they 
provide us with pleasure and sat isfact ion).And second, 
that this intrinsic value which states of nature have 
is objective in the sense that its existence is not a
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matter of individual taste or personal preferences. Any 
rational, morally sensitive person ought to be able to 
recognise that it is there.
But in fact there are significant differences between the 
way in which intrinsic values in nature have been treated 
in the literature, and while there are some proponents of 
intrinsic value as objective and as not relative to 
valuers’ perspectives, many of those who who have opted for 
intrinsic value have not wanted to accept any of these 
propositions. This is especially true in Australia, where, 
in contrast to America, few of those writing on the area 
have, to my knowledge, adopted such a position. Her 
analysis, and most of her argument, equates intrinsic value 
with objective or detached value, a confusion for which 
there is little excuse given the numerous explanations in 
the literature of how they, differ. For example, she 
refers to a paper jointly authored by myself and Richard 
Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics"^ as 
p r e s e n t i n g  such an o b jective account-of value , but 
apparently failed to notice that some twelve pages of the 
paper(ppl54-166 ) are devoted to showing that the resulting 
account of value need not eliminate valuers’ perspectives, 
is not realist or objectivist, and concluding "in the end, 
then, environmental value systems are based on different
preference rankings.....a different group preference
ranking and network (emanating from the valuer . . . ) which 
is gr o u n d e d  in a different per c e p t i o n  and emotional 
presentation of nature". Janna Thompson also fails to 
notice that two further papers (one of which she refers 
to) explain in still more detail how a non-instrumental 
non-objective account of value is possible . One of these 
provides a detailed semantics for such a relational theory. 
This semantics explains how taking something to have 
intrinsic value involves the v a l u e r ’s preferring 
situations/worlds in which the item valued exists or 
flourishes to ones where it does not. Where this 
evaluation occurs across the whole range of worlds, it will 
include ones where the valuer does not exist, as well as 
ones where his or her interests are in conflict with or are 
not furthered by the item’s existence. In this case .the 
item is not valued as instrumental to the v a l u e r ’s
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interest, but the account does not make value independent 
of the valuer’s perspective . On such an account it would 
cert a i n l y  not be plausible to claim either that any 
rational and morally sensitive person would recognise the 
intrinsic value of nature . I would want to count 
sensitivity to the value of nature as a virtue, but one 
which, like other virtues, is variably distributed among 
human individuals and societies.
4 7Although , as Robert Elliot notes , there are a number of 
distinctions which can be drawn in the area of intrinsic 
value, in my own work (and I think this is true for a good 
many others) the meaning intended in claiming that an item 
is intrinsically valuable is that it is not to have its 
value e x p l a i n e d  by or reduced to instrumental 
considerations. What is involved is the distinction 
familiar from classical p h i l o s o p h y  b e t w e e n  things 
c o n s i d e r e d  to be valuable in themselves and things 
considered to be valuable for the sake of something else 
which is taken to be valuable, that is as a means to some 
valued end. Since, plainly, not e v e r y t h i n g  can be 
instrumentally valuable, every theory must at some point 
admit intrinsic values, but clearly that does not make 
every theory an objective value theory. Usually intrinsic 
worth is assigned, without anyone feeling the need for a 
proper justificatory basis, to humans and their works; the 
assignment of intrinsic value to nature (or some part of 
it) does not have to introduce a somehow new and 
different account of value as objective, unrelated to 
valuers or their perspectives .
As I have argued, one important basis for the belief that 
intrinsic value for nature must equal objective value in 
nature is that uniess an evaluation is somehow reducible to 
the interests and purposes of the valuer, no valuer- 
relative preference ranking can be involved. But as 1 
have argued above and elsewhere , this is to employ the 
same assumptions as are involved in philosophical egoism, 
ignoring the possibility of non self-interested action and 
of relatedness of interests, that a v a l u e r ’s preference
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rankings may reflect not just his or her own interests, but 
those of others, especially others to whom he or she is 
essentially related, and including non-human others. (Thus 
too this brand of egoism is closely tied to 
instrumentalism, as critics of the market have noted). The 
argument involves a slide on "interests" , conflating the 
egoistic and instrumental senses ("in their own selfish 
interests") with a much more vacuous sense in which the 
valuer’s interests are involved merely because the valuer’s 
preferences or perspectives are involved. A variation of 
the argument is that anthropocentrism is inevitable; this 
is taken to follow from the fact that there are no values 
without a valuer,but only does so with similar egoistic 
as sumptions.
The quoted passage however gives an indication of another 
route by which Janna Thompson seems to have arrived at 
this confused account of intrinsic value and of opponents 
positions.Intrinsic value is said to entail "that things 
and states which are of value are valuable for what they 
are in themselves and not because of their relations to 
us. .". But what is being rejected is not relationship to 
us in general but instrumental relationship to us , which 
is partly recognised in her bracketed addition "and in 
particular, not because they provide us with pleasure and 
satisfaction". There is a slide from the intended meaning 
"not because of usefulness to us" to the unintended meaning 
"not because relations to us". But unless the question is 
thoroughly begged right from the start, allowance has to be 
made for there being other • possible relations besides, 
and not reducible to, that of usefulness -- being valued 
by, for example. The slide makes it seem as if someone 
invo1ved in denying ins t rumenta1 relationship is commi11 ed 
to denying aji relation, and hence to an objective account 
of value.
Thompson’s conclusion is that only assignment of moral 
considerability to creatures with a point of view can be 
non-arbitrary, and hence that there is no alternative to 
instrumentalism with respect to the rest of nature. She
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is silent on the issue, important given the place of the 
critique of instrumentalism in the critique of 
anthropocentrism, of whether the class of perspective- 
havers is the same as the class of humans. But in any 
case it seems that such an assignment to perspective- 
havers still is arbitrary (in the rather unsatisfactory 
sense in which "arbitrary” is used here, to mean relative 
to a valuer’s point of view) , first because it is not 
determined by considerations drawn purely from the ethic 
itself and there is room for alternative assignments and 
disagreement; and second because perspective-havers could, 
with good reason.also allocate their values to beings 
other than just their own kind, not just as means to 
their own ends but as ends in themselves. The only way to 
show that they could not would it seems be to employ the 
fallacious argument discussed above, that valuers can only 
value what is in their interests. The confusion here again 
is that because she has shown, or thinks she has shown, 
that valuations involve valuers’ perspectives and 
individuating criteria, they must be reducible to valuers’ 
interests and satisfactions, ie, cannot be intrinsic. But 
the kind of anthropocentrism objected to , which leads to 
instrumentalism, is that of interests, not the mere fact 
that (human) valuers have their own (human) perspective on 
the world. This does not lead to instrumentalism unless the 
question-begging assumptions outlined above are made .
The assumption that intrinsic value entails objective value 
vitiates a great deal of Janna Thompson’s argument, which 
depends critically on it. Thus she writes in summary of 
her argument (pl7)’’The problem , as I suggested before, is 
that how we view the world, how we divide it up into 
individuals and systems, what we regard as good for an 
individual or a system or bad for it is too arbitrary, i.e. 
too dependent on point of view, interest and convenience, 
to support an ethic which purports to find value in nature 
independent of our interests and concerns’ .Thus too 
disagreement about where to stop moral consideration is 
taken to be fatal or at least a serious problem, (p 7), 
but it would only be so on an objectivist view. On a non-
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objectivist view there is no reason why one should not 
admit a multiplicity of possible answers here, (as in the 
case of human virtue), and that choices will reflect 
valuer’s perspectives. Similarly, much effort is put into 
establishing that "how we divide up the world depends upon 
context and convenience."(p.11) This is apparently taken to 
be fatal because "surely an envi r o n m e n t a l  ethic which 
claims to discover intrinsic values in nature s h o u l d n ’t 
depend upon the way we happen to look at things ."( p.l 1 ) , 
that is it relies again on the confusion between intrinsic 
and objective value.
The failure of the search for a single, simple and 
indisputable criterion of all value in nature -- a search 
which would be equally certain of failure in the human case 
—  is t a k e n  to be fatal to e n v i r o n m e n t a l  eth i c s  
b e c a u s e (p l 3 ) "if they claim to be u n c o v e r i n g  intrinsic 
values in nature, then we are entitled to get an answer to 
the q u e s t i o n , ' W h a t  is it a b o u t  l i v i n g  c r e a t u r e s  or 
wilderness that is valuable?’" Why this is so is not clear, 
since in the human case it is common enough for people to 
value someone or something without being able to say 
exactly why or to specify a value-making property everyone 
would agree on, and people often assume and assign 
values in human areas without being able to answer such 
demands. (Here we see another aspect of her criteria at 
work, the d e m a n d  that e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e t h i c s  s a t i s f y  
standards wrhich human-based ethical systems are unable to 
meet). This criterion also rules out valuing something as 
a particular, rather than as an example of some property or 
other. But the demand is taken to somehow follow from the
assumption of objectivity in intrinsic value.As work on
4 9aesthetic values has shown too , we commonly value items 
according to a variety of complex criteria which may 
include their historical origins,(the comparable property 
in the case of natural items is their naturalness) . The 
criteria of naturalness, stability, harmony, diversity and 
integrity she criticises are given as examples of bases 
upon which natural items and ecosystems might be accorded 
value, and not taken to be an exhaustive account of such
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bases, and we do not , as she claims , view environmental 
systems as the only objects of value in nature.^®
In the same vein, Janna Thompson finds the emphasis on the 
importance of naturalness and on the damage which human 
beings can bring about to contain "a covert reference to 
the human point of view, to our interests and concerns” 
(pl6), and is puzzled as to "why an ethic which purports to 
find objective value in nature should be so concerned about 
what human beings bring about”. She goes on to ask "How 
can it [such an ethic] justify not being concerned to 
prevent (if possible) natural occurrences which threaten 
the stability, diversity, integrity of an environmental 
system?” But it in no way follows that it is not -- this 
would involve a case where criteria were in conflict, and 
it certainly would not follow that naturalness would 
override all other values or criteria in such a case. And 
apart from the obvious fact that such an ethic may be 
concerned with what human beings bring about because it too 
often damages all these values, it may also be primarily 
(but not exclusively) concerned with human actions because 
this is a factor which can be controlled, whereas "storms, 
floods , volcanoes, glaciers" etc cannot. And in the 
current social context this focus seems relevant enough. 
The world’s forests have existed for a long time , despite 
natural disasters; it is not cyclones but human activity 
which is creating the prospect of a deforested world which 
is now so close to realisation^. As it stands the ethic 
tells us little of how much we should intervene to save 
nature from itself, and is primarily addressed to human 
action, but it is far from clear why this should be 
accounted a serious problem, even on objectivist 
assumptions.
Human action is emphasised for another reason also —  the 
rejection of instrumentalism with respect to nature is part 
of a concern to "encourage a better relation between us and 
our environment" (pl6) -- a concern few working in the area 
have troubled to hide -- and part of the rejection of human 
arrogance and chauvinism with respect to nature and other
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species. The traditional western freedom of action with 
respect to nature is in part the product of an instrumental 
view of it; i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m  is a close a s sociate of 
domination, not just for nature but for human groups also, 
and the rejection of instrumentalism is part of a broader 
picture of re-evaluating human hierarchy in nature and in 
human social systems. The challenge to instrumentalism 
should be viewed in this broader context rather than the 
mistaken one of the creation of an objectivist value 
system,
Janna Thompson’s discussion of the problem of the extent of 
moral consideration takes place against the backdrop of her 
three r e q u i r e m e n t s  on an ethic, e s p e c i a l l y  the 
"Decidability Requirement", that "the criteria of value 
which an ethic offers must be such that in most cases it is 
possible to determine what counts as valuable and what does 
not" (p3) . This sounds plausible, but in practice this 
translates apparently into a demand that we be able to 
decide cases even where quite insufficient context and 
detail is provided, as on p 15 where she asks whether trees 
are of less value than forests. (In all these cases the 
criteria of diversity, naturalness, integrity under 
d i s c u s s i o n  are treated as n e c e s s a r y  and sufficient 
conditions for value when they were put up as jointly 
sufficient . ) But we can ask in the human case too 
whether individuals or social groups are more valuable, and 
the disputes and haziness surrounding these issues in the 
human case are c o n v e n i e n t l y  overlooked. Does the 
difficulty in answering it , especially without supporting 
detail, show that no criteria of value are possible there? 
Another "difficulty" which is supposed to illustrate the 
problems in taking nature to be valuable concerns possible 
future recovery of degraded natural ecosystems : why should 
we be terribly concerned about what we do now to our 
environment, why not degrade environmental systems if we 
think there is some chance that they may e ventually 
recover? The argument has the familiar ring of axes and 
chainsaws, yet no adequate decision-making would sacrifice 
existing items of great value (however this value is
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accounted for) just on the consideration that they may 
eventually regain some of it . It depends on the gains and 
the risks, as usual , but in this case these details are 
not specified. What the "difficulty" seems to be designed 
to show again is that such considerations are not-objective 
but rely on valuer’s perspectives.
Nevert h e l e s s ,  despite the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  about 
objectivity, some of the problems Thompson raises for 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  ethics are important and valid. 
Environmental ethics does face a set of problems about 
individuation and the extent of moral consideration, as I 
have argued elsewhere. I think that although Thompson is 
right in many of her points on the problem of 
individuation, she draws an unjustifiable conclusion from 
them —  that environmental ethics is thereby "refuted". But 
all that it is justifiable to draw in the way of a 
c o n c l u s i o n  from this is that ethics itself is not 
sufficient to settle these questions, that it is seriously 
incomplete if taken as an account of how we should relate 
to nature, and that it is necessary to draw on a network 
of further background assumptions and criteria, which are 
taken for granted in the human case . It would hardly be 
surprising that if we should find that environmental ethics 
too requires a whole network of further assumptions, 
p r actices and i n d i v i d u a t i n g  criteria which are not 
themselves ethical. In the case of ethical relations to 
nature, our society lacks some of these practices, but 
that does not show we could not develop them, or that other 
societies do not have them. The objection points to a 
problem area, but is only fatal if environmental ethics is 
mistakenly made to bear the entire weight of providing, 
from scratch, an environmental philosophy and practice.
Janna Thompson is right too in pointing to difficulties 
about deciding the extent of moral consideration. Stopping 
moral consideration with sentient beings produces results 
that are widely seen as problematic -- that the lake, the 
river, the mountain have value only as means to the ends of 
sentient beings. But it seems difficult t o f i n d  other
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criteria which do not cast the net of consideration either 
too widely or too narrowly. Janna Thompson discusses one 
promising criterion which has been proposed, that of having 
an interest or having a good of its own. She argues that 
there is an absence of individuating criteria and that 
hearts, lungs, livers and kidneys all satisfy the criterion 
and become objects of moral concern; even rocks and 
machines satisfy the criterion, she argues. Her claims 
here are unconvincing though, because the crucial phrase 
and qualification "of its own" is lost sight of in the 
discussion and a number of important distinctions are not 
made. For example it is simply not true that the health of 
a kidney can be defined without reference to the health of 
the organism of which it is a part. If the metabolism of 
humans or other kidney -owners were to change in such a way 
as to require a different type of functioning from the 
normal kidney and a different normal state , our notion of 
what was healthy for a kidney would change accordingly, and 
similarly for other internal o r g a n s .Machines and other 
artefacts do have purposes and structures and potentials, 
but they are ones which are built into them by their 
makers and reflect their goals, and do not satisfy the 
condition indicated by "of its own" .The suggestion that 
plants do not have a good of their own seems 
counterintuitive;"prefers sunny, moist position", says the 
plant label, and none of us have any difficulty in knowing 
what that means or how to act on it. Plants can be said to 
have needs, preferences and interests, provided we do not 
try to pack into these concepts notions of 
consc iousness ; they can even be seen as making choices (eg 
of how best to grow) , and respond as individuals to their 
conditions of life.Their interests are not reducible to or 
dependent on that of humans . Plants do not have 
conscious wants or preferences, but the application of 
these concepts does not require that they do, and the claim 
that, because they are not conscious they cannot want 
anything begs the question by using an inappropriate sense 
of " want" .
I find no great difficulty with the- suggestion that we
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should respect rocks, mountains and ecosystems, which 
Thompson takes to be somehow objectionable, but I think 
that what is wanted for these cases is not so much the 
notion of an item’s having a good or welfare of its own 
as the broader one of its having a teleology, a goal, an 
end or direction to which it tends or for which it 
strives, and which is its own. (See Chapter Five ) To the 
extent that rocks and mountains, in particular or in 
general, are expressions of ongoing processes which have 
directions, they may satisfy this, while ecosystems clearly 
do possess broadly teleological properties , eg the 
maintenance of ecosystem stability . Such a teleological 
approach is increasingly seen as fruitful in understanding 
bio l o g i c a l  systems. If an item has teleolo g i c a l  
properties,this means that there is a way of choosing 
between the various potential states the item may realise, 
contrary to Thompson’s claim, and that there is something 
our actions may aid,or turn aside and frustrate, that it 
is not the case that all states of affairs have equal 
value with respect to that item, that outcomes are 
indifferent. This means that the net of such an ethic may 
be cast very wide, but I do not think that there is any 
great problem in having a criterion of moral consideration 
which includes a great deal in its scope, provided we can 
make distinctions of appropriate treatment within that 
class. That we have to think a lot harder before we can 
say ”it doesn’t matter” is I think one likely consequence 
of moving out of an anthropocentric perspective and into an 
ecological one.
Few of these problems seem to be as readily solved by 
drawing the moral boundary at sentience as Janna Thompson 
suggests. To begin with,she provides two different and 
non-equivalent criteria for what is intrinsically valuable, 
first, being conscious, and second, having interests, 
needs and preferences. The problem of explaining what it 
is about c o n s c i o u s n e s s  which makes it and it alone 
intrinsically valuable has to be faced.The explanation 
T h o m p s o n  gives — b a sically that our actions make a 
difference where such items are concerned--wi11 not do,
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for , as I ’ve argued, such a making of difference will 
occur in any case where the item in question can be viewed 
teleologically, and this teleological class is certainly a 
much broader class than the class of sentient beings.Of 
course it does not matter "to" the item unless it is 
conscious, and we may not be able to create conscious 
states such as joy and a n g uish by such a making of 
difference , but to impose such a condition is surely to 
beg the question in favour of consciousness, to presuppose 
the unique value of consciousness rather than to explain
i t . I ndividuation is earlier claimed to be relative to 
context and perspective, but now we are toldv that it is a 
virtue of the sentience criterion that individuation is 
not relative to context or perspective, because conscious 
i n d i v i d u a l s  are"self defining". The good of such 
c o n s c i o u s  individuals is said to be s i m i l a r l y  not
"arbitrary" (where arbitrariness is taken to follow from 
relativity to context and consciousness, mistakenly in my 
view) because "they themselves define this by how they 
feel". But this is only so if we fail to make the normal
distinction between what is their good and what they think
is. their good.
There are similar problems in Janna Thompson’s suggestion 
that an e n v i r o n m e n t a l  ethic is not needed because a
, I
sufficiently broad instrumental ethic will do . First, 
such an approach misses out on the aspect of challenge to 
human domination and of revision of the concept of the 
human self of which the challenge to instrumentalism with 
respect to nature is an important part.Instrumentalism is 
part too of the account of the self as disconnected and 
egoistic, having no non-accidental or defining relations to 
others and treating others —  whether human or non-human —  
as merely means to its independently conceived ends. The 
strategy of accomodating environmental concerns through a 
broadening of instrumentalism results from a failure to 
critique this conception of the self.
Second, it seems that such a broadening is convincing only 
because it relies on concealed assumptions of intrinsic
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value. Thus Janna Thompson writes "We might be able to 
argue that something is valuable and therefore ought to be 
preserved because if we learn to appreciate it for what it 
is, if we learn to live in harmony with it, our lives and 
conception of ourselves will be enhanced. We will live 
more abundantly in a spiritual sense."(pl9) Appreciating
something for what it is sounds remarkably like treating it
\as intrinsically valuable. And presumably it is a virtue 
to appreciate something for itself and . to treat it with 
respect only if that thing actually is worthy of respect, 
is worth appreciation. If it is not, if it is actually 
something of no real value, then we have simply been 
deluded —  we do not "live more abundantly". The notion 
carries a concealed assumption of intrinsic value.
Even such a broad conception of the instrumental value of 
an item creates problems if it is assumed to be the sole 
reason for respect (as in her because), or if it is assumed 
that the reasons for protecting the item reduce to this. 
We can see these problems from an example in the human 
case. Frie rxd s cause us to live more abundantly, they 
enhance our lives and our conception of ourselves. But if 
we value our friends just for this reason, the real 
benefits of friendship will elude us. Friends must be 
valued for their own sake , not because they are 
instrumental to our satisfaction, however broadly 
conceived. The appreciation of nature can bring great 
benefits of the sort Janna Thompson indicates, but if we 
seek to preserve it only because of these benefits to 
ourselves, we will continue to chase anthropocentric 
shadows.
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Chapter Seven j_ Environmental Ethics, Deep Ecology and the
Critique of Rationalism
As a framework for moral decision, care is grounded in 
the assumption that self and other are interdependent, 
an a s s u m p t i o n  r e f l e c t e d  in a view of action as 
responsive and, therefore , as arising in relationship 
rather than the view of action as emanating from within 
the self, and, therefore, "s e 1f -g o v e r n e d ". Seen as 
responsive, the self is by definition connected to 
others, responding to perceptions, interpreting events, 
and governed by the organising tendencies of human 
i n t e r a c t i o n  and language. Within this f r a m e w o r k , 
detachment, whether from self or from others, is morally 
p r oblematic, since it breeds moral blin d n e s s  or 
indifference -- a failure to discern or respond to need.
Carol Gilligan "Moral Orientation and 
Moral Development" , p24.
Environmental philosophy has recently been criticised on a 
number of counts by feminist philosophy. In this chapter I 
develop some of this critique further and to suggest that 
much of the issue turns on the failure of environmental 
p h i l o s o p h y  to engage pr o p e r l y  with the r a t i onalist 
tradition which has been inimical to both women and nature. 
Environmental philosophy, although it has attempted to 
q u e s t i o n  some f u n d amental a s s u m p t i o n s  of western  
philosophical thinking concerning the role and value of 
non-humans, has nevertheless tended to be much less 
throughgoing than feminist philosophy in scrutinizing and 
challenging conventional philosophical positions and bases. 
Thus, it continues to employ damaging assumptions from this 
tradition in attempting to formulate a new environmental 
philosophy,and often makes use of or embeds itself within 
rationalist philosophical frameworks which are not only not 
neutral from a gender perspective, but which have had a 
negative role for nature as well. In the first two parts 
of the chapter I argue that both current mainstream brands of 
environmental philosophy, that based in ethics and that 
based in deep ecology suffer from this problem, that 
neither has an adequate historical analysis, and that both 
continue to rely implicitly upon rationalist-inspired 
accounts of the self which have been a large part of the 
problem. In the later part of the chapter I try to show how
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the critique of rationalism offers an better understanding 
of a range of key broader issues which environmental 
philosophy as it is currently done has tended to neglect 
or treat in too narrow a way, and to meet some recent 
criticism by showing that its insights here are central to 
the concerns of environmental philosophy.
RATIONALISM AND THE ETHICAL APPROACH
The ethical approach aims to centre a new approach to 
nature in ethics, especially universalising ethics or in 
some extension of human ethics. This has been criticised 
from a feminist perspective by a number of recent authors 
in Environmental Ethics, and I want to partly agree with 
and partly disagree with these criticisms ; I think that 
the emphasis on ethics as the central part (or even the 
whole of) the problem is misplaced , and that although 
ethics has a role, the particular ethical approaches which 
have been adopted are problematic and unsuitable. I shall 
illustrate this claim by brief discussion of two recent 
books —  first Paul Taylor’s recent (1986) book Respect for 
N a ture: A Theory o f Environmental Ethics published by 
Princeton University press, and second Tom Regan’s 1986 The 
Case for Animal R i g h t s , publi s h e d  by U n i v e r s i t y  of
oCalifornia Press. Both have been significant, and indeed 
impressive contributions to their areas. Paul T a y l o r ’s 
book aims to provide a detailed working out of an ethical 
position which rejects the the standard and widespread 
western treatment of nature as instrumental to human 
interests and instead takes living things , as teleological 
centres of life, to be worthy of respect in their own 
right. Although the book defends a biocentric position , 
it begins with a dedication to the e a r t h ’s wild living 
things but never' explains why its ethical position is 
constantly restricted to wild living things, or what the 
role of w i l dness is in the theory . A l t hough the 
importance of wildness is stressed throughout, it appears 
tacked on —  a restriction which evades a set of serious 
problems both about the limits of moral consideration and
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about how far a different moral approach is necessary for 
domestic as opposed to wild living things. Even the 
restriction of ethical consideration to living things is a 
problem for an environmental ethic, and there is also the 
problem that teleology does not coincide with life (let 
alone wild life).
The most serious problem however in the theory is that 
although it claims to be aiming to present a theory which 
is life-centred and in which a person’s true human self 
includes his or her biological nature^, it attempts to 
embed this within a Kantian ethical framework and makes 
strong use of the reason/emotion dichotomy. Thus we are 
assured^ that the attitude of respect is a moral one 
because it is universalizing and disinterested, ’that is, 
each moral agent who sincerely has the attitude advocates 
its universal adoption by all other agents, regardless of 
whether they are so inclined and regardless of their 
fondness or lack of fondness for particular individuals.” 
The essential features of morality having been established 
as distance from emotion and ’particular fondness” , 
morality is then seen as the domain of reason, and its 
touchstone belief. Having carefully distinguished the 
”valuational, conative, practical and affective dimensions 
of the attitude of respect", Taylor goes on to pick out the 
essentially cognitive "valuational" aspect as central and 
basic to all the others - "it is because moral agents look 
at animals and plants in this way that they are disposed togpursue the aforementioned ends and purposes", and 
similarly to have the relevant emotions and affective 
attitudes. The latter must be held at an appropriate 
distance, and not allowed to get the upper hand at any 
point. Taylor writes:
One further aspect of conduct is needed, however, for 
it to be a fully adequate expression of the attitude in 
practical life. The actions must be done as a matter of 
moral principle. Although one's aim is to preserve and 
protect the good of wild living things, one must 
conceive of acting with this aim in mind as something 
morally required of one and not as the fulfillment of a
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particular interest one happens to have at the moment. 
The end of action, in other words, must be thought of as 
an ethically obligatory end and consequently as an end 
that is to be pursued disinterestedly, whether or not 
one is so inclined. If one seeks that end solely or 
primarily from inclination, the attitude being expressed 
is not moral respect but personal affection or love.
It is not that respect for nature precludes feelings of
care and concern for living things. One may, as a
matter of simple kindness, not want to harm them. But
the fact that one is so motivated does not itself
indicate the presence of a moral attitude of respect.
Having the desire to preserve or protect the good of
wild animals and plants for their sake is neither
contrary to, nor evidence of, respect for nature. It is
only if the person who has the desire understands that
the actions fulfilling it are ethically obligatory, and
that they would be obligatory even in the absence of the
n
desire, that the person has genuine respect for nature.
Taylor’s negative point is partly correct -- respect is a 
moral matter , is not the same as affection or love,and 
expressions of respect for others have more to do with 
treating them as worthy of consideration in their own right 
and not just as instruments for the satisfaction of humans. 
But the attempt to give an account in terms of a morality 
divorced entirely from ”inclination", treated as irrelevant 
or even as a hindrance, is not acceptable, and in no way 
follows from simply distinguishing respect and love. 
Furthermore, respect for nature on this account becomes an 
essentially cognitive matter (that of a person believing 
something to have "inherent worth" and then acting from 
understandinng of ethical principles as universal).
The account seems to have the consequence too that some of 
the non-western peoples who seem to provide our best 
examples of respectful attitudes to nature cannot be said 
to have such respect unless they subscribe to this Kantian 
(and essentially western) account of universal moral 
principles, which is unlikely. The account is based on a
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view of reason and emotion as sharply sepa r a t e d  and 
opposed, and of " d e s i r e ” , caring and love as merely 
"personal" and "particular” as opposed to the universality 
and impartiality of understanding, of "feminine" emotions 
as essentially unreliable, untrustworthy, and morally 
irrelevant, an inferior domain to be dominated by a 
superior disinterested masculine reason.
Now this sort of rationalist account of the place of 
emotions has come in for a great deal of we 11 - de s e r ve d 
criticism recently, both for its implicit gender bias and 
its philosophical inadequacy, especially its dualism and 
its construal of public reason as sharply differentiated 
from and controlling private emotion . A further major 
p r o blem in its use in this context however is the 
inconsistency of employing, in the service of constructing 
an allegedly biocentric ethical theory, a framework which 
has itself played such a major role in creating a dualistic 
account of the genuine human self as essentially rational 
and as sharply discontinuous from the merely emotional, the 
merely bodily and the merely animal elements. For emotions, 
and the private sphere with which they are associated, have 
been treated as sharply differentiated and inferior as part 
of a pattern in which they are seen as linked to the sphere 
of nature in contrast to reason. And it is not only women 
but also the "earth’s wild living things" which have been 
denied p o s s e s s i o n  of a reason thus cons t r u e d  along 
masculine and oppositional lines and which contrasts not 
only with the "feminine" emotions but also with the 
physical and the animal. As we have seen, much of the 
problem (both for women and for nature) lies in rationalist 
or rationalist-derived conceptions of the self and of 
what is essential and valuable in the human makeup. 
It is in the name of such a reason that these other things 
—  the feminine, the emotional, the merely bodily or the 
merely animal, and the natural world itself have most
often been denied their virtue and been accorded an 
inferior and merely instrumental position.
It is precisely reason so construed which is usually taken
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to characterise the authentically human and to create the
supposedly sharp separation, cleavage or discontinuity
between all humans and the non-human world, and the similar
qcleavage within the human self . The supremacy accorded 
an opposi t ional ly-construed reason is the key to the 
anthropocentrism of the western tradition. The Kantian- 
rationalist framework then, is hardly the area in which to 
search for a solution. Its use, in a way which perpetuates 
the supremacy of reason and its opposition to contrast 
areas, in the service of constructing a supposedly 
biocentric ethic, is a matter for astonishment.
Ethical universalisation and abstraction are both closely 
associated with accounts of the self in terms of rational 
egoism. Universalisation is explicitly seen in both the
Kantian and the Rawlsian framework as needed to hold in 
check natural self-interest ; it is the moral complement 
to the account of the self as "disembodied and disembedded", 
as the autonomous self of liberal theory, the rational
tegoist of market theory, the falsely differentiated self of 
object-relations theory .  ^^  In the same vein, the
broadening of the scope of moral concern and the according 
of rights to the natural world has been seen by influential 
environmental philosophers as the final step in a process 
of increasing moral abstraction and generalisation, part of 
the move away from the merely particular, my self, my 
family, my tribe, the discarding of the merely personal, 
the merely emotional, and by implication, the merely 
selfish. It is viewed as moral progress, increasingly 
civilised as it distances from primitive selfishness. 
Nature is the last area to be included in this march away 
from the unbridled natural egoism of the particular and the 
emotional. Moral progress is marked by increasing 
adherence to moral rules and a movement away from the 
supposedly natural (in human nature) and the completion of 
its empire is , paradoxically, the extension of its domain 
of adherence to moral rules to nature itself.
On such a view, the particular and the emotional are viewed 
as the enemy, being seen as corrupting, capricious and
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self-interested. And if the "moral emotions" are set aside 
as irrelevant or suspect, as merely subjective or personal, 
what could there be to base morality upon but the rules of 
abstract reason, on the justice and rights of the 
impersonal public sphere. This view of morality as based 
on a concept of reason as oppositional to the personal, the 
particular and the emotional has been assumed in the 
framework of much recent environmental ethics. But as a 
number of feminist critics of the masculine model of moral 
life and of moral abstraction have pointed out, this 
increasing abstraction is not necessarily an improvement. 
The opposition between the care and concern for particular 
others and obedience to universal rules on which it is 
based is associated with a sharp division between public 
(masculine) and private (feminine) realms ^  . Thus it is
part of the set of dualistic contrasts in which the problem 
of the western treatment of nature is rooted.
Although there is good evidence that there is an opposition 
b e t w e e n  m o r a l i t i e s  of care o r iented to m a i n t a i n i n g  
relationships and those of justice conceived as abstract 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g  , the o p p o s i t i o n  b e t w e e n  care for 
particular others and general moral concern is a false one. 
There can be o p p o s i t i o n  b e t w e e n  p a r t i c u l a r i t y  and 
generality of concern, as when concern for particular kin 
is a c c o m p a n i e d  by exclu s i o n  of others from care or 
chauvinistic attitudes towards them, but this does not 
automatically happen, and emphasis on oppositional cases 
obscures the frequent cases where they work together -- and 
in which care for particular others harmonises with and 
forms the foundation for a more generalised morality of 
care. The morality of care is grounded in particular 
relationships and responsibility for particular others 
based on a connection between self and other , but it is 
also capable of generalisation to a relationship-based but 
universal concern for others’ welfare (as in "another 
mother for peace") . But its generalisation is based upon 
recognition of universal interdependence and relationship, 
rather than on detachment from relationship and devaluation 
of connection, as in the case of r a t i ona 1 i s t - i nf 1 uenc e d
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accounts of morality. (As we shall see, this failure to
deal adequately with particular relationships is a problem 
1 for deep ecology too.)
Special relationships, which are treated by universalising 
positions as at best morally irrelevant and at worst a 
positive hindrance to the moral life, are thus mistreated. 
For as Blum s t r e s s e s , ^  special relationships form the 
basis for much of our moral life and concern and it could 
hardly be otherwise. With nature, as with the human
sphere, the capacity to care, to experience sympathy, 
understanding and sensitivity to the situation and fate of 
particular others, and to take responsibility for others, 
is an index of our moral being. Special relationships with, 
care or empathy with particular aspects of nature as 
experienced rather than with nature as abstraction, are 
essential to provide a depth and type of concern which is 
not otherwise possible. Care and responsibility for 
particular animals, trees, rivers, which are known well, 
loved and are appropriately connected to the self, are an 
important basis for acquiring a wider, more generalised 
concern. This may involve a recognition that more distant 
others have special ties to threatened parts of nature and 
will feel grief and pain on its account, as well as 
recognition of relationship and interdependence with more 
distant others (including non-immediate nature).
C o n c e r n  for nature should not be viewed then as the
c o m p l e t i o n  of a proc e s s  of u n i v e r s a 1 isation and
15impersonalisation , moral abstraction and disconnection , 
discarding the self, and detaching from emotions and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  (in each case what is d i s c a r d e d  being 
a s s o c i a t e d  with the private sphere and f e m i n i n i t y ) . 
Environmental ethics has for the most part placed itself 
uncritically in such a framework, although it is one which 
is extended with particular difficulty to the natural 
world. Perhaps the kindest thing which can be said about 
the framework of ethical uni ve r s a 1 i s a t i on is that it is 
s e r i o u s l y  incomplete, and fails to capture the most 
important elements of respect, which are not reducible to
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or based on duty or obligation any more than the most 
important elements of friendship are, but which are rather 
an expression of a certain kind of selfhood and a certain 
kind of relation between self and other.
RATIONALISM ^ RIGHTS AND ETHICS
An extension to nature of the standard concepts of 
morality is also the aim of another recent major book in 
the area, Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights. ^  This 
is the most impressive, thorough and solidly argued book in 
the area of animal ethics, with excellent chapters on areas 
such as animal intentionality. But the key concept upon 
which this account of moral concern for animals is based is 
that of rights, which requires both strong individual 
separation of right-holders and to be set in a framework of 
human community and legality. Its extension to the natural 
world, as Mary Midgley notes, raises a host of problems.
Even for the case of individual higher animals for which 
Regan uses it, it is problematic. Regan employs a concept 
of rights based on Mill’s concept, where if a being has a 
right to something not only should he or she (or it) have 
that thing but others are obliged to intervene to secure 
it. The application of this concept of rights to individual 
wild living animals appears to give humans almost limitless 
obligations to intervene massively in all sorts of far- 
reaching and conflicting ways in natural cycles to secure 
the rights of a bewildering variety of beings. In the case 
of the wolf and the sheep, an example discussed by Regan, 
it is unclear whether humans should intervene to protect 
the sheep’s rights or whether in so intervening they 
violate the wolf’s right to its natural food. Regan 
attempts to meet this objection by claiming that since the 
wolf is not itself a moral agent (although it is a moral 
patient) it cannot violate the sheep’s rights not to 
suffere a painful and violent death. But the defence is 
unconvincing, because even if we concede that the wolf is 
not a moral agent, it still does not follow that on a
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rights view we are not obliged to intervene. From the 
fact that the wolf is not a moral agent it only follows 
that it is not respons ible for violating the sheep’s 
rights, not that they are not violated or that others do 
not have an obligation (on the rights view) to intervene. 
If the wolf were attacking a human baby, it would hardly do 
as a defence in that case to claim that one did not have a 
duty to intervene because the wolf was not a moral agent. 
And on Regan’s view the baby and the sheep do have 
something like the same rights. So on the rights view we do 
have a duty it seems to intervene to protect the sheep - 
leaving us where with the wolf ?
The concept of rights seems to produce absurd consequences 
and is impossible to apply in the context of predators in a 
natural ecosystem where such examples are the rule rather 
than the exception, as opposed to a particular human social 
context in which claimants are part of a reciprocal social 
community and conflict cases can be treated either as 
exceptional or as settlable according to some agreed on 
principles. It requires a level and kind of intervention 
which is inappropriate and disruptive in natural 
ecosystems, as well as requiring humans to act in a god­
like role. _ All this seems to me to tell against the 
interventionist concept of rights as the correct one for 
the general task of dealing with animals in the natural 
environment (as opposed of course to domestic animals in a 
basically humanized environment).
Regan of course is mainly concerned, as part of the animal 
rights movement, not with wild animals but with domestic 
animals as they appear in the context of and support of 
human society and culture, although he does not indicate 
any qualification in moral treatment. Nevertheless, there 
may be an important moral boundary here, for natural 
ecosystems cannot be organised along the lines of justice, 
fairness and rights, and it would be absurd to try to 
impose such a social order upon them via intervention in 
these systems. This does not mean of course that humans 
can do anything in such a situation, just that certain
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kinds of intervention are not in order. But these kinds of 
intervention may be in order in the case of human social 
systems, and .in the case of animals which have already, 
through human intervention, been brought into these social 
systems, and the concept of rights and of social 
responsibility may have far more application here. This 
would me a n  that the d o m e s t i c /w i 1d d i s t i n c t i o n  would 
demarcate an important moral boundary in terms of duties of 
intervention, although neither of the books discussed comes 
to grips with this problem. In the case of Taylor’s ’’wild 
living things” intervention seems less important than 
respect for independence and autonomy, and the prima facie 
obligation may be non-intervention. This issue raises the 
overall questions of the role of wildness, the problem of 
the extent of teleology, and the problem of delineating the 
natural. These have taken up little a t t e n t i o n  in 
environmental philosophy so far.
Rights have acquired an exaggerated importance as part of
the prestige of the public sphere and the masculine, and
the emphasis on separation and autonomy, on reason and
abstraction. A more promising approach,and one much more
in line too with the current directions in feminism,
would be to remove rights from the centre of the moral
stage, and pay more attention to some other less dualistic
moral concepts such as respect, sympathy, care, concern,
19compassion, gratitude, friendship and responsibility 
These concepts, because of their dualistic construal as 
feminine and consi g n m e n t  to the private sphere as 
subjective and emotional, have been treated as peripheral 
and given far less importance than they deserve for. several 
reasons. First, rationalism and the prestige of reason and 
the public sphere has influenced not only the concept of 
what morality is (as Taylor explicates it for example, 
essentially a rational and cognitive act of understanding 
that certain actions are ethically obligatory), but of what 
is central to it or what count as moral concepts. Second, 
concepts such as respect, care, and concern are resistant 
to analysis along lines of a dualistic reason/emotion 
dichotomy, and their construal along these lines has
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2 0involved confusion and distortion. They are moral
’feelings'* but they involve both reason, behaviour and 
emotion in ways that do not seem separable. As well 
rationalist-inspired ethical concepts are highly 
ethnocentric and cannot account adequately for the views of 
many indigenous peoples, and the attempted application of 
these rationalist concepts to their positions tends to lead 
to the view that they lack a real ethical framework. These 
alternative concepts seem better able to apply to the views 
of such peoples, whose ethic of respect, care and 
responsibility for land is often based on special, 
particular relationship with it and on an account of it in 
terms of kinship, in which human social and personal 
identity is linked to particular areas of land via links to 
kin Finally these concepts, which allow for
particularity and often do not require reciprocity, are 
precisely the sorts of concepts feminist philosophers have 
argued should have a more significant place in ethics (at 
the expense of abstract, male-governed concepts from the 
public sphere such as rights and justice). The ethic of 
care and responsibility they have explicated seems to 
extend much less problematically to the non-human world 
than those which are currently seen as central. Such an 
ethic is an expression of self-in-relationship, rather than 
a discarding or containment of a self viewed as self- 
interested and non-relational , as in familiar justice and 
rights accounts which engineer the overcoming of egoism via 
conditions which impose ignorance of the self’s particular 
conditions of life.
It is not, I think, that we need to or can dispense with 
the ethical approach, although we do need to reassess its 
centrality in environmental philosophy. Ethics is not 
necessarily involved (although as Marti Kheel notes, it 
often is) in establishing hierarchies of value or centrally 
in concepts such as rights , and there is a real point in 
the extension of moral consideration and value beyond the 
human sphere, especially to the extent that it involves the 
rejection of the instrumental account of the status of 
nature. As we have seen, there are important connections
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between the ecofeminist account of the self and the 
rejection of instrumentalism. What is needed then is not 
so much the abandonment of ethics as a different, richer 
and less dualistic understanding of it and a richer 
understanding of environmental philosophy generally than is 
provided by justice and rights-based ethics -- one which 
gives an important place to ethical concepts owning to 
emotionality and particularity, and abandons the exclusive 
focus on the universal and the abstract associated with the 
non-relational self and the dualistic and oppositional 
accounts of the reason/emotion and universal/particular 
contrasts as given in rationalist accounts of ethics .
This is not the same however as the abandonment of all 
general ethical concepts and the adoption of a "contextual" 
ethics based in pure particularity, as Cheney appears to 
advocate , or in pure emotionality. We do need both to 
reintegrate the personal and particular and reevaluate more1 
positively its role , but overcoming moral dualism will not 
simply amount to an affirmation of the personal in the 
moral sphere. To embrace pure particularity and 
emotionality in this way is implicitly to accept the 
dualistic construction of these as oppositional to a 
rational ethics and to attempt to reverse value. In 
general this reactive response is an inadequate way to deal 
with such dualisms. And rules themselves, as Jean 
Grimshaw points out, are not incompatible with recognition 
of special relationships and responsibility to particular 
others . Rules themselves are not the problem —  and 
hence it is not necessary to move to a ruleless ethics —  
rather it is rules which demand the discarding of the 
personal, the emotional and the particular in line with 
oppositional construals of reason, and which are oriented 
to containment of a self construed as disconnected from or 
as oppositional to others and to nature.
The problem is not just one of restriction in ethical 
concepts but also in concepts of ethics. Current attempts 
to add an environmental component as an extra room onto the 
edifice of justice or rights based ethics fail to engage
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critically with the way the tradition of rationalism has
influenced conceptions of the human self and, as a result,
of human virtue in relation to nature, and fail to address
2 5alternative conceptions of virtue . They have been 
preoccupied with accounts of ecological morality which 
treat it (in dualistic fashion) as containment of self and 
selfishness , as opposed to the view of it as expression of 
self inherent in virtue-based accounts and in the ethic of 
care discussed above.
Thus in treating instrumentalism for example as a problem 
just in ethics, a problem solved by setting up some sort 
of theory of intrinsic value , mainstream environmental 
philosophers neglect the key aspects of the overall 
problem which are concerned with the definition of the 
human self as separate from nature and the resulting 
account of the ideal for which humans should strive as not 
to be found in what is shared with the natural and animal 
(e.g. the body, sexuality, reproduction, emotionality, the 
senses, agency) but in what is thought to separate and 
distinguish them (especially reason and its offshoots). 
What is neglected too is the connection between this 
account of the self as disconnected from nature and the 
instrumental view of it, and broader political aspects of 
the critique of instrumentalism.
The neglect is ethnocentric since many other cultures have 
had a different conception of identity and a different 
standard of virtue , stressing as genuinely human virtues 
what con n e c t s  us to nature, c o n t i n u i t y  and not 
dissimilarity , and stressing also care and responsibility 
for nature. For example, Bill Neidjie’s phlosophy may
be interpreted as an affirmation of such kinship. "Animal 
look for food. People look. . . Bird look. . . turtle look, 
everyone look for food. We all the same. Skin can be 
different but blood the same. Blood and bone . . . all the 
same. Man can’t split himself."
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RATIONALISM AND DEEP ECOLOGY I
A significant exception to the neglect of self and virtue 
perspectives within environmental philosophy seems to be 
given by deep ecology, which is also critical of the 
location of the problem within ethics . Deep ecology 
also seems initially to be more likely to be compatible 
with a feminist philosophical framework, emphasizing as it 
does connections with the self, connectedness and merger. 
Despite this, deep ecology continues to be unsatisfactory 
from a feminist as well as an environmental perspective, 
and recent a t t empts to o v ercome this have not been 
successful. One problem is that deep ecology has not 
satisfactorily identified • what the key elements in the 
framework it wishes to reject are , or observed their 
connections to rationalism. As a result it fails to reject 
adequately or provide alternatives to accounts of the self 
as non-relational, and indeed often seems to provide its 
own version of universalisation and the discarding of 
particular connections.
Deep ecology locates the key problem area in the separation 
of humans and nature , and it provides a solution for this 
in terms of the "identification” of self with nature. 
"Identification" is usually left deliberately vague , and 
corresponding accounts of self are confused, various and 
shifting. There seem to be at least three different 
accounts of self involved —  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b i 1 i t y , 
t r a n s c e n d e n c e  of self, and e x p a n s i o n  of self —  and 
practitioners appear to feel free to move between them . 
All are unsatisfactory, I shall argue, from both a feminist 
perpective and from that of obtaining a satisfactory 
environmental philosophy.
The indistinguishabi1ity account rejects boundaries between 
self and nature. Humans are said to be just one strand in 
the biotic web, not the source and ground of all value and 
the Discontinuity thesis is,it seems, firmly rejected. "We 
can make no firm o n t o l o g i c a l  divide in the field of
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existence . . . there is no bifurcation in reality between
the human and non-human realms .... to the extent that we
perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological
2 9consciousness " says Warwick Fox. This is the central 
intuition of Deep Ecology according to Fox . But much 
more is involved here than the rejection of discontinuity, 
for deep ecology, as it is usually explained, wishes to go 
on to replace the human-in-environment image by a holistic 
or gestalt view which "dissolves not only the human-in­
environment concept, but every compact- thing-in-mi1ieu 
concept” -- except when talking at a superficial level of 
communication . Deep Ecology involves a cosmology of 
"unbroken wholeness which denies the classical idea of the 
a n a 1y s a b i 1 ity of the world into s e p a r a t e l y  and 
independently existing parts" . It is strongly attracted 
to a variety of mystical traditions and to the Perennial 
Philosophy, where the self is merged with the other -- "the 
other is none other than yourself". As John Seed puts it "I 
am protecting the rainforest" develops into "I am part of
the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the
3 2rainforest recently emerged into thinking"
I have several problems with this, not with the orientation 
to the concept of self (which seems to me important and 
correct) or so much with the mystical character of the 
insights themselves,^ as with the indistinguishability 
metaphysics which is proposed as their basis.
It is not merely that the identification process of which 
deep ecologists speak seems to stand in need of much more 
clarification, but that it does the wrong thing. The 
problem, on the sort of account I have given, is the 
discontinuity between humans and nature which emerges as 
part of the overall set of western dualisms. Deep ecology 
proposes to heal this division by a "unifying process", a 
metaphysics which insists that everything is really part 
of, indistinguishable from, everything else. This is not 
only to employ overly powerful tools, but ones that do the 
wrong job, for the origins of the particular opposition 
involved in the human/nature dualism remain unaddressed and
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unanalysed. The real basis of the discontinuity lies in 
the concept of an authentic human being, in what is taken 
to be valuable in human character, society and culture, as 
what is distinct from what is taken to be natural. The 
sources of and remedies for this remain unaddressed in deep 
ecology. Deep ecology has confused dualism and atomism, 
and then mistakenly taken indistinguishabi1ity to follow 
from the rejection of atomism. The confusion is clear in 
Fox, who proceeds from the ambiguous claim that there is no 
"bifurcation in reality between the human and non-human 
realms" (which could be taken as a rejection of human 
discontinuity from nature ) immediately to the conclusion 
that what is needed is that we embrace an 
indistinguishability metaphysics of unbroken wholeness in 
the whole of reality. But the problem must be addressed in 
terms of this specific dualism and its connections. 
Instead deep ecology proposes the obliteration of all 
distinction.
This failure to address the specific dualisms involved 
makes deep ecology unacceptable from a feminist point of 
view, because it ammounts to a failure to recognise the 
important historical and conceptual connections between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature, resulting 
in the feminization of nature and the naturalization of 
women.
Thus deep ecology’s solution to removing this 
discontinuity by obliterating all division, is far too 
powerful. In its overgenerality it fails to provide a 
genuine basis for an environmental ethic of the kind 
sought, for the view of humans as metaphysically unified 
with the cosmic whole will be equally true whatever 
relation humans stand in with nature -- the situation of 
exploitation of nature exemplifies such unity equally as 
well as a conserver situation and the human self is just as 
much indistinguishable from the bulldozer and Coca-cola 
bottle as the rocks or the rainforest. What John Seed 
seems to have in mind here is that once one has realised 
that one is indistinguishable from the rainforest, its
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needs would become o n e ’s own. But there is nothing to 
guarantee this -- one could equally well take one’s own 
needs f or its.
This points to a further prob l e m  with the 
indistinguishabi1ity thesis, that we need to recognise not 
only our human continuity with the natural world but also 
its d i s t i n c t n e s s  and i n d e p e n d e n c e  from us and the 
distinctness of the needs of things in nature from ours. 
The indistinguishability account does not allow for this, 
although it is a very important part of respect for nature, 
and of conservation strategy..
The dangers of accounts of the self which involve self- 
merger appear in the feminist context also , where they are 
sometimes appealed to as the alternative to masculine- 
defined autonomy as disconnection from others. As Jean
G r i m s h a w ^  writes of the related thesis of the 
indistinctness of persons (the acceptance of the loss of 
self boundaries as a feminine ideal):
Certain forms of symbiosis or connection with others 
can lead to damaging failures of personal development, 
but because care for others, understanding of them, are 
only possible if one can adequately distinguish oneself 
from others. If I see myself as indistinct from you, or 
you as not having your own being that is not merged with 
mine, then I cannot preserve a real sense of your well- 
being as opposed to mine. Care and understanding 
require the sort of distance that is needed in order not 
to see the other as a projection of self, or self as a 
continuation of the other.
These points seem to me to apply as much to caring for 
other species and for the natural world as they do to 
caring for our own species. Recognition of nature, like 
recognition of a human other, requires both relationship 
with the other, that it not be treated as totally alien or 
disconnected, but also recognition of its distinctness from 
the self. But in deep ecology, just as dualism is confused 
with atomism, so holistic self-merger is taken to be the
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only alternative to egoistic accounts of the self as 
without essential connection to others or to nature. 
Fortunately, this is a false choice ; as we have seen, 
non-holistic but relational accounts of the self, as 
developed in some feminist and social philosophy, enable a 
rejection of dualism, including human/nature dualism, 
without denying the independence or distinguishability of 
the other.
To the extent that deep ecology is identified with the 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b i 1 ity thesis, it does not provide an 
adequate basis for a philosophy of nature. Nor is it 
compatible with feminist accounts, which have rejected the 
self-merger and submergence of self positions as associated 
with the oppression of women under patriarchy. But in 
fairness to deep ecology it should be noted that it tends 
to vacillate between mystical indistinguishability and the 
other accounts of self, between the holistic self and the 
e x p a n d e d  self. V a c i l l a t i o n  occurs often by way of 
slipperiness as to what is meant by identification of self 
with the other, a key notion in deep ecology. This 
slipperiness reflects the confusion of dualism and atomism 
previously noted, but also seems to reflect a desire to 
retain the mystical appeal of indistinguishability but to 
avoid its many difficulties.
THE EXPANDED SELF
Where "identification” means not "identity” but something 
more like "empathy", identification with other beings can 
lead to an expanded self. According to Arne Naess, "The 
self is as c o m p r e h e n s i v e  as the totality of our 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . . . .Our Self is that with which we 
i d e n t i f y . T h i s  larger self (or Self to Deep Ecologists) 
is something for which we should strive "insofaras it is in 
our power to do so" , and according to Fox we should 
strive to make it as large as possible. But this expanded 
self is not the result of a critique of egoism -- rather it 
is an enlargement and an extension of egoism.^ It does
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not question the structure of egoism and self-interest —  
rather it tries to allow for a wider set of interests by an 
expansion of self. The motivation for the expansion of 
self is to allow for a wider set of concerns while 
continuing to allow the self to operate on the fuel of 
self-interest (or Self-interest). This is apparent from 
the claim that "in this 1 ight . . . . ecological resistance is 
simply another name for self defence." Fox quotes with 
approval John Livingstone’s statement "...when I say that 
the fate of the sea turtle or the tiger or the gibbon is 
mine, I mean it. All that is in my universe is not merely 
mine ; it is me. And I shall defend myself. I shall 
defend myself not only against overt aggression but also 
against gratuitous insult".^
The fact is that deep ecology is not really critical of 
egoism and continues to subscribe to two of the main tenets 
of the egoist framework -- that human nature is egoistic 
and that the alternative to egoism is self-sacrifice. Thus 
John Seed says : "Naess wrote that when most people think 
about conservation, they think about sacrifice. This is a 
treacherous basis for conservation, because most people 
ar e n ’t capable of working for anything except their own 
self-interest....Naess argued that we need to find ways to 
extend our identity into nature. Once that happens, being 
out in front of bulldozers or whatever becomes no more of a 
sacrifice than mo v i n g  your foot if you notice that 
someone’s just about to strike it with an axe.
Given these assumptions about egoism plus the desire to 
obtain some sort of human interest in defending nature, the 
expanded Self operating in the interests of nature but also 
along the familiar lines of self-interest makes a good deal 
of sense. The expanded self strategy might seem to be just 
another rather pretentious and obscure way of saying that 
humans empathise with nature and gaining the same effect as 
a relational theory. However, its strategy of transferring 
the structures of egoism is highly problematic, for as 
Cheney notes'^, it obtains its widening of interest at the 
expense of failing to recognise u n a m b i g u o u s l y  the
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distinctness and independence of the other. And the 
failure to critique egoism and the non-relational self 
means a failure to draw connections with other contemporary 
critiques which have done so.
Because the expanded Self requires that we leave behind the 
concerns of the self (a relinquishment which despite its 
natural difficulty we should struggle to attain 
according to deep ecology) t expansion of self to Self 
also tends to lead into the third position, and to become 
the transcendence or overcoming of self. Thus Fox urges us 
to strive for impartial i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with all 
particulars, the cosmos, discarding our identifications 
with our own p a r t i c u l a r  concerns, emotions and 
attachments^^. Fox presents here the deep ecology version 
of universalisation, with the familiar emphasis on the 
personal and the p a r t i c u l a r  as c o r r u p t i n g  and self- 
i n t e r e s t e d  ("the cause of p o s s e s s i v e n e s s ,  war and 
ecological destruction"^^).
There are other r e s pects in which deep ecology is 
problematic from an ecofeminist perspective, some of them 
identified, although not always completely, by ecofeminist 
critics such as Cheney. Deep ecology advocates embracing, 
at the level of rational belief, a grandiose holistic 
metaphysics in which the self identifies indiscriminately 
with the whole of nature, the universe, the route to this 
state being per s o n a l  mystical e nlightenment. Deep 
ecology’s treatment of particularity ,its devaluation of an 
identity tied to particular parts of the natural world as 
o p p o s e d  to the whole, the universe, reflects the 
rationalistic preoccupation with the universal and its 
account of ethical life as oppositional to the particular 
-- the analogy in human terms of impersonal love of the 
cosmos is the view of morality as based on universal 
principles or the impersonal "love of man ", identity with 
the other in a completely abstract and general form. Thus 
W a r w i c k  Fox, in his defence of deep ecology against 
ecofeminist criticism, not only ignores the excellent 
historical scholarship linking conceptions of gender,
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especially conceptions of morality in terms of the public 
and private division , to these accounts, but simply 
reiterates as if it were unproblematic the view of 
particular attachments as corrupting and as oppositional to 
genuine,impartial "identification", which necessarily falls
A Ctshort with all particulars . But concern for, and
identity based upon, special relationships with particular 
parts of nature is not an ethically suspect or inferior 
version of this universalised concern .
Rather a certain kind of embeddedness and responsibility
is only possible in • relation to particular others . It
is not this vague, bloodless and indiscriminate
cosmological concern which has generally motivated
either the passion of modern conservationists or the love
of the indigenous peoples for which deep ecology professes
respect and treats as a model* but intimate knowledge of,
strong attachment to and responsibility for particular
areas of land , and often formation of social and personal
identity based upon relationships to country as special as
those to kin . The ecological self is expressed especially
in connection to and care for particular country, not in
the detached contemplation of the abstract idea of the
cosmos suggested by some forms of eastern religion . This
set of identifying ties emerge clearly in the philosophies
of many indigenous peoples, especially in those of
Australian Aboriginal people. As Bill Neidjie of the
Gagadju people expresses it :
That tree, grass.... that all like our father.
Dirt, earth, I sleep with this earth.
Grass...just like your brother.
In my blood in my arm this grass.
This dirt for us because we'll be dead, 
we'll be going to this earth.
This the story now.
The same kind of relationship to the land emerges in the
moving words of American Indian Cecilia Blacktooth
4 8explaining why her people would not surrender their land:
We thank you for coming here to talk to us in a way we 
can understand. It is the first time anyone has done 
so. You ask us to think what place we like next best to 
this place where we always lived. You see the graveyard
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there? There are our fathers and our grandfathers. You 
see that Eag1e-ne s t mountain and that Rabbit- ho 1e 
mountain? When God made them, He gave us this place. 
We have always been here. We do not care for any other 
place...We have always lived here. We would rather die 
here. Our fathers did. We cannot leave them. Our 
children were born here - -  how can we go away? If you 
give us the best place in the world, it is not so good 
as this.... This is our home.... We cannot live any where 
else. We were born here and our fathers are buried 
here. . . We want this place and no other. . . .
There is no other place for us. We do not want you 
to buy any other place. If you will not buy this place, 
we will go into the mountains like quail, and die there, 
the old people, and the women and children. Let the 
Government be glad and proud. It can kill us. We do 
not fight. We do what it says. If we cannot live here, 
we will go into the mountains and die. We do not want 
any other home.
The suggestion that one might relate to one’s country as 
real estate , exchanging it for a strange piece when its 
immediate "resources" had been extracted, is on such a 
view as foreign and insensitive as the suggestion that one 
might exchange one’s children or other close kin for 
strangers on the ground of advantage.
The account is also in conflict with the aims of 
bioregionalism, the view that our social identities need to 
include connection and attachment to our particular 
ecological habitats, that we need to identify with, cherish 
and take responsibility for our own " country" as well as 
relating to the whole. In inferiorising such particular 
relationships, deep ecology gives us another variant on 
the superiority of reason and the inferiority of its 
contrasts, failing to grasp yet again the role of reason 
and incompletely critiquing the influence of rationalism.
But it is not necessary to adopt any of the stratagems of 
deep ecology, the indistinguishable, expanded or
260
transcended self, or the rationalistic account of ethical 
rules as functioning to contain the egoistic self, in order 
to overcome anthropocentrism, or human self-interest. This 
can be done with the relational account of self, which 
clearly recognizes the distinctness of nature but also our 
essential relationship and continuity with it. On this 
account of the ecological self, respect for nature results 
neither from the containment of self, nor a transcendence 
of self, but is an expression of self in relationship, not 
self as merged with the other but self as embedded in a 
network of essential relationships with distinct others, 
which can include all or part of nature. The feminine 
self, the related, social self and the ecological self 
emerge in opposition to the egoist account of self which 
underlies both masculinity and the market and its 
associated institutions and which has its roots in 
self/other dualism.
This view of seif-in-relationship is, I think, a good 
candidate for the richer account of self deep ecology has 
sought and which they have mistaken holistic accounts for. 
It is an account which avoids atomism but which enables a 
recognition of interdependence and relationship without 
falling into the problems of indistinguishability, and it 
also breaks the culturally - posed false dichotomy of 
egoism and altruism of interests (in the sense of altruism 
in which it means neglecting or transcending one’s own 
interests); it bypasses both masculine "separation” and 
traditional-feminine "merger" accounts of the self. It can 
also provide an appropriate foundation for an ethic of 
connectedness and caring for others and for nature.
To show that the self can be essentially related to nature 
is however by no means to show that it normally would be 
especially in western culture. What is culturally viewed 
as alien and inferior, as empty mechanism , and as not 
worthy of respect or respectful knowledge, is not something 
to which such essential connection can easily be made. 
Here the three parts of the problem of human/nature 
dualism, that of the conception of the human, that of the
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conception of the self, and that of the conception of 
nature, connect again. And normally such essential relation 
would involve particularity, through connection to and 
friendship for particular places, forests, animals, to 
which one is particularly strongly related or attached, and 
towards which one has specific and meaningful -- not merely 
abstract —  responsibilities of care.
ANTHROPOCENTRISM OR ANDROCENTRISM ?
One of the effects of viewing the problem of human-nature 
relations as arising especially in the context of 
rationalism is to provide a rich set of connections with 
other critiques; it makes the connection between the 
critique of anthropocentrism and various other critiques 
which also engage critically with rationalism, such as 
feminism and some forms of socialism, much more important, 
indeed essential to the understanding of each. This is, I 
think, one of the main points of ecofeminism. The problem 
of the western account of the human/nature relation is seen 
in the context of the other related sets of dualisms , and 
these sets are linked through their definitions as the 
underside of the various contrasts of reason. Since much 
of the strength and persistence of these dualisms derives 
from their connections and their ability to mirror, confirm 
and support one another, critiques which fail to take 
account of these connections have missed an essential and 
not merely additional feature. Anthropocentrism and 
androcentr ism in particular are linked, as we have seen, 
via the rationalist conception of the human self as 
masculine and the account of the authentically human 
characteristics as centreing around rationality and the 
exclusion of its contrasts (especially characteristics 
regarded as feminine or as animal or natural) as less 
human. This provides a different and richer context for 
the notion of anthropocentrism, conceived by deep ecology 
now in terms of the notion of equality, which is both 
excessively narrow and difficult to articulate in any 
meaningful or convincing way in the context of such
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diversity of characteristics , needs and interests as is 
found in the range of beings in nature.
The perception of the connection as at best accidental is a
feature of some recent critiques of ecofeminism, for
51example the discussion of Fox on the relation of feminism 
and environmental philosophy. Fox misses entirely the main 
thrust of the ecofeminist account of environmental
philosophy and the critique of deep ecology which 
results or which is advanced in the ecofeminist 
literature which is that it has failed to observe the
way in which anthropocentrism and androcentrisra are linked. 
It is a consequence of my arguments here that this critique 
needs broadening -- deep ecology has failed to observe 
(and often even goes out of its way to deny) connections 
with a number of other critiques, not'' just feminism for 
example but also socialism, especially in the forms which 
mount a critique of rationalism and of modernity. Fox for 
example attempts to argue for the lack of connections to 
socialism and feminism by presenting a "thought 
experiment” in which we imagine a socialist (or a feminist) 
society which is not ecologically aware or benign. This is 
not at all difficult to do , and in the case of socialism 
does not even need a thought experiment, but it shows 
little about connections, since it is compatible with each 
forming a necessary but not sufficient condition for a non- 
anthropocentric culture, or with various other connections. 
Such a "thought experiment" would only be telling if the 
connection were taken to be that feminism (or socialism) 
forms a sufficient condition for non-anthropocentrism, a 
most implausible assumption, and one which virtually no-one 
has advocated . There are many possible forms of connection 
other than this . The failure to observe such connection is 
the result of an inadequate historical analysis and 
understanding of the way in which the inferiorisation of 
both women and nature is grounded in rationalism, and the 
connections of both to the inf eriorising of the body, 
hierarchical concepts of labour, and egoist accounts of 
the self.
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Fox, ignoring this major ecofeminist argument, instead 
bases his critique on a different account of the thrust of 
ecofeminism, first taking it to involve the thesis that it 
is men and not women who have been responsible for
5 3environmental destruction, and second, following Zimmerman 
that it criticises deep ecology as concerned with 
anthropocentrism when it should be concerned instead with 
androcentrism. This account accords poorly with what is 
found in the now extensive literature. The first account 
involves again the confusion of sex and gender; men have 
been more involved in environmental destruction than women 
(and white men no doubt more than black men), but since 
men have allocated to themselves the active and controlling 
role in general and have excluded women from access to 
technology, including destructive technology, this would 
not itself show very much. But ecofeminism involves a 
thesis about masculinity and femininity, and the 
corresponding construction of humanity and nature, and only 
secondarily about men and women.
The account of ecofeminism as aiming to replace concern 
with anthropocentrism by concern with androcentrism has 
the effect of making ecofeminism a reductionist position, 
essentially a branch of those sorts of radical feminism 
which take women’s oppression as the most basic and
attempts to reduce all other forms to it. The position, as 
we have seen, has some representatives, but just as 
reductionist radical feminism cannot be taken as 
representative of feminism, so this can hardly be taken as 
representative of ecofeminism. It is essentially a 
strawwoman, and suffers from the usual problems of such 
reductionist positions. Fox is right to resist such a 
reduction and to insist on the ineliminability of the form 
of oppression the critique of anthropocentrism is 
concerned with, but the conclusion that the critiques are 
unrelated should not be allowed to follow. Critiques and 
the different kinds of oppression they correspond to can be 
distinguishable, but, like individuals, still related in 
essential and not merely accidental ways. The choice 
between merger (reductive elimination) and disconnection
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(isolation) of critiques is the same false dichotomy which 
inspires the false contrasts of holism and atomism, and of 
self as merged, lacking boundaries, versus self as isolated 
atom, lacking essential connection to others.
Of
The orientation of at least one major strand^the 
ecofeminist critique is not towards the elimination and 
subsumption of the critique of anthropocentrism, but 
towards its broadening and development. Ecofeminism offers 
a richer account of anthropocentrism and its 
connections, a richer account of environmental philosophy, 
and a richer understanding of the alternatives open in 
building a culture which respects both nature and women.
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Chapter Eight : Ecofeminism and the Death of Gender
When difference means dominance as it does with gender, 
for women to affirm d i f f e r e n c e s  is to a ffirm the 
qualities and characteristics of powerlessness. Women
may have an approach to moral reasoning, but it is an 
approach made both of what is and what is not allowed to 
be. To the extent materialism means anything at all, 
it means that what women have been and thought is what 
they have been permitted to be and think. Whatever this 
is, it is. not women’s, possessive . To treat it as if it 
were is to leap over the social world to analyse women’s 
situation as^  i_f equality , in spite of everything, 
already ineluctably existed.
Catharine A. MacKinnon,Towards a Feminist 
Theory of the State, p51.^
DUALISM, POWER AND DIFFERENCE
As Chap t e r  Two notes, the literature of e c o f e m i n i s m  
displays an important division between on the one hand, 
those positions which have been concerned with a difference 
account of gender and the affirmation of feminine values 
and characteristics in human life and culture, and on the 
other hand positions which have been largely concerned with 
an analysis of gender based on power or hierarchy and its 
application to the understanding of the dynamics of a range 
of dualisms or oppositional distinctions where one side 
excludes, d o m i n a t e s  and infe r i o r i s e s  the other. 
Ecoferainism straddles, perhaps somewhat uneasily, power 
and difference analyses of woman’s identity. It is common 
for ecof eminists to try to make use of both sorts of 
arguments , appealing for example to difference to explain 
alternatives to egoism and instrumentalism, and to the 
dualist analysis to understand the way western culture has 
treated human identity and nature , as well as the self 
/other and spirit/raatter dualisms .
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The dualisms are often seen as forming a system which
defines the structure of our personal, social and political
lives and inhibits the realisation of wholeness
within them . Such an analysis is a power rather than a
difference analysis to the extent that dualisms are seen to
be ideologies which justify and support hierarchy, and that
it shows how such power constructs identity. Thus the
gendered models of nature and reason have shaped the
identity of each and of their contrasts. The model of
women as nature has shaped both their identity and that of
men ; the model of reason as male has shaped its treatment
and that of its range of contrasts, femininity,
oemotionality , physicality, nature, and so on.
The relationship between these two approaches is usually 
unclear, the difference between them is usually not 
articulated, and many writers in the area employ both types 
of consideration in their arguments without considering 
whether they are compatible . But they are associated with 
broad types of theories -- power and difference theories -- 
which are usually treated as exclusive and competitive 
approaches. They are associated too with solutions to the 
gender problem which appear to be incompatible , the anti­
dualist approach sometimes being explicitly linked with 
androgyny and the difference approach linked with 
gynocentrism or the affirmation of the feminine. These 
linkages, I shall suggest, are suspect.
Yet some sort of affirmation of the feminine is implicit in 
the analysis of the problem in terms of dualism , for the 
absence or repression of the feminine is seen as fatally 
distorting, in the words of Rosemary Ruether "biassing all 
the development of culture in the direction of competitive 
aggressiveness rather than social cooperation ." The 
passage continues :
It is perhaps not too much to say that the Achilles’ 
heel of human civilisation, which to-day has reached 
global genocidal and ecocidal proportions, resides in 
this false development of maleness through repression of 
the female . ^
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And at the same time t the "difference" strategy of 
affirming the feminine needs to address and clarify the 
questions : which feminine? whose feminine? and how
affirmed?
Perhaps when these questions are addressed these positions 
will not turn out to be as opposed or irreconcilable as 
they are usually taken to be. I shall argue that there is 
a great deal of ambiguity in the meaning of both 
gynocentrism and androgyny, but that when they are 
understood in terms of their common interpretations, they 
are indeed incompatible but also equally in need of 
rejection. More consideration needs to be given to 
delineating and clarifying the alternatives and to a third 
set of positions which I call regendering, which combines 
elements of both positions, affirming the feminine and 
androgyny, of power and difference analyses. Both the 
affirmation of the feminine and the dualist or power 
analysis require significant qualification , and when these 
qualifications are made they are no longer inconsistent 
analyses. To put the point another way, if we understand 
the affirmation of the feminine and androgyny in certain 
ways -- which are not the usual ways -- these positions can 
be reconciled. I also consider the question of how far an 
ecofeminist stress on women’s difference and closeness to 
nature is compatible with a liberatory view of women’s 
nature and future , of how far ecofeminisra is feminist , 
and of whether there are sorts of ecofeminist arguments 
which are not .
GYNOCENTRISM AND POWER
Androgyny and gynocentrism are the two commonly and 
popularly contrasted "solutions’’ to the problem of how to 
reconstruct gender. Both are presented as alternatives to 
the androcentric status quo , which Catharine MacKinnon 
describes as follows :
Men’s physiology defines most sports, their health needs 
largely define insurance coverage, their socially
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designed biographies define workplace expectations and 
successful career patterns, their perspectives and 
concerns define quality in scholarship, their 
experiences and obsessions define merit , their military 
service defines citizenship,, their presence defines 
family, their inability to get along with each other —  
their wars and rulerships —  defines history, their 
image defines god, and their genitals define sex."  ^
And, I have argued, their identity has defined the western 
concept of human identity and the human relation to nature. 
Official gender neutrality disguises this implicit 
androcentrism, which presents the norm of human virtue by 
departure from which women are judged other. Traditionally, 
the sexes have presented two different gender ideals, and 
one of these, the masculine one, converged with the human 
ideal, the other, that of femininity, made woman an 
inferior or merely complementary human being, an exception 
or afterthought to the truly human story.
As we saw in Chapter Three, the early wave of feminism 
represented by such writers as Mary Wol1stonecraft, Harriet 
Taylor and Simone de Beauvoir, challenged the character 
ideal of femininity . The dual character ideals of 
masculinity and femininity were to be replaced by a single 
masculine model of human virtue in which women were to 
participate equally with men, and achieve full humanity 
within this masculine character ideal and its associated 
institutions. But this early wave did not challenge this 
masculine ideal or the institutions of the public sphere, 
and this first "masculinizing" wave of feminism can be 
seen as presenting a critique of femininity, or the ideal 
feminine character, and urging its replacement by 
participation by women in the masculine ideal. Hence it 
remains, to a large degree, and in this sense, 
androcentric.
The last two decades of feminism have brought challenge to 
this masculine model, and difference varieties of 
feminism have sought to affirm and reinstate "feminine" 
values, culture and characteristics seen as having been
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excluded and devalued in both social construction and 
dominant character ideals. Much ecofeminist writing has
been of the "difference" variety and called for such an 
affirmation of feminine values and styles thought to be 
less damaging to nature. The position calling for a
reinstatement of feminine values remains ambiguous between 
value androgyny —  adding the reinstated values onto 
existing masculine social values —  and value gynocentrism 
—  their replacement by feminine values and a feminine 
model of the ideal human character, as well as being 
ambiguous with respect to a variety of other options.
Gynocentrism can be seen as presenting a critique not of 
femininity, (or only to a limited extent) but of
masculinity, the masculine character and ideal, as well as 
of male power over women, and as involving a transfer of 
power and value to women or to the feminine in cultural and 
other aspects of life . According to the replacement
n
position, which I shall call the gynocentric position, if
masculine character traits and social values could be
replaced as a human ideal by the character traits and
social values of femininity many of the world’s ills would
be solved, indeed without such a replacement there is no
5future at all —  ’the future, if there is one, is female” .
Although the affirmation of the feminine is often assumed 
to amount to gynocentrism , it is better viewed as a set of 
strategies among which many distinctions are necessary and 
which only dubiously includes gynocentrism proper. To see 
this, we need to make a number of distinctions between 
kinds of gynocentrism.
In simple sex gynocentrism, women hold power in place of 
men. In cultural gynocentrism, women’s experiences form 
the basis of culture ( in some versions "female experience 
determines culture” D ). In value gynocentrism, (which may 
also be viewed as gender gynocentrism) feminine values, 
including non-dominance, replace male ones as the dominant 
ones, and the female model of the human replaces the 
dominant male one. Value gynocentrism, may on some
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interpretations but not on others , be inconsistent. 
Relations between these positions require clarification, 
and they are not necessarily consistent with one another or 
internally consistent . For example, sex gynocentrism is 
apparently not consistent with value gynocentrism, although 
may be with cultural gynocentrism depending on how this is 
elaborated. Cultural gynocentrism is supposed to be 
distinct from sex gynocentrism, but this is not so clear. 
Suppose, for example that we replace all the masculine 
pronouns in Catharine M a c K i n n o n ’s description of 
androcentrism by feminine ones. It is hard to imagine how 
such dominance could come about if women were not in power 
in the same sense that men are now and had the power to 
impose their image on the other. The result of this 
substitution reveals clearly enough that this power 
reversal is not what most of those calling for a 
reinstatement or re-integration feminine values want. The 
only conditions under which such gynocentrism would not 
involve such a power reversal would be those of separatism.
The substitution reveals the divergence between those 
positions which hold that the real problem is tfyat the 
wrong sex is in power, and those which see the problem as 
power itself, that one sex has such power to impose its 
image on the other. To the latter , not only is a such a 
gynocentrism hardly more attractive than androcentrism, but 
the result is to preserve the male power version with 
different actors, for the women involved may remain female 
in sex but have acquired the masculine gender. If power 
is the basis of gender, then there has been no real change 
at all, for the women involved have acquired the power 
which now defines men . And the result of such replacement 
is not to affirm feminine values at all, but quite the 
opposite, since to the extent that feminine values are 
those of powerlessness or are in opposition to power they 
have disappeared from the scene entirely. And the position 
confronts too here the paradox of power —  if feminine 
character and feminine values are shaped by absence of 
power, how can they become socially dominant and still 
retain their character ?
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There are many familiar examples of the situation where the 
holders of power have changed but not the fact or the 
structures of power . The third world elite which has in 
many places taken over the power structures left by 
colonialism, who ride in air-conditioned cars, work and 
live in air-conditioned buildings, speak the tongue and 
admire the culture of their former colonial masters may 
subjugate their people no less thoroughly . There are 
plenty of examples too to show us that women have no magic 
exemption from this capacity to change places with the 
oppressor. This is one obvious problem with the critical 
mass or "get enough women into power" strategy for ending 
women’s oppression.
It is principally an anarchist critique which has insisted 
that merely changing the holders of power while the 
structures of power remain intact or are reinforced —  the 
typical revolutionary scenario —  is not enough. The 
structures too must be changed, the dualisms of 
dominant/subordinate, master and slave broken . Gender 
gynocentrism , the affirmation of feminine values , is less 
liable to the simple "changing places” power objection 
raised above to sex gynocentrism , but still has to explain 
how it will deal with power.
There are many issues concerning power such a gender 
gynocentrism seems to need to clarify. For example there is 
an important ambiguity between aiming for a gender 
"liberation" in which power is not distributed along gender 
lines (which is compatible with hierarchy remaining but 
being constituted in some non-gendered way as in liberal 
f e m i n i s m ) , thus removing the gendered character of 
hierarchy, and aiming for one which involves a general 
dissolution of hierarchies, not only their gendered 
character. When is gender gynocentrism seen as preserving 
such hierarchies , and when as challenging and dissolving 
them ? Gender gynocentrism needs to meet too the objection 
that feminine values and culture which have been formed in 
subordination cannot take over a dominant social role. In
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order to meet these objections it needs to provide 
qualifications and a more detailed account of which sort of 
feminine values are to be affirmed and how. However it does 
seem clear that to the extent that the affirmation of 
feminine values provides a challenge and an alternative to 
hierarchical relationships (including those between humans 
and n a t u r e ) , and hierarchical ways of working, 
organising and structuring society, it cannot envisage a 
society which is sex-gynocentric or in which women are 
culturally dominant in the sense obtained by the 
substitution . I shall consider- below the question of 
whether such an affirmation of the feminine therefore 
requires, paradoxically, the death of gender, the 
dissolution of gender categories .
Qualified Gynocentrism
Unqualified gynocentrisra of either the sex or gender 
variety and the unqualified affirmation of the feminine are 
•difficult to maintain for a number of reasons, but 
especially because they lead to inconsistency in the 
affirmation of feminine qualities, affirming both 
traditional femininity and what replaces or opposes it. 
The critique of masculinity and of the masculine character 
of the apparently "neutral" concept of the human and of 
basic institutions of male culture, has shown the need for 
the replacement of the masculine model, but the position 
affirming the feminine is also critical of and rejects, 
like the early forms of feminism, the traditional model of 
the feminine as a model for the human. Nevertheless, 
although a traditionally feminine model is not what is 
usually called for, in the creation of the new woman (and 
new human) "crucial ingredients [ are to ] come from the
traditional strengths of women developed during the long7period of their subordination."
Qualification is difficult to avoid because it seems 
impossible not to recognise that patriarchy and the shaping 
of women to subordination has produced weaknesses in women 
as well as strengths. The problem is: how do we select
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from the traditional strengths without also selecting the 
traditional weaknesses? If we do recognise that there are 
weaknesses as well as strengths in the feminine character 
so developed, how do we know which are which? A genuinely 
sex-gynocentric model must claim that it is the association 
with women which is the basis for selection. But to assume 
that we can select women’s strengths but not weaknesses is 
to assume that there is some selection principle operating 
to select those strengths which is not simply based on 
their being women * s characteristics or women’s experience, 
or associated with women’s bodies. So the view that the 
strengths can be selected without the weaknesses is not 
available to the sex-gynocentrist. But it is available to 
the gender gynoc en t r i s t , who then has to propose some 
plausible selection criterion which will rule out, 
presumably, the traditional feminine and other femininities 
which are problematic for affirmation.
Concepts such as that of being "woman-defined” , or 
exhibiting genuine, authentic womanhood as o’pposed to a 
false version and false "colonized" consciousness produced 
by patriarchy, are sometimes introduced to try to get 
around this problem of selecting strengths but not 
weaknesses, and of selecting a "new and authentic" 
femininity rather than traditional femininity. The 
colonisation model is appealing in some ways, for example 
in its ability to explain the devaluation women themselves 
can practise against women and the feminine, but appears 
problematic in that it treats the feminine on the model of 
ethnic culture , as an independently constituted (or once- 
independently constituted) feminine nature, force or 
culture, temporarily suppressed or overwhelmed . But there 
is no good reason not to think that women have always been 
positioned within patriarchy, and that all femininity is 
constructed in that context. The treatment of the 
authentically feminine as an independent nature waiting to 
emerge and escape a distortion which has caused it not to 
recognise itself seems to exaggerate its' level of 
independent construction and discount its present social 
context .
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The approach of affirming an ideal , authentic feminine as 
if it were a reality and then making exceptions to 
affirmation in terms of the failure to realise genuine 
femininity carries certain dangers : where women do not 
seem to be so admirable or sisterly as the affirmation 
suggests they should be , women who do not conform to the 
rosy picture can be written off as "male-defined", and 
hence the thesis of feminine perfection preserved by 
trivialisation. Another problem in this approach is that 
of elitism. How is genuine femininity to be recognised ? 
Who is to say who its bearers are ? To the extent that 
qualified gender gynocentrism does not affirm all feminine 
qualities , or the determinable characteristics of actual 
women, it has to face the problem of explaining what the 
relevant feminine characteristics are, how they are 
selected and how they are associated with women, that is, 
exactly how they are feminine.
The approach of affirming a difference declared to be 
genuinely feminine in contrast to the unaffirmed qualifies 
is popular in part because it can be used to disguise the 
fact and complexity of qualification and to preserve 
gynocentric appearances; if traditional or other 
problematic femininity can be said to be not authentically 
feminine at all, it seems as if the affirmation of the 
feminine is being made without qualification . But open 
qualification on the basis of criteria which can be 
discussed and negotiated is more honest and open than 
unclear or undisclosed criteria of "authenticity" which can 
leave everyone feeling inadequate. I shall argue below 
that the appropriate set of qualifications are those which 
take account of the way in which power relationships have 
formed femininity. These also provide a meeting point with 
the power and dualist analyses.
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DUALISM, ANDROGYNY AND REGENDERING
The critique of dualism also gives rise to difficulties 
for both qualified and unqualified gynocentric positions 
affirming difference . Dualism is a conceived as a process 
which distorts both sides of what it splits apart, , the 
master and the slave , the sadist and the masochist , the 
egoist and the seif-abnegating altruist, the masculine 
and the feminine, through complementary construction. If 
this is so, clearly we cannot resolve the problem simply by 
affirming the slave’s character or culture , by giving 
power to the underside, for this character as it is is 
not an independently - constituted nature but represents an 
equal distortion and is a reflection in the dualistic 
mirror- of the master’s character and culture. If the 
feminine is the dualised other of the masculine , the anti­
dualist will see the affirmation of this dualised other as 
preserving the dualism through the affirmation of the 
characteristics of femininity , and as equally limiting 
and distorting of possibilities . Thus for example if 
women’s ’’closeness to nature” consists in or is mainly a 
product of their powerlessness in and exclusion from 
culture and from access to t e chnological means of 
separating from and mastering nature, affirmation of these 
qualities or a related set which are the products of 
powerlessness will not provide a genuine alternative but 
rather one which reactively preserves and maintains the 
dualism in the character of what is now affirmed.
The treatment of emotion as constructed by the reason / 
emotion dualism provides one sort of example . What is 
contra-indicated by the analysis of reason/eraotion dualism 
is the replacement of the affirmation of reason by the 
a f f i r m a t i o n  of e m o t i o n  as it is c o n s t r u c t e d  as. the 
dualised underside of reason, in which emotion is an 
unreflective and irrational force. There may still be a 
distinction, but emotion will not be treated as so 
unreasonable nor reason as so divorced from emotion as they 
are in the dualistic construction, nor will they be
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construed as necessarily oppositional, but as capable of a 
creative integration.
The critique of dualism can provide an approach to the
specific dualisms of mind /body, human /animal,
reason/emotion , culture /nature , masculine /feminine ,
and dominant /submissive which is systematic and structural
and not merely piecemeal, although this does not mean that
gthey will all have exactly the same resolution. Masculine 
/feminine gender difference can be seen as not only 
dualistic in character itself but as in part constructed 
out of other gendered dualisms.
For this sort of reason the critique of dualism is often 
seen as indicating the need for a complete reconstruction 
of dualised gendered character rather than the simple 
affirmation of the underside. Empowerment of the underside 
is important, but will not result in the affirmation of the 
underside as it is constructed in the dualistic context , 
but rather the affirmation of its potential for 
constructive change and development in a situation of 
empowerment. Hence the importance of the questions the 
concept of difference tends to obscure : which feminine
should we affirm, how should we affirm it , and how far do 
the characteristics to be affirmed really belong to 
women ?
The critique of dualism implies a critical and 
reconstructive approach to gender difference , which is 
often treated in positions which advocate affirming 
feminine difference as simply existing, and as being 
problematic only to the extent that it is inferiorised or 
not adequately recognised or is not authentic ^ . The
dualist critique can agree that this inferiorisation has 
occurred and the reintegration and revaluing of these 
excluded and inferiorised areas of human life is an 
important part of the dualist approach also , but they are 
not necessarily to be affirmed in their usual expression as 
or in terms of gender difference. The reconstructive 
approach does not just accept gender difference, nor does
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it treat all feminine difference as good or as expressive 
of women’s distinctive identity .
The reconstruction implied by the dualist analysis of 
gender is often taken to amount to androgyny , but I shall 
argue that androgyny , as it is normally understood, is 
just one of a set of reconstructive strategies appropriate 
to overcoming dualistic construction, and in its \isual 
meaning not the best one. I shall try to clarify these 
alternatives both within the set of reconstructive 
strategies and in the wider context of alternatives to 
androcentrism.
Several factors have facilitated confusion and 
misconception of the general set of alternatives to 
androcentrism . One is the erroneous assumption, which I
have discussed in Chapter Three 11 , that androcentrism
curvetgynocentrism exhaust the logical space, that the only A
alternative to androcentrism is gynocentrism, so that all 
arguments that involve rejection of the masculine ideal are 
assumed to imply gynocentrism. Another potent source of 
confusion however is the common equation of the regendered 
position and androgyny, which is often contrasted with 
gynocentrism as a further logical alternative. Since 
androgyny is in turn considered only to be quickly 
dismissed as seriously flawed (with good reason as we shall 
see), the confusion between the regendered position and 
androgyny appears to leave the gynocentric model as the 
sole viable rival to the androcentric model, and to leave 
no place for reconstruction strategies emerging from the 
critique of dualism . However, once androgyny and the 
other regendered strategies are clearly distinguished, this 
can no longer be assumed. In addition to androgyny , we 
need to consider among regendering strategies degendering 
and regendering . There are at least three reconstructive 
strategies then which differ in crucial but unrecognised 
respects.
Although the critique of gender dualism implies a critical 
approach to gender difference , it does not demand its
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elimination . It is important to distinguish reconstructive 
strategies which imply the death of gender difference and 
the the removal of all structure of social difference and 
meaning attached to male and female biologies and 
experience , which aim at degendering or the elimination of 
gender difference, from those which do not. In contrast
regendering is a type of reconstruction which does not 
imply giving no special significance to specifically female 
forms of experience. The terminology "degendering" 
suggests that the body is neutral and passive, devoid of 
differential social meaning, and that the subject is 
neutral, although not all those who have used the term have 
intended this meaning ^  . In contrast, regendering aims at 
a reconstruction of the social power and meanings attached 
to differently sexed bodies, which leads to power
differences which flow through and determine virtually all 
areas of social life, and which are expressed in dualistic 
gender construction as dominant/submissive. A society which 
was regendered might for example celebrate specifically 
female experience, for example menstruation, childbirth, 
menopause, whereas a degendered one would aim to obliterate 
or minimise their social significance. Both androgyny and 
degendering assume such a neutral subject and passive body 
and assume that the subject is to be identified with the 
mind and that change takes place there. This is an
important reason for preferring regendering to 
degendering, (although in fact the same points apply to 
androgyny which also assumes a neutral body) and I shall 
henceforth restrict my discussion to regendering and 
androgyny. But as we shall see there are other reasons as 
well for preferring regendering to androgyny.
13In androgyny in its usual sense , just as the androgynous 
human being of mythology combined masculine and feminine 
sex organs, so the androgynous character is taken to be 
formed by the combination of existing masculine and 
feminine traits —  or some selected subset of these -- into 
a new model of the ideal human character. It is often 
described as the combination into a single human character 
of existing good ingredients of masculine and feminine
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character. The result is people who, in terms of 
contemporary views of what is masculine and feminine, could 
be seen as part masculine and feminine, (because they have 
positive traits from both sides) , or alternatively as 
neither (because they lack the distinguishing undesirable 
traits from each side). So in its usual form androgyny 
involves both a qualified rejection and a qualified 
affirmation of existing gender categories. A number of 
further distinctions between kinds of androgyny are found 
in the literature, but it is not clear how they enable 
androgyny to escape the major objections brought against 
it.14
Androgyny enjoyed some popularity in the seventies as a 
solution to what was called "sex-role stereotyping”, the 
rigid limitation of each sex to the range of 
characteristics thought proper to it since it permits and 
even encourages "cross-gendering" i.e. the adoption of 
characteristics proper to the opposite sex. As Eisenstein 
notes androgyny appealed as a solution because the 
problem was seen as the limitati on imposed on women (and 
men) by confinement to the appropriate gender 
characteristics, not the way in which the gender 
characteristics themselves had been formed or their 
unsatisfactory nature. This view of the problem as due to 
the limitations of gender roles and not the content of the 
"roles” themselves is behind the view of the problems as 
soluble by "gender-crossing”, the deliberate breaking down 
of gender roles. With the emerging critique not just of 
the character of femininity but of the character of 
masculinity, and of the relation between them in terms of 
power, androgyny in this simple form of gender-crossing 
appears as having a certain political blandness and is no 
longer so appealing as a solution.
Androgynous individuals then are formed as a composite, by 
bringing or mixing together existing ingredients, so that 
each person is part masculine and part feminine. The new 
androgynous character is usually taken to be made up of the 
best qualities of both men and women, or the desirable
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traits in existing character ideals, to form a new set of 
the same characteristics differently allocated. Androgyny 
as an ideal is close to what is advocated by Jungian 
psychological theory (as well some positions in eastern 
thought concerning yin and yang) of the integration of 
"male" and "female" personality aspects in a single 
personality. Androgyny is compatible with a very limited 
affirmation of the feminine, (eg of "best" feminine 
qualities), but that this is a very weak sense is clear 
from the fact that it allows for affirmation in just the 
same sense of the masculine. This is not a sense then 
compatible with the affirmation of the feminine as it has 
been understood by those who have called for it.
Androgyny contrasts in these respects with other 
reconstructive strategies, degendering and regendering 
which emerge from the critique of dualism. These 
reconstructive strategies get their momentum from the 
critique of both masculinity and femininity, and of how 
they are interrelated. In contrast to androgyny, which 
seem to see the gender characteristics themselves as 
satisfactory but is dissatisfied with the limitations of 
the so-called sex role stereotyping imposed on individuals, 
especially women, these strategies are typically critical 
of both sides of the traditional gender contrasts and the 
associated set of characteristics and of the power 
relationship between them . The traditional gender 
categories are perceived as a systematic and related 
dualistic network of false choices, and the heart of the 
regendering proposal involves the transcendence or 
overcoming of these dualisms and the overcoming of the 
false choices.
For example, the traditional genders of masculinity and 
femininity basically correspond to and are a composite of a 
number of specific dualisms including dominant/ 
subordinate, rationality (objectivity) contrasted with 
emotionality, mind/nature, reason/sense-perception, 
rationality/physicality (animality), human/nature ( non­
human), public/private , production/reproduction ,
287
culture/nature, active/passive, transcendence/immanence, 
sphere of freedom /sphere of immersion in life , struggle 
with nature / not being in control, transcendence of life 
conditions /acceptance of life conditions, domination 
/subordination , egoism/altruism, disconnection from nature 
/immersion in it, being-for-self /being-for-others, self- 
realisation /nurturance, end in itself /means to others’ 
ends (instrumental). The list is of course by no means 
complete.
But these are all false contrasts, although the description 
and classification of experience in terms of them has 
written them very deeply into our culture and society, our 
view of both reality and possibility. Although their 
establishment has been the central preoccupation of western 
philosophy since its inception, there are now powerful 
independent critiques of most of these, and they can be 
seen as very much in need of healing independently of their 
connections with gender. What regendering proposes is the 
basing of a new human character ideal on the overcoming of 
these false contrasts, and hence the transcending of 
traditional gender. Transcendence can be seen as a version 
of a dialectical synthesis. Dualistic gender 
characteristics are replaced by a third set of 
characteristics usually different from either. In contrast 
an androgyny based on reallocating masculine and feminine 
characteristics retains the dualistic structure of these 
characteristics , challenging only their gender allocation.
How do regendering and androgyny deal respectively with the 
case of the dualism of altruism and egoism ? Androgyny 
would suggest that instead of a sexual division of labour 
along masculine/egoist feminine/altruist lines, each 
individual would have a combination of egoism and altruism. 
This sounds simple enough, but when we look harder at it we 
see some problems. At any one time, for any one individual 
and for any one piece of behaviour or action, egoism and 
altruism and incompatible bases for action, i.e. the same 
action by the same actor cannot both be egoistic and 
altruistic as that is usually defined -- it can’t both be
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pursued just for the actor’s sake and also for the sake of 
another, except in the lucky cases where these happily and 
accidentally coincide as in enlighted self-interest. 
Egoism and altruism are exclusive modes . How are they 
to be combined in the androgynous individual? Presumably 
only by such an individual being some times altruistic and 
sometimes egoistic; perhaps depending on which sphere 
(public'or private) he or she is dealing with. The result 
does very little to challenge the social institutions of 
public and private sphere, egoism and altruism, merely 
altering the allocation by sexual division of labour to the 
spheres.
The regendering proposal would deal with this case in a
very different way. First it would point out, the modes of
egoism and altruism are not only complementary, and unable
to function in isolation from each other, they also involve
a false choice (they are not exhaustive as supposed). As
we have seen, what the conventional choice between egoism
and a l t r u i s m  n e g l e c t s  is the third p o s s i b i l i t y  of
interdependence of interests, the case where p e o p l e ’s
interests are c o n c e i v e d  r e 1a t i o n a 11y . Where the
satisfaction of o n e ’s own interests includes that of
relevant others, the question of altruism versus egoism
does not arise, because people’s interests are not discrete
and separated in the way that the altruism/egoism contrast
assumes. Hence the e g o i s m / a 1 truism contrast is
transcended, by the creation of a further characteristic
which is different from each of the old contrasts and
1 6synthesises them, dissolves them in it.
The egoism / altruism example is a key one for political 
theory and for other linked contrasts, and it is important 
to understand too how transcending the dualisms works out 
in specific cases. Other examples of regendering via 
transcendence of false contrasts related to this one are 
supplied in feminist literature. Jessica Benjamin for 
example discusses masculine overemphasis on seif-boundaries 
and feminine merging and loss of self in the case of erotic 
domination. Jean Baker Miller argues for re-examination
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and redefinition by women of related concepts such as 
autonomy, and of power, authenticity and se 1 f'-directedness , 
to give characteristics that differ both from the 
traditionally self-denying feminine ones and also from the 
masculine ones implying non-relatedness and separation from 
others.
How does regendering meet the objections to androgyny?
Now that the differences between androgyny and regendering 
are clearer we are in a position to examine a number of 
objections that have been or can be pressed against 
androgyny, some of which were touched on at the end of 
Chapter Three, and to see how regendering fares with 
respect to them.
1. The mixing strategy of reallocating traits traditionally 
proper to one sex to the other sex ("gender-crossing " ) 
assumes that this can be done unp r ob 1 ema t i c a 1 ly despite 
different bodies. Thus it is assumed that possession of 
different bodies, and of the different experience this 
gives rise to, plays no essential role in the assignment of 
different sets of traits. It assumes in short that the 
body is neutral with respect to the development of 
different character traits, that sex and gender are 
basically unconnected except through a readily changeable 
set of conventions. This is a dualistic assumption, since 
it assumes determination of gender to proceed entirely on 
the level of consciousness
This objection seems to have some force against the 
proposal for androgyny, but it carries little weight 
against the regendering proposal. The proposal not to 
determine the ideal human character in terms of traits 
associated with one sex or the other does not imply that 
the body is neutral and plays no role in determining such 
traits or that bodily differences are irrelevant, but only 
that they do not determine gender characteristics. It is 
not sexual dif f erence, or even gender difference, as such 
which is problematic, but rather this particular
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traditional set of gender contrasts which have formed the 
basis for gender differentiation in western culture. The 
proposal to transcend or dissolve these dualistic gender 
categories does not imply then the dissolution of all 
difference, but just that set of differences which are 
produced by power differences and resulting dualistic 
construction , and which flow through most aspects of 
social life. Hence it does not assume the passivity or 
neutrality of the body, or the inevitability or 
desirability of a single identical ideal character for 
people of different sexed bodies.
The proposal for androgyny similarly seems to assume that 
the category of sex is fixed and biological, not socially 
determined but natural, in contrast to the variable, 
socially determined category of gender. But this is as 
unviable as the simple nature/culture contrast since gender 
may have bodily determinants in the different experiences 
created by different bodies, and sex may have social 
determinants.^
2. There are in many cases a complex set of relations
between the character traits which would prevent our simply
addins them tosether. For example some characteristics have
been construed or developed so as to exclude or be
incompatible with others: rationality is normally taken to
exclude emotionality for instance and partly defined by
21such exclusion. Given this situation, the androsynous
recipe of simply addins all desirable characteristics 
tosether and st irr ins will not do. A more complex story 
has to be told. Thus masculine esoism complements and 
requires feminine altruism and vice versa. Since they are 
not separately viable, we cannot just select the ”s o o d " 
traits (e . s • altruism ) and leave out the "bad" (e.s-
esoism ).
This sort of objection to androgyny obviously does not 
apply to regendering, which does not propose to add 
together existing "good" traits, but to develop new ones 
transcending the old dualisms.
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3. The next objection, which is advanced as a criticism of
androgyny by Hester Eisenstein in Contemporary Feminist 
2 3Thought , also misses its mark as a criti c i s m  of
regendering. This is that the androgyny proposal is
essentially static —  it assumes that a satisfactory or
viable set of character traits will emerge from simple
r e c o m b i n a t i o n  or a d d i t i o n  of existing masc u l i n e  and
feminine traits, whereas what is required is the creation
of new ones. To the extent that existing character traits
of each gender represent a set of false choices or have
deformed and distorted human character, androgyny will do
nothing to overcome these false choices or to forge a new
set of traits or a new approach to culture. It merely
rearranges old ingredients. But one cannot make a whole by
putting together two distorted and impoverished halves, as
2 3Rosemary Ruether and Mary Daly point out.
But this word [androgyny] is formed out of dualistic 
origins. Authentic relationship is not a relation 
between two half selves, but between whole persons, when 
s u p p r e s s i o n  and p r o j e c t i o n  cease to distort the 
encounter. We seek a new concept of relationship which 
is not c o m p e t i t i v e  or hie r a r c h i c a l  but m u t u a l l y  
enhancing.
This objection is a powerful one against androgyny. But 
regendering goes well beyond rearranging old components, 
and r e c o n c e p t u a l i s e s  the world in a way that leaves 
"masculine" , "feminine*' and the associated dualisms behind. 
The recognition of the problematic character of each 
tr a d i t i o n a l  "half" and of the false choice that it 
represents forms the motivation for the anti-dualist 
reconstruction of gender .
4. Perhaps the leading objection against androgyny is that 
noted by Hester E i s e n s t e i n  in C o n t e m p o r a r y  Feminist 
Thought and suggested by Catharine MacKinnon’s analysis, 
that it neglects the area of power and domination entirely. 
Like the talk of sex-roles itself, it suggests a model in 
which both sexes are equally limited and equally victims of 
vague "sex roles". The fact that one of those roles is
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that of master and the other slave, the fact that key 
feminine gender characteristics are in fact those of 
subordination and key characteristics of masculinity 
those of domination also disappears.
Androgyny not only treats difference as separable from 
power, and then neglects power entirely, it usually assumes 
gender symmetry, that men and women are equally placed and 
positioned in culture, that they can equally change and 
choose their identities and that these identities are 
equally and unequivocally theirs.
But men and women are positioned differently within a
culture which is male in that it systematically rewards and
values the male body and the meanings attached to it over
the female body and its meanings. And to the extent that
the meanings of w o m e n ’s bodies and r e sulting
characteristics of femininity reflect male power, they are
not theirs, so choices drawn from masculine and feminine
traits will not reflect symmetrical or equal participation
«
in the new androgynous human model . And if such relations 
of power obtain, how can the two elements simply be put 
together? Androgyny tries to adopt a neutral stance 
politically between the powerful and the powerless, the 
master and the slave. Each, it is suggested , is to be 
equally called on in the formation of the new androgyne.
Equally facile is the version of the Divided Self theory 
associated with androgyny, according to which each person 
has both male and female aspects or personalities within. 
Again, the assumption is that these "sides " to a person 
are equally available to be drawn upon by both sexes, that 
men and women have equal access to these divided realms of 
characteristics, that these gendered behaviours have the 
same significance when thus exchanged. Power relations
between them again disappear.
But it certainly is not inevitable that a reconstructive 
model be set up in this way. In contrast to the 
androgynous model, the regendering model has recognition of
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the domination/subordination relation built into it. The 
dualist analysis is a difference/power model , treating 
those aspects of difference which are shaped by power, 
where difference and power cannot be separated. The 
characteristics of the oppositional or hostile dichotomy 
are those of a gendered power structure ; discontinuity 
and the maximisation of distance follow the dynamic of 
repudiation or "spitting out”, of ejection from the self 
and denial of relatedness, while inferiorising and 
instrumenta1ising are major mechanisms of power. The 
transcendence of the dualisms regendering is concerned with 
overcoming involve the domination of the feminine side by 
the masculine side, for example traditionally rationality 
dominates and controls emotionality, which is confined and 
bursts out in "outbursts”, mind dominates and controls 
body, human controls nature, public dominates private, and 
the masculine spheres of egoism, culture, activity, 
production and transcendence are empowered in relation to 
their feminine counterparts, which are treated as 
subsidiary. Much of the momentum of the regendering model 
comes from perception of the need to move beyond the 
relation of domination/subordination incorporated in the 
dualistic structure, and the elements of dualistic 
distinctions are to be explained in terms of power, as 
Chapter Four argues.. Hence the classic model for 
transcendence, that of the master/slave dichotomy, is one 
of power and domination. Regendering can hardly be accused 
of ignoring the power dimension.
5. A connection objection (again from Hester Eisenstein)^  
is that the proposal for androgyny basically supports the 
status quo, is in no way radical. It merely proposes an 
enrichment of character traits for men by the adding on of 
intuitive, "emotional" and "nurturant" characteristics, 
without any critical engagement with masculine institutions 
or masculine character traits. For women, androgyny will 
equip them to compete in a male sphere, again without a 
critical scrutiny of the nature of that sphere.
It should be clear that this objection does not apply to
' t
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regendering at all. The regendering strategy is highly 
critical of masculinity. Clearly the proposal to transcend 
the network of dichotomies involves very radical social 
change, for example that involved in transcending the 
public and private sphere associated with masculinity and 
femininity. This involves transformation of work, the 
family, and the character of public, political and economic 
life. In fact the opposite objection seems likely to be 
raised to regendering, that it involves too much social 
change and is too utopian. I will discuss some points 
relevant to this later*
These objections together add up to formidable case against 
the proposal for androgyny as the aim of ecof eminist or 
feminist theory and practice and the associated perception 
of the problem as one of sex-role stereotyping. The 
objections leave the regendering proposal unscathed 
however.
Yet despite the important differences between androgyny and
regendering, they and other reconstructive strategies have
not been adequately distinguished in the literature, and
the weakness of androgyny is taken to establish
gynocentrism. Hester Eisenstein,^  despite having herself
presented many examples of regendering, the transcending of
masculine and feminine traits, takes all this to amount to
a case for gynocentrism, a mode of argument which is
clearly invalid once androgyny and regendering are
f 27adequately distinguished. Similarly Mary Anne Warren, 
defends a position on ’androgyny” which is close to 
regendering , but without distinguishing it from the usual 
form of androgyny. Although she advocates a form of 
transcendence of dualism , her main recommendation for 
strategy is cross-gendering, the adoption of roles 
appropriate to the opposite sex. This is a strategy which 
corresponds to androgyny but not to regendering.
The discussion above indicates not only that androgyny is 
highly problematic, but that the critique of dualism 
points much more strongly towards regendering than to
295
androgyny. Although androgyny is not compatible with the 
affirmation of the feminine in any meaningful sense, the 
question of how far regendering is compatible with such 
difference affirmation remains to be addressed.
REGENDERING AND THE AFFIRMATION OF THE FEMININE
The reconstructive approach outlined above as flowing from 
the critique of dualism seems at odds with the approach 
which bases its hopes for the future on women , their 
characters and culture, which affirms the feminine. 
Nevertheless I want to suggest that the affirmation of the 
feminine , of feminine values and characteristics , can be 
developed in ways which converge with the reconstructive 
positions and the dualist critique, and that it is 
compatible if appropriately qualified to take account of 
the dimension of power.
Ecoferainist and feminist positions have ranged all the way 
from sex - gynocentrism to positions which query whether 
the activities and qualities such as closeness to nature to 
be affirmed are w o m e n ’s at all in any good sense. 
Gynocentrism affirms a feminine nature conceived as an 
independent and distinct force or a feminine culture 
suppressed under patriarchy but ready to flower in its full 
glory once it has a chance -- rather on analogy to ethnic 
pride and the suppression of independent ethnic culture. 
The analogy as we have seen is inappropriate, and its 
maintenance requires —  paradoxically for a position 
claiming to affirm women -- repudiation of most or indeed 
honestly all women as "colonised " , the products of male 
culture. The crucial question here is one of feminine 
identity, of which feminine and whose feminine to affirm 
and how far and in what sense such qualities really belong 
to women.
Thus the defence of the gynocentric model often turns on 
the search for the authentic feminine which will satisfy 
these conditions, and attempts to mark it out from the
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sphere of the "male-defined". This corresponds to the view 
of the resolution of the master/ slave dualism in which the 
slave’s character and culture is the model for liberation. 
In contrast the dualist analysis insists that the slave’s 
(women’s, working class) characteristics are not determined 
independently but reflect, depend on and are in balance 
with those of the master, so that the attempt to base the 
new culture on the slave’s experience alone is bound to 
mirror the master’s nature and reproduce the roots of the 
problem in a new form.^ The slave’s character , this 
position might go on to suggest , is not really the slave’s 
at all , but is what the master found useful and permitted 
her to have. Thus Catharine MacKinnon writes of the 
affirmation of difference in the passage which heads this 
chapter.
But is femininity so entirely constructed by power that 
when we have rejected such construction there is nothing 
further to be extracted from it, said about it ? And are 
things really as deterministic , as closely controlled, as 
this approach claims? What is rejected here as not truly 
woman’s is the dualised feminine, the feminine identity as 
it is constructed under patriarchy as the dualistic 
opposite of the masculine identity. The dualised feminine 
is the extreme form of w o m e n ’s oppression, feminine 
identity as it would be if it were nothing but what 
patriarchy made it , were no more than what patriarchy 
wanted it to be , fantasised that it was.
But, the difference position can reply, patriarchy has been 
powerful but rarely all- powerful , and the dualised 
feminine has never been the only feminine. We have to 
recognise a greater complexity and variety of traditions 
and social forces than this . Wherever women have been able 
to resist or escape or subvert total oppression, a 
different kind of feminine has been able to emerge. There 
has often been some freedom even in the patriarchal context 
for women to create their own identities as different from 
the dualised feminine, and the devalued activities and 
sphere allocated them under patriarchy include many that 
are of great value and importance . As both the dualist
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analysis and difference theory has stressed, the exclusion 
from male character and culture of the devalued feminine 
has fatally riven that culture and set people at odds with 
the basic conditions of their existence in nature.
MacKinnon’s point is overly deterministic but nevertheless 
raises very important issues and gives a clear and pungent 
expression to the doubts some other types of feminism hold 
about ecofeminism and the affirmation of difference . And 
of course she is at least partly right —  under patriarchy 
powerlessness is both feminised and naturalised (and, as 
she notes, also eroticised ), and the female body has this 
powerlessness as one of its central social meanings. 
Hierarchies of power among males are also hierarchies of 
the less to the more feminised . Her point requires 
that careful consideration be given to the question as to 
which feminine we should affirm and how we should affirm 
it. These are complex issues , but one thing at any rate 
is clear : We cannot affirm the dualised feminine ; it is 
a reflection of our oppression . But although this 
certainly rules out the indiscriminate and unqualified 
affirmatiom adopted by extreme gynocentrism , it does not 
prevent us from drawing on either what women have done in 
the past or on certain traditional qualities and 
characteristic activities as a source of pride , identity , 
strength and hope for the future.
A recognition and discovery of these strengths is also 
central to the regendering strategy, which also recognises 
that the areas which have been assigned to women are not 
secondary or unimportant, and that the splitting off of 
these areas plus their denigration has created many of the 
problems western culture faces. Although many 
characteristics of traditional femininity, with its created 
characteristics of helplessness, passivity and dependency, 
are undesirable, women who are moving beyond traditional 
femininity may now, as Jean Baker Miller argues , be in the 
best position to reintegrate many of these divisions and to 
create a new culture and character which has neither the 
rigid and excessive self boundaries of the masculine nor
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the absence of self boundaries of the traditional 
f eminine.
MacKinnon’s approach has much in common with the 
dualistic analysis. On her view , gender difference is 
not just something that intersects with power, is not 
something constituted independently of power which 
happens to be valorised wrongly, and which could just as 
easily be valued as devalued. Gender is power, power is 
not detachable from the way it is formed. This parallels 
the way in which gender identity as described in the 
dualist analysis is formed reactively by the dualising 
process .
But the view of gender as pure power, of gender identity as 
expressive of nothing else, is too limited and results in a 
number of problems. If feminine identity is just 
constituted by power, and women’s qualities are just what 
male supremacy has foisted on women for its own advantage, 
women seeking to escape male power have no basis for an 
identity they can claim as truly their own. But this lack 
of an independent and prideful identity is precisely one of 
the conditions of powerlessness which perpetuate 
dependence on male definition. If women can only escape by 
repudiating the false feminine identity associated with 
women’s sphere and activities, they are left in a vacuum . 
They can only obtain a genuine identity by and as 
repudiating this false feminine identity, (as "liberated” 
perhaps) or else by taking on some form of masculine 
identity. Either way they can have no identity which is 
truly their own and which connects them with the past, with 
the history , struggles and being of women, and such an 
identity defined against , by repudiation of, feminine 
identity is uncomfortably close to male identity.
It seems that there is a need to make some distinction 
between those activities themselves which are typical of 
the feminine and the low status or powerlessness 
contingently attached to them or attached to them because 
of their association with women . That their power
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status is often contingent can be seen from the way the 
same activity, for example cooking, is structured as 
prestigious , powerful and creative when performed by a man 
(a chef , who is an artist rather than a drudge). The
power analysis makes it seem as if we can’t reject women’s
powerlessness without also rejecting the whole content of 
women’s lives and roles because these have been structured 
as powerless. But the point of affirming these activities 
is precisely to empower them and to empower these aspects 
of their lives and these disempowered aspects of culture. 
These have usually been disempowered and excluded by being 
treated as part of nature so this affirmation involves an 
analysis of the dualistic treatment of the nature/culture 
contrast.
And if power is the only dimension in terms of which we can
assess gender, it seems as if we can say nothing useful
about the content of gender, about the gendered division of 
labour and life activities and how this has affected 
culture , and about the way in which not only women 
themselves but also this content , these areas of human 
life taken to be feminine, have been assigned by patriarchy 
to unimportance and powerlessness. The old femininity was 
also the expression of a range of human interests, concerns 
areas of life and social orientations which cannot just be 
written off as powerlessness. Their importance is stressed 
by both the dualist and the difference analysis of 
ecofeminism , and the dualist analysis also shows us how 
this division and disempowerment has impoverished and 
distorted not just the slave but also the master .
Although powerlessness then is an important aspect of 
femininity and is not detachable from some aspects of 
difference, it is not plausible to claim that all 
difference and all qualities characteristic of women are 
the result of or are imbued with powerlessness. We really 
need to distinguish those cases where powerlessness is 
necessary to or inherent in some quality allocated to the 
feminine from those cases where it is contingent. (Not that 
the distinction is always clearcut, but in many cases it
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is.) Often a characteristic will be ambiguous in an 
interesting way ; for example "nurturance" and "empathy”, 
qualities often affirmed these days by ecofeminists , can 
mean supporting others, being receptive to their needs and 
being concerned for their growth and welfare , or it can 
mean making men feel good, bolstering masculinity and ego 
massaging , the sensitivity of the slave to the needs and 
moods of the master. The first is not necessarily a product 
of powerlessness, the second is . MacKinnon writes as if 
all the qualities and activities associated with femininity 
and difference were in the second, necessary group, and if 
this were true affirming women’s difference, their special 
qualities and characteristic life activities, would indeed 
be affirming powerlessness.
On the other hand , as we have seen , difference theory has 
largely ignored the problem of those qualities (including 
those considered positive) which are necessarily tied to 
powerlessness or which have other negative features and 
tended to proceed as if affirmation of any and every kind 
of feminine difference was in order, to idealise women’s 
qualities and sisterhood . Subordinated women for example 
were and still are encouraged to distrust, dislike and 
compete with each other for marks of male favour , and to 
undervalue both themselves and women in general. This 
situation is hardly entirely in the past and reveals the 
ideal character of many properties attributed 
unproblematically to women in difference theory . Much of 
the problem stems from the problem MacKinnon identifies, of 
writing as if women were already empowered and had moved 
out of the context of subordination which gives 
"nurturance" the second rather than the first meaning. 
This may reflect the life climate of particular fortunate 
groups of women, but hardly accurately reflects women’s 
overall social situation , and reveals the priveleged 
social context of certain kinds of difference theory 
This sort of unqualified affirmation of the feminine does 
not give enough credit to the complexity of women’s 
current situation and preserves gynocentric appearances by 
being unwilling to admit the extent to which its
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affirmations are ideal . As a result it does not recognise 
clearly enough the ambiguous political face and potential 
conservativeness of affirmed qualities such as motherhood 
and nurturance , ^
The structures of masculinity are implicated at every level 
in the domination of both women and nature , via the market 
systems of rationality , psychological structuring and the 
dynamics of personal and public life, the social structure 
of work and home, of production , consumption and the 
structure of human identity . In the attempt to base an 
alternative in women’s identity , we need to recognise that 
we are affirming what is for many women still a potential 
expression of that identity. And of course once this has 
been adequately recognised the strategy of affirming the 
feminine is much closer to a reconstructive, regendering 
strategy . Writers such as Jean Baker Miller give a 
powerful sense both of women’s problems in disempowering 
contexts and of their potential to transform themselves and 
others, without neglecting the crucial role of their social 
context which seems to be lost in much celebration of 
feminine di f f e r e n c e ^  In a situation where there are 
great differences in women’s social context , perhaps one 
of the most useful things we can do is to maintain such a 
sensitivity to the possibilities of transition , of the 
route from the subservient sort of nurturance to the 
supportive sort , from the self defined by the other and as 
a means for the other to the connected self of radical 
social potential.
RECLAIMING FEMININE IDENTITY
Are the q u a l i t i e s  the ecof eminist a r guments affirm, 
especially "closeness to nature ’’ , ones that this analysis 
suggests we can and should affirm , that is , are they in 
the category of contingent powerlessness or the category of 
necessary powerlessness ? Sometimes, as I ’ve already 
argued, they do seem to be in the last category ; to the 
extent that women’s "softer" stance with respect to nature
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depends on their exclusion from power both in human society 
and with respect to nature , their exclusion from culture , 
and from access to science and technology which provide the 
means to dominate nature , affirming this stance would 
amount to a f f i r m i n g  w o m e n ’s p o w e r 1e s s n e s s . The
affirmation of their closeness to nature in the form of 
unfreedom , their immersion in the realm of necessity and 
the body and renunciation of or lack of means of control
over their lives and choices via contraception , as
v 32expressed for example by Carol MacMillan would also be
an affirmation and celebration of their powerlessness.
This kind of ”ecofeminism" is not a kind of feminism , and
especially where such passivity is affirmed for women and
not for men is its antithesis. The affirmation of such
qualities also runs into the paradox of power discussed
above, that q u a l i t i e s  which depend n e c e s s a r i l y  upon
subordination will not survive translation to dominant
status, and hence cannot be empowered or affirmed in this
sense.
Motherhood arguments are diverse and more difficult to
classify. Some have pointed to the way in which the
disempowerment , dependency and privatisation of motherhood
maintain it as a conservative and exclusionary rather than
a radical social force, and to its potential for a wider
scope and definition in a different, less powerless social
context, where it can provide a basis for a broader type of
n u r t u r i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  dir e c t e d  to more than the
traditional child and potentially directed to nature as 
3 3well . It is more common for ecofeminist arguments,
34such as those of based on women’s character as mothers ,
to treat m o t h e r h o o d  not as p o werless but rather as 
unrealistically powerful. Motherhood is defined in ideal 
terms , overlooking its numerous oppressive manifestations 
under patriarchy to both women and children , and is
treated somewhat in the way that MacKinnon complains of , 
as if equality already existed and women took on their 
maternal projects in freedom and security. Women in some 
ecofeminist arguments remain identified primarily as 
mothers , rather than as wider beings, and the empowerment
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of women is treated as the empowerment or dominance of
3 6motherhood and the sphere of reproduction.
But the affirmation of a special relation between women and 
nature has not always or only depended on such arguments or 
their powerlessness. It does in part appeal to features 
that women have or are open to developing as a result of 
not being dominant, of not being so directly enmeshed in 
the structures of masculinity , but this is not equatable 
with powerlessness in the sense of being subordinate. The 
dissolution of power transcends the dominant / subordinate 
dualism , both the mode of the dualised masculine and that 
of the dualised feminine, and not all qualities which do 
not derive from dominance can be ascribed to subordination. 
To the extent that ecofeminist arguments focus on 
dominance features of masculinity and to the way in which 
dualised masouline identity and masculine institutions are 
damaging to nature and have resulted in an identity and 
concept of culture defined in terms of alienation from 
nature, they do not rely on women’s powerlessness, since 
the real alternative to this dominance is not subordination 
( which dualistically preserves it ) but the dissolution of 
the gender power system. And the alternative to such an 
alienated identity is not one of passive powerlessness or 
immersion in nature, but the construction of an identity 
which is both truly human and which recognises human 
continuity with and dependence on nature , and which thus 
breaks the dualism of nature and culture. Thus the dualist 
analysis is not only a power theory, but a power 
/difference theory, showing how hierarchy constructs 
dif f erence.
Ecofeminist arguments can also appeal to the areas which 
have been excluded from the earth-destroying malestream 
culture of rationality, production and consumption and 
which have occupied women’s lives as precisely those which 
are .crucial for the construction of such an identity as 
well as for the practice of an ecological lifestyle^ . The 
devaluation of the sphere of women’s activities which have 
mediated nature and taken care of reproduction , human
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relationships and affiliations and the "natural" side of 
the human being , as well as the daily and basic needs of 
people and households, is of course part and parcel of the 
devaluation both of nature itself and of what is needed to 
relate in a better way to it. But this is not to say that 
such areas should be upgraded but remain the province of 
women —  indeed it is a consequence of this kind of 
ecofeminist argument that they should not continue to be 
excluded from truly "human" identity and culture, 
remaining the province of those specially "close to 
nature", but become fully admitted and integrated as the 
province of both sexes and as a basis for an
alternative, less destructive culture . Again this type of 
argument does not depend on powerlessness.
The reintegration and re-evaluation of "woman’s sphere", in 
some of its aspects at least, can provide the basis for an 
new human identity ; for example one which is both more 
related to others and more located , incorporating in that 
identity the ties to particular places and regions which 
have been so much destroyed in modern industrial 
capitalist'societies which demand mobility of their 
workers, and which is especially lacking in the footloose 
lifestyles of male workers . This feminine definition of 
identity in relationship to place and to particular others, 
which has always been part of women’s orientation to home 
and to family , has often under patriarchy been overly 
restricted or exclusionary, and hence a politically 
conservative force . Nevertheless it contains the seeds 
of the specific ties and caring relationships which are 
essential both to an ecological and bior e g i o n a 1 ist 
consciousness and a social identity stressing relationship 
and community as the basis of political and social life, 
rather than one based on the lack of relationship to others 
that is characteristic of modern liberalism.
Once we have made this distinction between characteristics 
only contingently associated with women’s subordination in 
patriarchy and those necessarily so , and have worked out 
and felt out both individually and collectively which parts
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of the landscapes of our lives and gender identity are 
thus shaped by subordination, we are in a position to do 
what many ecofeminist arguments do , affirm selected 
traditional feminine qualities and life activities as able 
to provide at least a partial base for w o m e n ’s
contemporary identity and at the same time for an
ecological identity. Such an identity should be viewed as
a home, as an empowering base from which to view and
relate to the world , rather than as a fence around that 
world, a limitation on what women can do and be. And 
selection is important ; we cannot afford to lose sight of 
the way in which patriarchy has shaped and continues to 
shape our identities.
Such an identity can provide a degree of continuity with 
past women , but if we are to avoid the mistake MacKinnon 
points to of assuming that equality already exists, it is 
essential to recognise the ideal character of much of this 
affirmation, that what is affirmed is women as they might 
t be in a context of equality, and that it can’t just be 
assumed that all women as they are in the present context 
of inequality already have by nature all these positive 
qualities in the relevant form (the "angel in the 
ecosystem" position , assuming implicitly a fixed feminine 
nature abstracted from social c o n t e x t ) . This is to 
recognise the transformative and creative aspect of such 
an identity , that is not just passively to be inherited or 
to be discovered but also to be created and invented , 
involving active choice and forging. It is to recognise too 
its ideal element , that it represents something to which 
we might aspire and for which we might work rather than a 
state already completely realised. It is also to recognise 
that the qualities required, both of individuals and of 
culture , cannot just be those of the past, of women’s 
immersion in nature, but that a movement beyond the old 
dualistically-defined boundaries of nature and culture is 
necessary.
Adoption of these qualifications and recognition of the 
transformative social character of the affirmation of the
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feminine creates conditions for convergence between the 
regendering strategy and the critique of dualism on the 
one hand and the affirmation of feminine values on the 
other . The dualist analysis provided an account of past 
feminine identity as the product of oppression, but as well 
points forward to a strategy for moving beyond dualistic 
identity, both feminine and human. But affirmation must be 
at least partly seen , not as a reclamation of the past, 
but as involving a struggle for the emergence of these 
affirmable qualities which have continuity but not identity 
with women’s past. It suggests too that it is in the 
context of gender and social equality that the strategy of 
transcendence of dualism and the strategy of affirming the 
feminine converge. Both must involve a struggle for the 
social conditions of equality in which affirmable 
qualities can be empowered in social structure and 
transcendence of the dominance / submission dualism can 
become possible.
We can trace a path for example by which the quality of
t
altruistic self-abnegation occurring in a patriarchal 
context as part of the egoism / altruism and ends /means 
and masculine /feminine dualisms, is transformed or 
transcended in a different political or social context of 
equality into one of mutual relational selfhood. If the 
means /ends and egoism/a 11ruism relationship is
transformed into an equal and symmetrical relation, what is 
lost is the instrumental and assymmetrical character which 
required one identity , the egoist identity, to be defined 
n o n - r e 1 a t i o n a 1ly as end and the other, the altruist 
identity , to be defined entirely in relation to the end. 
Neither side of this dualism can be uni versal i sed and 
treated as viable in its own right , since each depends 
for its viability on the other, as in the case of the
identity of the master and that of the slave. What must
take their place as a universalisable identity in the 
context of equality and escape from dualism is not 
androgyny but precisely the sort of relational autonomy 
Jean Baker Miller describes . She herself explains in 
terms of many examples how the transformation from
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traditional subordinate relational identity to this kind 
of relational autonomy can occur. These are examples of 
the transformation of w o m e n ’s qualities developed in 
subordination into strengths of a different sort in a 
different context of equality, and of how they can in turn 
transform these contexts.
Baker Miller views this as the expression of the 
same qualities in a different context, ("women’s strengths
O Odeveloped in their long period of subordination" , thus 
stressing identity with women’s past) , but as she herself 
concedes in the claim that women are seeking a different 
sort of autonomy from men , they can perhaps better be 
seen, or at any rate can be a l t e r n a t i v e l y  seen, as 
different while still related and continuous. It may- not 
be the same quality as in the past , but what can be shown 
is how it has developed from and is continuous with the 
corresponding property of traditional femininity.
For example, women are to take on autonomy in contrast to 
their traditional lack of it, but in quite a new and 
different sense from masculine autonomy; she writes "Women 
are quite validly seeking something more complete than 
autonomy as it is defined for men, a fuller not a lesser 
ability to encompass relationships to others, simultaneous 
with the fullest development of oneself” . ^  But this is 
different from the ideal of traditional f e m i n i n i t y  
developed in subordination. So the contrast between self- 
realisation at the expense of others and feminine self- 
abnegation at the expense of the development of the self (a 
version of the egoism/altruism contrast) is essentially to 
be transcended in her new proposal. The proposal is 
critical of and leaves behind traditional masculinity, but 
it is just as critical and leaves behind just as much its 
old f eminine counterpart of self-abnegation . Her new 
property of relational selfhood is an analogue of the 
dualised-feminine quality of being defined by and through 
others, as a means to their ends, but it is not the same. 
It is an analogue because it is possible to show how it has 
developed from the corresponding dualised-feminine quality
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in an altered social and political context.
In a situation of continuity, we can choose to stress 
either sameness or difference, in this case with different 
theoretical consequences. Such a choice makes the 
difference between the dualist-reconstructive approach and 
the difference-based , feminine -affirming one both small 
and arbitrary , as can be seen when both are properly 
qualified . Thus affirmation stresses continuity of the 
feminine ideal with the past, and the positive value of 
what has been devalued and excluded from culture as woman’s 
sphere , while dualist critique stresses reconstruction and 
the difference between the qualities of past oppression and 
those of transcending future. Appropriately qualified they 
are complementary rather than inconsistent viewpoints, and 
the qualifications, I have argued , are needed and have 
independent virtue. Both positions illuminate the route 
beyond the dualism of dominant/subordinate, from the old 
identity of the dualised feminine to the new feminine and 
new human identity currently in the making.
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